The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission: V: The Failed December 1989 Coup: Pre-Coup Events and Battle Zone Narratives




A. Overview

This chapter deals with the events associated with thefailed December 1989 coup attempt in great detail. This overview gives the reader the broad picture, like a road map in a manner of speaking. The illustrations on page 259 show the battle sites during the December 1989 coup. The Commission hopes this will help him link one event with the others which occurred in different places at the same time.

A.1. Strategy and Planning of the Coup d’Etat

The basic assumption behind the launching of a coup is that a concerted attack conducted with speed, surprise, and surgical precision against key facilities of a government in crisis, actual or perceived, will cause its immediate collapse. Such a strategy, however, calls for the total commitment of all the coup forces at one time.

As pointed out in Chapter I, in a coup there is no opportunity to change strategy and tactics, replace weapons and men, or correct errors and omissions. The planning stage of a coup is thus of crucial importance. The strategy, the propaganda, the recruitment, the logistics, and every move necessary for the success of the coup must be set beforehand.

A.2. Pre-Coup Activities

The Commission has, therefore, included in this chapter a report on Pre-coup activities (both the rebels’ and the government’s) as gathered “rough direct testimonies, sworn statements, affidavits, exhibits, and intelligence reports. These sources indicate that by at least the first garter of 1989, an extensive conspiracy amongst the coup plotters was in motion.

The major players, ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan, BGen Edgardo Abenina, ex-BGen Jose Ma Zumel,1 and others, met frequently with BGen Alejandro Galido, who was reportedly then acting as a deep penetration agent for Gen Renato de Villa, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP). Galido also had meetings during this period with, among others, Cherry Cobarrubias, Enrique Cojuangco, and Luis Tabuena. An alliance between the RAM-HF (Honasan Faction) and the Loyalists (Zumel Group) was forged at this time. Individual efforts at recruitment, such as those conducted by Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu and other parts in the south, were taking place in various units of the Armed Forces. The activities of the government, on the other hand, consisted of monitoring the various moves of the conspirators and of taking such preventive action as was possible under the circumstances.

A.3. Execution of the Coup

A.3.a. 29 November – Tagaytay Incident

The failed December 1989 coup began inauspiciously on 29 November 1989, when a Scout Ranger team prematurely destroyed the AFP communications station in Tagaytay. This mission was not supposed to take place until 30 November, since it was meant to signal D-Day forthe 1 December coup.

Nonetheless, despite this false start, rebel ground and air forces commenced hostilities against their pre-chosen targets almost simultaneously in the late evening of 30 November and in the very early morning of 1 December. These targets, picked in accordance with the aforementioned strategic principles, were: Fort Bonifacio, Villamor Air Base (VAB) together with the Domestic and International Airports, Camp Aguinaldo, Channels 2 and 4, Sangley Point, Mactan Air Base (MAB), MalacafSang, and North and South Harbors. The Makati business district appears to have been outside the initial plan.

A.3.b. 30 November and 1 December – Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base

At about the same time that two rebel Marine companies, supported by three LVTs and two V-150s, launched an attack on VAB, three companies of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) occupied the FSRR Headquarters (HQ), surrounded and secured the Army Operations Center (AOC), almost capturing the Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CG PA) in the process, and thereafter took over the rest of Fort Bonifacio without encountering any significant resistance.

However, the rebels were unable to use the armor of the Light Armor Brigade (LABde), nor the artillery pieces of the Philippine Army Light Armor Regiment (PALAR), whose range is capable of reaching Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang, because these units remained loyal to the government.

Meanwhile, rebel Marines succeeded in entering VAB, neutralizing the 205th Helicopter Wing (205 HW) and its assets, sealing off the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force (CG PAF) on the third floor of his HQ, damaging the 205 HW HQ Building, and the Bachelor Officers’ Quarters, as well as disabling the helicopters and taking over the entire base.

A.3.c. 1 December

Domestic and International Airports

At the Manila Domestic Airport, gunfire erupted early in the morning as Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM) soldiers engaged rebel troops in defending the airport terminal. However, shortly after 5:00 a.m., the PAFSECOM personnel at the Domestic Airport were overpowered. A rebel force of about 100 men took over the Baggage Area near Terminal No. 2. Another group led by ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang and Maj Jose Gamos, composed mainly of civilians and Guardians, occupied the main Terminal Building where defending PAFSECOM personnel were herded into a room inside the Terminal Building.

At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), a PAFSECOM Battle Staff was established which ordered Runways 06-24 and 13-31 barricaded with firetrucks and baggage containers to prevent their use. However, rebel forces made no attempt to capture it. By 2:30 p.m., rebel forces led by Gamos and Tugbang left the Domestic Airport and moved to the vicinity of Quirino Avenue and Coastal Road.

Coastal Road

The Gamos-Tugbang-led rebel troops were blocked by a unit of the South Sector Capital Command (CAPCOM) who were deployed at the vicinity of Coastal Road corner MIA Road. A firefight ensued when the Wockingforce refused to join the rebels. At around 5:00 p.m., troops from theMetropolitan Police Field Force (MPFF) arrived to assist the blocking force, causing the group of Gamos-Tugbang to withdraw shortly after.

Camp Aguinaldo

At Camp Aguinaldo, the AFP Logistics Command (LOGCOM) under Commo Domingo Calajate declared their open support for the rebels at about 8:00 a.m., occupying the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Building by force. The LOGCOM rebels backed off, however, and returned to their compound when confronted by BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who was supported by the 72nd Infantry Battalion (72 IB) under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan. Thereafter, the 2nd Infantry Division (2 ID) under the command of BGen Javier Carbonell, supported by five armor vehicles, launched an attack against LOGCOM. After a firefight, LOGCOM surrendered.

The following reinforcements arrived to defend Camp Aguinaldo:

1. 72 IB at 7:40 a.m.;

2. 701st Infantry Brigade (701 Bde) of 7 ID at 8:10 a.m., along with other elements of the 72 IB, a total of 260 men;

3. 2 ID at 11:30 a.m., a strength of 826 men;

4. AFP Training Command (TRACOM) at 11:46 a.m., a strength of 345 men;

5. RECOM 3 at 5:27 p.m.;

6. 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) of NCRDC at 7:05 p.m.; and

7. On the following morning at 3:30 a.m., the 202 Bde and the 203 Bde.


Before dawn, some of the rebel Marines, who took over VAB, proceeded to ABS-CBN and PTV-4 compounds in Quezon City and easily occupied the government television station PTV-4, since the security platoon assigned there withdrew in the face of superior forces. At around 2:00 p.m., a group of civilians, led by Rafael Recto, arrived and entered the PTV-4 premises ostensibly to look for his daughter Plinky who works at ABS-CBN. However, Recto was overheard to say that he was thereto attend a press conference. Lito Gorospe, who was inside the ABS-CBN area at that time, allegedly intended to air some messages, but since the management of ABS-CBN and PTV-4 had disabled the transmitters, none of these events took place.

Mactan Air Base

BGen Jose Comendador, the Commander of the 2nd Air Division, took parallel action in MAB by assuming control of the base, and while initially not declaring his position, he later took the rebel side. Army troops from Mindanao composed of elements from the 23 IB and 30 IB joined Comendador later that day, and secured MAB for the rebels.

Sangley Point

With the use of minimal force, the rebels took control of Sangley Point. At 12:30 a.m., two 6 x 6 trucks loaded with rebel soldiers in full battle gear disarmed the guards manning the main gate. The rebels then successively took over the flight line and the government air assets, then isolated the Wing Commander of the 15th Strike Wing (15 SW) in his HQ. The same action was taking place on the naval side of the base. The rebels equally restricted the Commander of the Philippine Fleet to his HQ, after failing to convince him to join them, and then proceeded to occupy several units of the Philippine Fleet Headquarters.

However, by around 1:00 p.m., the rebel air assets were destroyed by the government F-5s. By mid-afternoon, combined elements of Cavite, Laguna, and Batangas Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (PC/INP) Commands launched an attack which eventually resulted in the retaking of Sangley. Also, the two rebel battalions of the 68 IB and 24 IB which had earlier arrived from Bataan aboard a fishing vessel were permitted to return to their home base. Thus, by early evening of 1 December, Sangley Point was back in government hands.

Malacañang and Sta Mesa

At around 6:25 a.m., three T-28s (Tora-Tora), manned by rebel pilots and assisted by a British Norman Islander acting as a forward air controller, took offfrom Sangley Air Base. They conducted bombing and strafing runs over the Malacanang complex. Although two F-5 fighter jets from Basa Air Base were scrambled to intercept the Tora-Toras, no dogfight occurred.

Meanwhile, rebel soldiers mostly in civilian clothes, blocked certain approaches leading to Malacañang to prevent it from being reinforced. However, a Task Force’ comPosed of the Presidential Security Group  (PSG) and Manila police personnel, augmented by seven armor infantry fighting vehicles, assaulted rebel positions in and around the Sta Mesa district. At about 7:00 p.m., this area was cleared of rebel soldiers by the Task Force.

North and South Harbors

By 3:00 a.m. RAM-HF forces with some Customs personnel, led by ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, had control of the main entrances and exits of the North and South Harbors, and occupied key buildings in both areas.

The Zaragoza Gate (Gate 1) and Moriones Gate (Gate 2) of North Harbor were barricaded with container vans and cargo trucks by heavily armed rebels. The same thing happened at Gate 3 of the South Harbor. Personnel at the Coast Guard Station located at the North Harbor were disarmed and the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) office there was made the headquarters of the rebels. At the South Harbor, the rebels occupied the Customs Police Station and raided the Enforcement and Security Services (ESS) HQ, while disarming the personnel on duly, and carting away guns and goods of various sorts.

However, in the late afternoon, RAM-HF soldiers around the PPA Police Station area started dispersing and leaving. By earlyevening, the Coast Guard had cleared the North Harbor of some more rebel soldiers.

A.3.d. 2 December

North and South Harbors

Early in the morning, rebel troopers abandoned the area around the ESS HQ and regrouped by the building where the Office of the Commissioner of Customs is located. Elements of the CAPCOM and Western Pohce District (WPD) were poised to attack the rebels, waiting only for reinforcements, when two CAPCOM cars unexpectedly entered Port Area through Gate 1 with full sirens blaring. Alerted, rebel soldiers withdrew through Gate 6. By early afternoon, the North and South Harbors were clear of rebel soldiers.

Fort Bonifacio and Makati

By midmorning, Scout Rangers began abandoning their strong holds in Fort Bonifacio and brought their firearms, mortar tubesm and Howitzer guns to Gates 1 and 2. The Philippine Army Communications Center (PACOMCEN) and AOC were abandoned by rebel troops as they started consolidating near Gate 2 and the Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA) Grandstand. An attempt to negotiate the surrender of the Scout Rangers occurred at this point but when it failed, most of the rebel forces moved out of Fort Bonifacio for the Makati business district.

Upon reaching Makati, the rebel Scout Rangers occupied some 22 high-rise buildings in the Ayala business area. Snipers were deployed at the rooftops of strategically located buildings, supported by maneuvering forces on the ground. In response, the government organized a Task Force Makati, composed initially of elements from CAPCOM and the PC from Laguna and Batangas, to block off escape routes and eventually to retake Makati.

At this time and for some days thereafter, intermittent en-counters took place and sniper shots were exchanged between the rebels and government forces.


Government forces attacked in the early morning, and after a two-hour resistance, rebel soldiers withdrew from the PTV-4 station and joined their comrades near Camp Aguinaldo.

Camp Aguinaldo and BGen Blando

The rebel Marine forces, which came from VAB and PTV-4, utilizing LVTs and V-150s, commenced their attack on Camp Aguinaldo, alternating between Gates 1, 2, and 3. However, government troops held on to their defensive positions. Meanwhile, the rebels situated by the Mormon Church at White Plains were being subjected to frequent air strikes. No significant inroads were made by the rebels on this day.

In the morning, BGen Marcelo Blando’s forces, composed of two infantry battalions of the 7 ID plus one Scout Ranger company from Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, reached Metro Manila and, instead of proceeding to Camp Aguinaldo, positioned themselves at the Greenhills Commercial Center in front of Unimart. After pretending all the while to be on the government side, Blando finally declared himself for the rebels. Fortunately, his two infantry battalions refused to commit outright and to fight the govemment forces in Camp Aguinaldo, eventually causing Blando to surrender the following day, 3 December. However, the company of Scout Rangers detached themselves and attacked Camp Aguinaldo through Gate 4.

Mactan Air Base

The pilots in MAB, under the leadership of Lt Col Antonio Anciano, Commander, 208th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, escaped from the base and proceeded to the Visayas Command (VISCOM) HQ in Cebu City. Thus, BGen Comendador was left with airplanes but no pilots to fly them. Both BGen Renato Palma, Commander VISCOM, and BGen Cesar Go contacted Comendador and tried to convince him to give up, The latter refused to surrender, and threatened that should government forces attack Mactan, he would blow up the aircrafts in the base, particularly the two 747s belonging to Philippine Airlines (PAL).

A.3.e. 3 December – Camp Aguinaldo

From 1:30 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., the battle of Camp Aguinaldo raged in earnest.

Rebel forces, coming from the White Plains area, initiated combined artillery and mortar attacks. Backed by Marine LVTs and other armor vehicles, ground assaults were launched in the northern vicinity (Gate 1 of Camp Aguinaldo and Main Gate of LOGCOM), as well as the eastern vicinity (LOGCOM perimeter). But loyal troops repulsed the attacks using artillery, mortar, and recoilless rifles, which disabled the enemy’s armor. A rebel V-150 was destroyed, while an LVT was totally burned and partially blocked Gate 1.

Meanwhile, some rebel Marines led by Maj Cesar de la Pefia infiltrated Camp Aguinaldo but government defenders were able to isolate them at the General Headquarters (GHQ) Dispensary and St Ignatius Chapel. After a brief firefight, the rebels surrendered.

Later, at about 6:30 a.m., the rest of the attacking rebel forces under Lt Col Romelino Gojo PN, Operations Officer, Philippine Marines, withdrew towards White Plains but were subjected to continuous air strikes by PAF F-5 jets and Sikorsky helicopter gunships. Enemy forces then dispersed and finally withdrew from the camp’s vicinity. At 7:00 a.m., rebel remnants and their armor located near the Mormon Church at Katipunan Avenue were bombed by government jets. Elements of the 2 ID then cleared the area of all rebel resistance and secured it against possible counter-attacks.

A.3.f. 4 to 9 December – Makati and Mactan Air Base

In Makati and Mactan, the period between 4 to 9 December was spent with both sides intermittently threatening, posturing, fighting or negotiating. Finally, by 2:30 a.m. of 6 December as a result of the negotiations led by BGen Arturo Enrile, Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), with the rebels, a ceasefire was declared, culminating later in the morning in the departure of foreign tourists and apartment dwellers from the rebel-occupied Makati area. On 7 December, at around 9:00 a.m., the rebels ended their occupation of the commercial district of Makati and marched back to their barracks at Fort Bonifacio. Mactan followed suit on 9 December when the rebels, headed by BGen Comendador, formally surrendered to BGen Palma in the middle of Mandaue Bridge.

A.3.g. 1 to 2 December – Air Strikes

Rebel Air Strikes

In the morning of 1 December, the rebels, using air assets captured at Sangley, conducted the following sorties:

1. 6:25 a.m.: Three Tora-Toras bombed and strafed Malacanang complex;

2. 7:00 a.m.: Two Tora-Toras strafed government troops in the vicinity of PTV-4;

3. 8:00 a.m.: A Sikorsky strafed government forces around PTV-4;

4. 9:00  a.m.: Two Tora-Tora planes augmented a Sikorsky in bombing Camp Crame resulting in the burning of the PC HQ;

5. 9:45 a.m.: Tora-Tora planes dropped four bombs hitting Gen de Villa’s quarters; and

6. 10:00 a.m.: A Sikorsky hit Camp Aguinaldo twice.

Government Air Strikes

On the other hand, government aircraft made the following strikes:

1. 7:00 a.m., 1 December: Two F-5s scrambled to intercept three Tora-Toras but no dogfight occurred;

2. 7:30 a.m., 1 December: An F-5 took off to intercept two Tora-Toras;

3. 9:45 a.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky fired at rebel forces at LOGCOM;

4. 10:00 a.m., 1 December: Three F-5s fired rockets at the sea waters adjacent to the runway at Sangley;

5. 11:45 a.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky struck at rebel positions at LOGCOM;

6. 12:45 p.m., 1 December: An F-5 piloted by Maj Danilo Atienza took off to attack Sangley, and destroyed the rebel planes and the fuel dump;

7. 12:49 p.m., 1 December: Two F-5s took off to attack Sangley and fired cannons, strafed the airfield, and bombed the hangar;

8. 1:00 p.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky made three air strikes at rebel positions in White Plains;

9. 3:20 p.m., 1 December: Two Sikorskys struck at White Plains;

10. 6:00 a.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky and an F-5 struck at White Plains;

11. 6:15 a.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky made three air strikes at White Plains;

12. 6:45 a.m., 2 December: Two F-5s made two air strikes at the Katipunan-White Plains area and the 202 Bde was hit by mistake;

13. 7:00 a.m./7:15a.m., 2 December: Two F-5s dropped bombs over Libis area;

14. 10:00 a.m., 2 December: Two Sikorsky helicopters made two air strikes each over the next seven hours at White Plains; and

15. 3:00 p.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky struck at White Plains. Other air missions after 2 December are no longer listed.

A.3.h. 1 to 7 December – Other Hostile Acts In the Provinces

While Metro Manila was under seige by various rebel forces, the following incidents took place in Regions I, II, IV, V, VI, X, and XI.

1 December

1. Twelve soldiers in the Cordillera region entered a local radio station and insisted in broadcasting their support for the rebels.

2. Rebel Scout Rangers took over Legaspi City Domestic Airport. However, after lengthy negotiations, they ended their occupation of the airport and were escorted back to Camp Bagong Ibalon.

3. Elements of 253rd PC Company left Sorsogon in two buses for Manila but were stopped in Camarines Norte where the Provincial Commander convinced them to return to Camp Escudero, Sorsogon.

4. Two hundred men from 339th PC Company gathered at Bacolod Airport waiting for a PAF C-130 to fly them to Manila. When the airplane did not arrive and subsequent efforts to use a shipping vessel at a nearby wharf failed, they were persuaded by the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental to return to their camp.

5. Lt Emil Ong, Team Leader, 7th Riverine Assault Company, wrote BGen Raymundo Jarque, Commander Negros Island Command, offering to resign because he was disappointed with the AFP. Later, Ong with four men from his company attempted to use the Pulupandan Port but was refused entrance by the security guard at the gate.

6. A group of junior pilots at Fernando Air Base wanted to fly an SP-260 aircraft and conduct persuasion flights over Manila in support of the coup. Col Hector Tarrazona, Director for Operations, 100th Training Wing, was instructed by WingCommander Col Felipe Abando to persuade the pilots not to do so. While the meeting was going on, Col Abando ordered the maintenance officer of the 443rd Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron to disable the aircrafts.

7. Cagayan Gov Rodolfo Aguinaldo went on the air over DZRH in the morning, declaring support for the coup. Five hundred of his men attempted to reach Manila but were blocked in Nueva Ecija.

2 December

1. An officer of the HQ Service Company, PC TRACOM, at Silang, Cavite displayed a banner expressing support for the RAM-HF.

2. Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, Davao del Norte PC/INP Provincial Commander, with a group of 30 officers sought guidance from BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, RECOM 11 Commander. They wanted to issue a manifesto in favor of the rebels. He dissuaded them from doing so; but an unsigned manifesto was circulated just the same.

3 December

1. Elements of the 56 IB based in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija left for Manila but were stopped in Pampanga.

2. Before an assembly of officers and men of PC TRACOM, Superintendent Col Renato Motus issued a manifesto expressing support for the rebel cause.

3. Capt Gregory Ramos, Commanding Officer (CO), Alpha Coy, 2nd Light Armor Battalion (2 LAB) LABde, with 20 of his men and five armor vehicles left his station at Tuburan, Mawab, Davao del Norte to secure the Davao City Airport in a show of sympathy for the rebel cause. They encountered a roadblock at Barangay Sasa, Davao City. They were eventually brought to BGen Baccay by Col Danilo Olay, and after a lengthy dialogue, Capt Ramos and his men returned to their camp.

4. Six truckloads of rebel soldiers from 30 IB led by Lt Generoso Bolina boarded MV Nasipit Princess in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte bound for Cebu. However, the vessel was unable to depart due to the absence of the ship’s captain.

7 December

Forty officers of the 4 ID at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro, led by Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera, sought a meeting with their Commanding General to air their grievances, among which seems to have been their objection to the participation of the US Phantom jets. However, they were made to resign before their Commanding General would dialogue with them. It appears that their resignations were not accepted.

With the foregoing overview as a background, a detailed narrative of significant pre-coup events and of each battle zone follows.

B. Pre-Coup Events

B.1. Activities of Major Coup Plotters

The conspiracy and planning which took place prior to the coup is best unraveled by recounting the activities, as gathered by the Commission, of some of the major coup plotters and their supporters and sympathizers. Some of their activities were made public for the first time in the now famous “Galido Expose” which disclosed the alliance between the forces of Honasan and Zumel through the efforts of Abenina, as well as the role which the military coup plotters wanted to give some civilian political leaders of the opposition.

B.1.a. Honasan, Abenina, Zumel

Playing his role as a “deep penetration agent” for the CSAFP,2 BGen Alejandro Galido,3 CG Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM), instructed his security officer, Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, to find a way to get in touch with the group of Honasan. Honasan escaped from detention on board BRP Andres Bonifacio while it anchored off Manila Bay on 2 April 1988.4

Initially, Mapalo could not establish the desired contact, despite his getting in touch with his former classmates, Capt Ed Oban and LtSG Alex Pama. However, after meeting Lt Col Marcelino Malajacan, Mapalo was able to attend a meeting somewhere in Cavalier’s Village, Antipolo, Rizal. This meeting was attended by Col Anselmo Avenido, Lt Col Rodolfo Tor, Lt Col Malajacan, ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, Cmdr Bernardo Patino, and others who Mapalo could not identify. On this occasion arrangements were discussed for a future meeting between Galido and Abenina. Also, Mapalo was apprised of the objective of the movement which was purportedly for reform and to establish a civilian-military junta to consist of Abenina, Zumel, Honasan, and Galido (if he joined the movement), together with some civilians who are non-traditional politicians.5

In January 1989, Enrique “Henry” Cojuangco, younger brother of Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, Jr, picked up Galido in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and brought the latter to a parking place in the Makati Commercial Center where Galido met Honasan in a van. They (Galido and Honasan) talked while the van cruised along the South Expressway. Honasan asked Galido’s support for a planned destabilization to be launched in March 1989.6 Later, Galido confided to BGen Raul Aquino, CG 2 ID, the fact of the meeting without disclosing its subject matter. Galido also revealed that during the August 1987 failed coup attempt, he had an overseas phone conversation with ex-President Marcos, and kept the latter informed about the progress of the attempt.7

Meanwhile, on 5 June 1989, the office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2) received information on an alliance forged between the Zumel and Honasan groups for a destabilization attempt to be staged during the first or second week of June 1989.

In July 1989, Galido had a meeting at the Manila Garden Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila — arranged by one Cesar Lopez — with a certain Harold Magleo (or Maglio, as in some news reports), who claimed he was a colonel with the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).8 Magleo informed Galido that the DIA favors the overthrow of President Corazon C. Aquino and the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. According to Col Juan Mamorno, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer SOLCOM, Galido commented after the meeting that he doubted that Magleo was a colonel because he did not behave in a military manner.9

In a press statement issued on 3 April 1990, the US Embassy in Manila confirmed that Magleo met Galido once, sometime in April 1989 (not July 1989 as Mapalo testified), but denied that Magleo was ever a colonel in the US Air Force or that he was in any way connected with the DIA. The Embassy also said Magleo is employed at the Norton Air Base in California and was vacationing in the Philippines as a private individual.10

On 2 August 1939, Galido, Abenina, and Malajacan met at a house in Kamuning, Quezon City.11 Abenina tried to convince Galido to join the group planning the coup12 and suggested that destabilization activities be undertaken, citing Malacanang and VAB as targets, and President Aquino, Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, and Gen de Villa as persons to be assassinated.13

Abenina also gave Galido a series of documents regarding the creation of a new Government Council to be composed of military officers, namely, BGens Abenina, Artemio Tadiar, and Zumel, as well as Honasan, and three unnamed civilians. Abenina then tried to convince Galido that he should be the seventh man in the Council, in lieu of Honasan who was viewed as “so junior”.14 In his testimony before the Commission, BGen Tadiar, Deputy Commander, Subic Naval Base Command (SUBCOM), denied any knowledge about his proposed membership in the Council.15

In the same meeting, Abenina briefed Galido on the military officers joining the coup, namely: Col Avenido, Secretary, Head-quarters, Philippine Constabulary Staff; Lt Col Gojo, Cmdr Patino of SUBCOM, reportedly representing BGen Tadiar; Col Mamorno, Maj Artemio Gamayo of 16 IB in Magdalena, Laguna; Lt Col Renato Jamora of 42 IB in Catamayan, Quezon; Lt Col Ramon Garcia in Pamplona, Camarines Sur; Col Victor Mayo of 49 IB; and Col Edgardo Espinosa PN (M). Abenina further claims that BGen Blando, CG 7 ID, and BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant, Philippine Marines (PMAR), were supporters of the planned coup.16 It is possible that these officers mentioned were not necessarily supporters of the coup, but dropping names of “credible” officers is a classic strategy in planning for a coup, as mentioned in Chapter I.

Galido asserted that, according to Abenina, the following officers hadbeen assigned to make destabilization tactical plans: Lt Cols Avenido, Gojo, and Malajacan, Cmdr Patino, and Col. Mamorno.17

Abenina also informed Galido that, for the planned coup, funds and logistics would be provided by Cesar Lopez and Cherry Cobarrubias. Tadiar testified that Cobarrubias was a close friend of the Marcoses.18 According to Patino, she regularly dealt with the Navy, selling various Applies.19 Lopez’s role was supposedly to extend support in terms of transportation. Cobarrubias, on the other hand, promised to give between P2 million and P4 million once the final plan for execution was completed. She is also supposed to have relayed the promise of Imelda Marcos to give Galido “ten million” pesos within 24 hours after the “rival of Mrs Marcos and her family in the Philippines.20

In his testimony before the Commission on 15 June 1990, Luis Tabuena, manager of the Manila International Airport during the Marcos regime, confirmed that Cobarrubias is close to the Marcoses. She arranged his meeting with Galido at a room at the Mandarin Hotel on 6 September 1989; she likewise arranged for the long distance conversation between Galido and Imelda Marcos the day before.

Tadiar, meanwhile, testified before the Commission that atameeting with Galido in June or July 198921 or July or August 1989 at a house in Times St, Quezon City, he (Tadiar) was surprised to see Cobarrubias whom he last met in Malacanang in 1986. She was with a man who was introduced to Tadiar as one Mr Lopez. Actually, this Lopez is Cesar Lopez, another close associate of former President Marcos and the “Liaison of Marcos with the loyalist forces.”22

In a letter received by the Commission on 10 August 1990,23 Cobarrubias is described as a coup operator or coup financier tied to the Zaldivia-Aguas front whose dealings link Mrs Marcos to the coup plotters. Diane Aguas admitted that Cobarrubias is a friend of her former live-in partner, who originally introduced himself to her as Kit Santiago. Santiago later became known as Capt Francisco de la Pefla, and later still, when he “died” on 5 August 1989, as Franco Sanchijo.24 Sanchijo’s “death” is surrounded by suspicious circumstances.

Evidence obtained by the Commission further discloses that on 29 November 1989, Cherry Cobarrubias (under the name Serafia C. Cobarrubias) checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel.25 She checked out on 2 December 1989.

In his sworn statement dated 19 January 1990,26 Galido stated that Col Avenido, according to Abenina, was a member of the planninggroup; that Col Espinosa had promised to support the coup with two Marine battalions assigned in Bulacan; and that Lt Col Gojo would take care of getting all the Marines in Fort Bonifacio to join the rebel forces. Galido further said that he ordered Col Mamorno to join the planning group as his (Galido’s) means to monitor the group’s plans.

On 12 August 1989, Rico Mendoza, representing himself as a close friend of exiled Danding Cojuangco, met Galido in the Quezon City residence of a certain Rafael Ayoste, a businessman from Lucena City. Mendoza purportedly relayed Cojuangco’s wish to return to the Philippines and support a takeover of the government.27

From August to October 1989, on Galido’s verbal instructions, Mamorno attended four meetings of a certain group. The first two of these meetings were held in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, in theresidence of a certain Medardo Pestano, reportedly an uncommissioned PMA ’72 graduate. The latter fetched Mamorno at the parking area of the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati for these meetings. Present in the first meeting were Avenido, Pestano, Tor and a PAF officer whose name Mamomo could not recall.28 In attendance during the second meeting were Avenido, Pestano, Tor and one Col “Joe” Espinosa of the Philippine Marines (Mamorno knows Espinosa by his nickname “Joe” but was uncertain if “Jose” is the former’s correct first name. He is sure, however, that Espinosa belongs to the Marines).29

The next two meetings were held in the residence, either in Marikina or Antipolo, of a certain “Tor”, introduced to Mamorno as a PC officer. On those meetings, Malajacan, Tor, Avenido and Pestano were present. The group asked Mamorno to commit SOLCOM forces for the coup; however, he consistently replied that he would refer the matter to his commander.30

Galido further said in his affidavit that Luis Tabuena received P5 million, evidently from the Marcoses, of which P2 million would be for Zumel and P3 million for Galido. It was BGen Luther Custodio who informed him (Galido) about the money during a family reunion on 2 September 1989 at the residence of Rico Mendoza in San Fernando, Pampanga. This affair was also attended by Henry Cojuangco and Baby Asistio. Galido then asked Capt Mapalo to contact Cobarrubias to inform Tabuena that he would like to talk to him. His meeting with Tabuena eventually took place in a room at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati on 6 September.31

According to Tabuena, he was contacted by Cobarrubias at the 365 Club of Hotel Intercontinental, informing him that Galido would like to see him. It was Cobarrubias who arranged the 6 September meeting at the Mandarin and when he arrived there at 2:00 p.m., Cobarrubias and Galido were already there. In the presence of Cobarrubias, Galido asked Tabuena about the delivery of the money to Zumel. Tabuena denied navingknown about it, while Cobarrubias did not say anything. According to Tabuena, Zumel was the Military Supervisor of the Manila International Airport for two years when Tabuena was its General Manager.32

Gahdo and Cobarrubias had been at the Mandarin Hotel since 5 September. According to Galido, in the eveningof said date, Cobarrubias arranged a long distance call for him with Imelda Marcos who asked him (Galido) to hasten the plan to destabilize the government through a coup that the Marcoses could return to the Philippines and help the new Government. Mrs Marcos further expressed her willingness to support the activity financially, however, at that moment she was hard up. She promised to provide support within 24 hours following her arrival in the Philippines.33

Tabuena admitted that he had known Mrs Marcos since college days when he played basketball and she used to watch the NCAA games. A year after the Marcoses left the Philippines, Mrs Marcos used to call him once or twice every two weeks; as a matter of fact, two weeks before he gave his testimony to the Commission, Mrs Marcos had called him. She also called him before the December coup to ask what was going on and also after the coup to inquire how many were killed.

Ten days after that Mandarin Hotel meeting, he met Cobarrubias at the Intercontinental Hotel and confronted her: “O iyon lang pala ang tatanungin mo sa akin, eh, hindi mo pa sinasabi sa akin?” She answered that she did not know what Galido wanted to take up with him. Tabuena, however, admitted that he was of the impression that what Galido wanted to take up with him was secret, but that Cobarrubias knew what it was about. He did not confront Galido as to why the latter insinuated that he (Tabuena) may have misappropriated the money nor did he inquire as to the source of the money. When he obtained a copy of Galido’s affidavit implicating him, it did not occur to him to communicate with Galido or to try to see Cobarrubias.34

Tabuena confirmed that Cobarrubias resides abroad and travels a lot to the Philippines, often passing through Honolulu where she has a travel agency. She told him that she visited the Marcoses in Honolulu. He used to see Cobarrubias at least twice a month; however, since after the December 1989 coup when she was implicated, he has not seen her.

Other Meetings of BGen Galido

On 14 November 1989, Galido, Zumel, Abenina and Honasan met to discuss a coup slated to be staged before Christmas. On the way to the meeting, Galido rode in a car with Abenina and Atty Homobono Adaza.35 Also present at the meeting were Avenido and Tor, both of whom were implicated in the 28 August 1987 failed coup. This meeting was allegedly held either in San Francisco del Monte,36 or Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora37, both in Quezon City.

In Camp Aguinaldo at about 2:00 p.m., 30 November, Galido received a note from Abenina stating that H-Hour for the coup would be at 3:00 a.m. of 1 December, and for Galido to bring all his SOLCOM forces to support the rebel forces in the National Capital Region (NCR). Galido said he was annoyed at this unexpected change of date for launching the coup, since the original date mentioned by Abenina was 8 December. Upon being contacted by Galido for an explanation, Abenina said that he was just notified of the change by Honasan and that he (Abenina) had no control over the matter, since RAM-HF was calling the shots.38

That evening, during the Command Conference called by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo, Galido briefed the officers on the different coup countersigns (white-day 1, pink-day 2, red-day 3, and again, white-day 4, pink-day 5, red-day 6, they had plans for six days) as disclosed to him by Abenina.39 After the Command Conference, Galido met Abenina somewhere in the Araneta complex in Cubao during which time Abenina kept urging Galido to support the coup despite the change of date and time, or at least to remain neutral. Galido claimed he turned down both propositions.40 On the following day, Abenina telephoned Galido almost everyhour trying to convince him to support the coup. As an inducement, he allegedly offered Galido the initial position of Commanding General of the Philippine Army and eventually that of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, if the coup succeeded.41

Other coup leaders played the following roles during this period: Commo Domingo Calajate at the LOGCOM; Col Alexander Noble in Agusan del Sur and Metro Manila; ex-Lt Col Bibit and Lt Col Victor Batac, in Quezon City and Holiday Inn, Manila; Lt Rasco in Quezon Province, and Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu City.

B.1.b. Calajate

On 26 November, after the flag ceremony in Camp Aguinaldo, a conference was held at the AFP LOGCOM at which all officers were informed that there might be a coup sometime during the second week of December. Commo Calajate, Commander LOGCOM, instructed all officers to proceed to camp immediately once they hear about it over the radio. According to him, this information came from a conference at GHQ on 24 November.42 Three days later, Calajate sent his family out of their residence at Camp Aguinaldo to some place outside the camp.43

In breach of the code of honor of an officer and a gentleman, all the time aware of his participation and role in the unfolding coup, and knowing the exact hour it would be staged, Calajate had the temerity to attend the Command Conference at 5:30 p.m. of November 30 called by CSAFP on which occasion government defense plans were discussed.

Afew days before the coup, Lt Col Jerry Albano was a frequent visitor of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Deputy Commander AFP LOGCOM. On 1 December, Albano joined Calajate at the LOGCOM, Camp Aguinaldo.44

B.1.C. Noble

From October up to the second week of November 1989, at the latest, Col Noble had been going around Mindanao. He sought to establish links with the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) of Reuben Canoy.45

He also tried to establish links with landowners who opposed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and who organized themselves into the Mindanao Freedom Movement (MFM).

As testified to by former Bukidnon governor, Carlos Fortich, Noble attended conferences of the Mindanao Freedom Movement. In one of these, which was either held in Cagayan de Oro City or Bukidnon, either early or in the second week of November, both Noble and Canoy attended. This is further evidenced by pictures taken on that occasion.46 Others present were Atty Romeo Montalban (brother-in-law of Fortich) and Atty Odilon Mallari of Davao City, an organizer of the MFM.

In said meeting, Noble read a paper in which he mentioned secession. Canoy read the MIM’s proclamation of independence. The subject of a coup d’etat was also discussed. The stand of the MFM was that if a coup succeeded, Mindanao should secede. Noble assured the Movement of protection.

On 26 November, while in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, Noble told Sgt Asterio Dejarme of the 401 IBde, 4 ID based in Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, that they would go to Manila to get instructions from the RAM-HF command control, and that they would return to Mindanao to set up the Federal Republic of Mindanao.47 That same day, at 6:00 p.m., Noble and Dejarme arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport aboard a PAL flight from Butuan City. They proceeded to Noble’s house at 135 MacArthur Avenue, Fort Bonifacio. There, Dejarme was tasked to operate Noble’s radio and to handle communication with contacts in Agusan del Sur. Dejarme learned that codes 949 and 375 referred to Noble and Honasan, respectively.48

On 27 November, Sgt Romeo Evangelio, Noble’s close-in bodyguard, joined Noble and Dejarme in Fort Bonifacio. At 10:00 a.m., Evangelio and Noble left the latter’s residence in Fort Bonifacio for an unknown destination, returning at 7:00 p.m.49

On 28 November, Evangelio left Noble’s house, returning later with one Galil, one machine pistol cal 9 mm, and one Zig assault rifle.50

At noon of the same day, on Noble’s instructions, Dejarme went to the South Harbor on a red Land Cruiser. At the gate, the driver of the Land Cruiser approached the security guard who directed the former to a van located just outside the gate. Without asking for pertinent papers, the guard unloaded from the van a wooden box which he turned over to the driver and Dejarme. The latter noted that there were four other similar boxes left inside the van. The driver told Dejarme that the items inthebox were financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Later, when Noble opened the box at his Fort Bonifacio residence, Dejarme saw that it contained an Armburst anti-tank weapon. Earlier in the morning, Noble revealed to Dejarme that there would be a coup.51

B.1.d Noble/Batac

On 29 November, around 9:00 p.m., a driver on board a Pajero came and fetched Noble and Dejarme in Fort Bonifacio.52 They were brought to a house in Gen Segundo St, Quezon City where Noble stayed for almost one hour53 while Dejarme stayed in the Pajero.54 In Dejarme’s supplemental statement of 3 January 1990, Dejarme pointed to this house near Maalikaya. It turned out to be No. 62 Gen Segundo St.55

Other evidence obtained by the Commission disclosed that the address of Crismel Verano, who was mentioned in the Galido affidavit, is No. 60 Segundo St, Heroes Hill, Quezon City, just adjacent to No 62.56

According to Emmanuel Lao, owner of the lot where House No. 56, Gen Segundo St is located, a certain Verano is the owner of the two lots where houses No. 58 and 60 stand.57

Around 10:00 p.m., Noble, with two companions — one of whom was identified by the Pajero’s driver as Lt Col Vic Batac and who was “served by Dejarme to be carrying a bulging brown envelope—emerged from the house and boarded the Pajero.58

The group proceeded to Holiday Inn Hotel where Noble, Batac and their unidentified companion alighted and went inside, leaving Dejarme and the driver behind. The brown envelope was left in the Pajero; because it was open, Dejarme could see that it contained money which the driver estimated at P1 million.59 Thirty minutes later, Batac called through the handheld radio and instructed the driver to bring the brown envelope into the hotel. The driver complied. Upon returning to the Pajero with the envelope (“parang bawas na iyong laman” [it seems some of its contents were taken] because it was no longer bulging, according to Dejarme), the driver told Dejarme that there were around 30 persons in the room with Batac and Noble.60

Noble and Batac stayed inside the hotel for approximately two hours. Later, Noble and Dejarme were brought back to the former’s residence in Fort Bonifacio at around 2:00 a.m., 30 November.61

As shown in the discussion below, Bibit had already checked in at Room 1701 of Holiday Inn by 29 November.

In his testimony before the Commission, Dejarme confirmed the foregoing.62 He declared further that he and driver Alex Callada, on board a Mitsubishi car together with Noble and Evangelio, were intercepted at a checkpoint in Sta Rita, Samar on 5 December 1989. Noble and Evangelio subsequently managed to escape. Found and seized from the car were P70,000 in crisp P500 bills, sophisticated weapons including one Armburst anti-tank weapon, a rifle with a laser sight, and documents tending to show the tie-up of the RAM-HF and troops which Noble referred to as the “Armed Forces of Mindanao”, and which he was to lead in the last coup attempt.

Also found from the car were several documents, among which are:

1. A letter dated 28 November 1989 of one Vic addressed to Sir Alex. The latter was told to contact or see Sonny, Andy Gauran, MJ Mendoza, or to relay his messages through their base (code 581); after making all these contacts, Alex was to meet “TF Diamond” at Room 1701 of the Holiday Inn. Alex was also to call Billy or Jake, or Abe. The codes for them were 757 for Billy, 507 for Jake and 711 for Abe.

2. A draft of a press release/public statement addressed to the “Soldiers of Mindanao.”

3. Alert codes for broadcast which read “The roses that lately bloom in November will surely warm cool hearts by December” and “Dear Pare, comadre Rose will give birth anytime after 29 November 1989. Please contact other Maninoys for the grand binyag.”

4. Instructions on the countersigns to be used and attached to uniforms/clothes and vehicles of coup participants.

5. Codes for pick-up points, like (a) New Library for McDonalds, Quezon Blvd, (b) Library for McDonalds, Paseo de Roxas, (c) Dennis for McDonalds, Greenhills, (d) Adamson for Shakey’s

along Katipunan Road, (e) Palace for Tropical Hut, corner EDSA and Ortigas Avenue, and (f) HI for Holiday Inn.

6. Papers regarding the establishment of the Armed Forces of Mindanao under the Federal Republic of Mindanao.

7. List of confirmed radio frequencies of various military units, base stations, and group operations centers.

8. Code numbers relating to Malacañang, such as the President’s car; cars and drivers of Presidential kin Noynoy, Viel, Eldon, Ballsy, Pinky, Kris and Manolo and their individual code numbers; those of the PSG and its officers; and other operational codes.

9. Handwritten notes containing entries about an apparent bank heist.

10. A handwritten note referring to the radio network of the rebels containing the telephone number 810-1701. The Commission traced this number to someone answering on behalf of Royal Match, Inc, and when asked about his location answered that he was in Ayala Avenue.

MGen Flores believes that Vic referred to Victor Batac, Alex to Alexander Noble, Billy to Billy Bibit, Jake to Marcelino Malajacan, and Abe to Abraham Purugganan.63

B.1.e. Bibit

Bibit had earlier been appointed by Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tafiada to serve in the Customs intelligence service. Commissioner Mison subsequently appointed him as Assistant Chief, Operations Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS).64

In August 1989, Bibit had been seen in Bacolod City with an unidentified companion.

The Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)had earlier warned Mison of the recruitment activities of Bibit in the Visayas in September 1989. Mison assigned Atty Jereos, CIIS Chief, to watch Bibit. However, Mison later admitted he had not given the matter his personal attention, explaining that his business was to raise revenues for the government.65

On 28 November, Bibit checked in at Room 1701, a suite at Holiday Inn, Manila, accompanied by another man. The room reservation was made in his behalf by his sister-in-law, Fe de los Reyes, secretary of the Chief Engineer of the hotel.66

During Bibit’s stay, de los Reyes went to his room twice for merienda-dinner at his invitation. On the first occasion, de los Reyes overheard Bibit making a telephone call; on the second occasion, the phone rang twice and she heard Bibit talking to the caller(s).67

Records of Holiday Inn show that during this period, long-distance telephone calls from Room 1701 were purportedly made by one Boy Fuentes to telephone number 22376 in BacolodCity. This is a private PLDT line subscribed to the residence of one George Yap, a former member of the PC-Regional Security Unit 6 operating in Bacolod City.68 Yap went into hiding after the December 1989 failed coup attempt and remains at large.69

On 29 November, at 3:11 p.m., four persons, with one transceiver, entered Room 1701.70

At about 7:30 a.m., the following day, Bibit telephoned P/Capt Job Gavino, Station Commander, North Harbor Port Police, and told the latter that he (Bibit) would be sending over his representatives for some important business. At 11:00 a.m., 20 men in civilian clothes arrived at the North Harbor Police Station looking for Gavino, supposedly on Bibit’s orders. They tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces but he allegedly refused.71

In the early morning of 1 December, Bibit’s room was discovered vacant. Because Bibit did not check out properly, de los Reyes had to pay his bill since she was the one who made Bibit’s hotel reservation. De los Reyes was later reimbursed by her sister, Mrs Bibit.72 Evidence received by the Commission discloses that at 2:00 a.m. of 1 December, rebel soldiers in full battle gear equipped with high-powered weapons arrived and deployed themselves all over the area of Gate 3, South Harbor, Manila. The soldiers numbered approximately 200 and were commanded by Bibit.

B.1.f. Rasco

At 1:00 p.m., 28 November, in Sariaya, Quezon, a Philippine Army officer approached and informed 2Lt Eliseo Rasco PC, CO of the 1st Special Action Company, RSAF Battalion, RECOM 4, of a coup d’ etat, and asked him to bring his troops to Sangley Point, Cavite City.73 Two days later, or on the night of 30 November, a BLTB bus was found parked inside Camp Nakar, Lucena City. Subsequent investigation showed that this bus was originally contracted by Rasco to transport soldiers to Sangley but mistakenly, was sent to Camp Nakar instead of to Barangay Sto Cristo, Sariaya, Quezon. Rasco and his group got another bus and eventually reached Sangley.74 Rasco used to be under Lt Col Marcelino Malajacan when the latter was Battalion Commander of 16 IB.75

B.1.g. Fusilero

Lt Col Fusilero played a leading role in Cebu, particularly in Mactan during the December 1989 coup attempt. He was the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Oriental for sometime until his relief for having assaulted a human rights lawyer in Dumaguete City on 4 September 1986.76 Recalled to the RECOM 7 Headquarters in Cebu City, he was accused together with Abenina, then RECOM 7 Regional Commander, and PAF ex-Lt Col Neon Ebuen, then manager of the AFPSLAI Office in Cebu City, of joining the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. The three were charged with violation of Articles ofWar 67,68,96, and 97 before General Court Martial (GCM) No 8. Fusilero was placed under house arrest under the custody of the commander who took over from Abenina, BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr. Baccay was later transferred to Davao and replaced by BGen Benjamin Dizon who retired shortly before 30 November 1989. Dizon allowed Fusilero to roam around freely.77 BGen Raul Imperial took over RECOM 7 a few days before the coup.

During the months of September and October 1989, Fusilero was sighted in Negros Occidental in the company of Bibit, a former PMA classmate, courting the support of military officers and enlisted men for a coup attempt. Intelligence reports were submitted by NICOM Intelligence Officer, Maj Alphonsus Crucero, on the recruitment activities of Fusilero and Bibit as early as September.78 No pre-emptive action was made by higher headquarters and thus recruitment of coup supporters appeared to continue.

Although Fusilero was facing charges before GCM No 8 for his role in the 28 August 1987 coup attempt, he was not prevented from going to Leyte, certain parts of Mindanao, and Luzon. With his motorcycle buddies called the Cyclones, he went to Agusan del Norte and contacted logging concessionaire Cesar Magsaysay, in whose company a brother of Fusilero has been employed.79 A book entitled “A Path of the Masters”, bearing Cesar Magsaysay’s name, was among the things found in Noble’s attache case when the latter’s car was intercepted at a checkpoint in Sta Rita, Samar on 5 December 1989.80 Apparently, Fusilero made these motorcycle caravan trips with the Cyclones as a good cover to make contacts with his military and civilian friends in various areas, including Bicol and the islands of Leyte and Samar.81 The Cyclones also visited Aparri, Cagayan, bailiwick of former Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo, another one of Fusilero’s classmates.

Sometime before 1 December, Fusilero was also seen at the Alavar’s Seafood Restaurant in Cebu City, dining with Atty Homobono Adaza, an opposition leader from Mindanao, and BGen Comendador.82

In the morning of 29 November, Fusilero instructed Lt Augusto Marquez, Chief, Regional Operations and Plans Branch of the R3 Division, RECOM 7, to contact Maj Anacleto Chagas, CO of the 347th PC Company based in Toledo City, and to tell Chagas to go to Roy Khan Station Restaurant located at Osmena Boulevard, Cebu City at around 8:00 p.m. that day.83 Chagas went directly to the office of the Operations Officer or R3, RECOM 7, thinking that it was Lt Col Alphonso Uranza, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, RECOM 7, who called for him. Upon reaching the R3 Division office and before he could go into the office of Uranza, Marquez told him that there would be a meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant at 7:00 p.m.84 While in Cebu City on official business, Capt Cecil Ezra Sandalo, former Aide-de-camp of Abenina and CO of the 342nd PC Company based in Bogo, Cebu, also received a message in his residence from Fusilero for him to proceed to the restaurant.85 Marquez, who was at the quarters of Uranza that evening with his future bride and in-laws, also received a call from Fusilero for him to proceed to said restaurant himself.86

During this meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant, Fusilero informed those in attendance, namely, Chagas, Sandalo, Marquez, Ebuen and others, who were all in civilian clothes, that the coup they have been waiting for, would be staged at 10:00 p.m of the following day, 30 November.87 Fusilero then gave Chagas the amount of P10,000 in P100 bills in the presence of the conferees, and told Chagas to send troops to Mactan at 2:00 a.m. on 1 December.88 Fusilero also requested Sandalo for his support, promising logistics and a handheld radio.89 Fusilero told Marquez that the coup would not really affect Cebu as troops nationwide would converge in Manila.90

After the meeting, Chagas followed Marquez to the quarters of Uranza where they revealed to him the disclosure made by Fusilero.91 The three had a drinking session which lasted until 2:30 a.m. of 30 November.92 None of them saw it fit at that time to inform either BGen Imperial, the Regional Commander, Col Andres Superable, the Chief of Staff, or Lt Col Enrique Cuadra, the Provincial Commander, of what transpired at the restaurant.93

At around 6:30 a.m. of 30 November, Chagas left Toledo City and went directly to the quarters of his immediate superior, Lt Col Cuadra, informing him about what had taken place at the Roy Khan Station Restaurant the previous night.94 Sandalo was also there to report the same matter. Cuadra instructed the two not to allow any troop movement, and to adhere to the chain of command.95

At about the same time, Marquez, who barely had four hours of sleep, reported to his office and advised Superable that a coup would be staged inManila that evening.96 Superable then instructed Marquez to gather more information.97 It seems that Superable did not elicit anymore information from Marquez, nor did Marquez, who was briefed by Fusilero the previous evening, appear to have volunteered much information.

After advising Lt Col Cuadra, Maj Chagas reported to Col Superable the incident at restaurant. Superable was surprised and got mad upon learning that Fusilero had asked Chagas to send troops to Mactan. Chagas was then instructed not to make any troop movement and to follow the chain of command. Chagas said that he later went to see Marquez and gave back the P10,000 to be returned to Fusilero:98 Marquez confirmed that he received the amount from Chagas and alleged that he had returned it to Fusilero the same day at the RECOM 7 HQ, right after Chagas told Superable that the coup would be staged at 10:00 p.m. that day.99 It was only upon learning about the planned coup from Fusilero that Superable informed BGen Imperial that there were strong indications that a coup would be staged that day, prompting Imperial to call PC Chief MGen Ramon Montano. As Montano was not around at that time, Imperial called up BGen Victor Natividad, then PC/INP Deputy Chief, and inquired about the developments in Manila. Imperial asked Natividad: “Sir, may mga bali-balita dito na may mangyayari ngayon. Mayroon ba kayong balita riyan?” (Sir, we have news here that something is going to happen. What’s the news on your side?) To which query Natividad retorted: “Anong ibig mong sabihin na may mangyayari ngayon (What are you referring to), can you give me more details? Imperial answered thus: “Wala nga Sir, kaya nagtatanong ako kung mayroon kayong balita riyan100 (We have none, Sir, that’s why I’m asking if you yourself have news). Imperial said that Superable did not convey to him the information given by Fusilero that the coup would occur at 10 p.m. on 30 November, although, he admitted that Superable mentioned to him of troop movements scheduled for 2:00 a.m. the following day.

B.1.h. Purugganan and Lim

Maj Abraham Purugganan and Capt Danilo Lim held meetings in Fort Bonifacio in October and November respectively. The first meeting was reportedly held at the office of Purugganan. In attendance were Col Luisito Sanchez, Capt Rogelio Bonifacio, Capt Lim, Capt Nestor Flordeliza, Capt Joe Cruz, Lt Stephen Flores, Lt Charles Galvez and enlisted personnel including MSgt Demabildo. It was mentioned that an “activity” may happen sometime.101

The second was held at the FSRR office and was also led by Purugganan and Lim. Other officers who attended were Capt Felix Calimag, Capt Roberto Rusio, Capt Jose Barao, Capt Pablo Casalme, Lt Allen Capuyan, Lt Samuel Bactad, and 2Lt Napoleon Mabalot. Each was asked for his particular field of interest and function in office.102

B.2. Related Activities

B.2.a. Davao del Sur

The 19-25 January 1990 issue of the Philippine Muslim Times reported that certain Army authorities based in General Santos City were behind the alleged arrival of Irwin Ver and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr at the latter’s farm in Malita, Davao del Sur, on 23 November 1989. An intelligence report of a senior NBI agent in Davao City dated 22 January 1990 further revealed flights of two private aircrafts during the week of 20 November in the vicinity of Malita at a private airstrip owned by a company controlled by the Cojuangcos and at the Davao International Airport.103

Taking these news item and report as leads, the Commission was able to obtain information and evidence which may have some connection with the arrival of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, a personality mentioned in the Galido affidavit who incidentally arrived a few days before the coup attempt.

The Chartered Flight to Kota Kinabalu

On 20 November at 9:15 a.m., a plane registered as RP-C585 left Manila for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia with a lone passenger, Roberto Huang. The plane was piloted by Capt Adriano Morales and Capt Loreto Vergeire.104

Capt Morales initially told the Commission that the flight was chartered by Jayapuri Brunei Ltd and arranged through the Executive and Tourist Aviation, a company owned by Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc and managed by him. Huang, later testified that “about two or three” months before 20 November, a certain Oliver Ker, a Malaysian whom Huang had accidentally met in one of the casinos in Metro Manila, called him by telephone. Ker told Huang that he would arrange for him to visit Kota Kinabalu. Around 20 October, Huang was allegedly calledby another man (whose name Huang could not remember), claiming to be the manager of Jayapuri, who told him that “they were contacted by Ker to arrange for a chartered flight for me [Huang]…” In any case, Huang was requested to assist in getting a charter and so he asked Capt Vergeire to arrange it.

The route contracted for, as authorized by Jayapuri, was Manila-KotaKinabalu-Manila.105 Without the prior knowledge of either Jayapuri or Ker, Huang added Davao City to the itinerary. According to Huang, a side trip to Davao City would not make that much difference in price, and so he and Capt Vergeire decided to do it on their own. However, the price differential and the flying time are not likely to be negligible because Capt Morales, in a sworn statement, said that Manila, Kota Kinabalu, and Davao are like the three points of an equilateral triangle as shown in Figure V-l.

[Figure V-1 — Flight Diagram of Manila-Kota Kinabalu-Davao-Manila]

At any rate, the total cost of the charter flight was a little over US $6,000. About two weeks before 20 November, around US $5,000 was sent to Huang allegedly from Ker through an emissary whose identity Huang could not remember. The foreign exchange was not surrendered to the banking system. Approximately US $4,000 was given to Vergeire as down payment, while Huang kept the balance. When asked whether Vergeire issued him a receipt, Huang first said “I cannot remember, but I think so …” and then corrected himself and said a receipt was issued “because I remember he [Capt Vergeire] wrote ‘Jayapuri’ on the receipt” But in the end, Huang confessed that he was not really sure a receipt had been issued. Capt Vergeire, he said, was not really authorized to issue a receipt because, “from what I know, the airline is not his own or he does not work for the airline” whose plane they had used.

When asked whether a charter contract was in fact executed to cover theflight, Huang claimed: “I am not familiar with it. I don’t know if there was a contract signed by Mr Vergeire with whom, to whoever, I don’t know.” Ker, for his part, apparently did not object to the informality of the arrangement, even if this was the first and only time Ker had arranged for Huang to charter a flight to Kota Kinabalu.

Huang alleged that the purpose of the trip was to make a deal about an oil mill, belonging to an insolvent company under receivership. It was situated about 200 kilometers from Kota Kinabalu, in a place whose exact name Huang could not remember.

The plane landed in Kota Kinabalu at 11:50 a.m. of 20 November. The pilots and Huang stayed there for three days, billeted in separate rooms at the Hyatt Hotel. Neither Morales nor Vergeire claimed to know what Huang did or whom he met. Capt Morales even disclaimed knowing whether Huang stayed at the Hyatt Hotel in Kota Kinabalu.106 On the other hand, Huang admitted that he told the pilots that he was checkingin at the Hyatt Hotel and that on one occasion, the pilots invited him for a drink at the hotel lobby.

Huang did not meet with Ker until “in the afternoon, in the evening”. They agreed to see the oil mill the next day, after which Huang would meet its receiver.

On 21 November, Ker and Huang went to the mill site and were there for less than two hours. They were permitted by the guard to look at the machineries and they saw that “there are about 12 units of them . ..” Huang considered the mill as still saleable, but, as a bargaining ploy, he described it to Ker as “in a very bad condition”.

The following day, Ker told Huang that the receiver would not be able to meet him. No reason was given. In fact, not even the name of the receiver was revealed by Ker. The wasted time, effort and money did not wem to bother Huang. After all, he claimed to have “earned a few bucks,” and said that the money spent was not his.

On 23 November, the plane left Kota Kinabalu at 2:00 p.m. for Davao City, allegedly with only Huang as the passenger.107 At Davao International Airport, it was met by PAFSECOM, the Bureau of Customs and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation personnel. After refuelling, the plane left for Manila.

There are conflicting testimonies on the number of passengers aboard the flight to Manila, but there was unanimity on the point that Huang was not one of them.108

The plane arrived in Manila at 7:45 p.m., 23 November.

Huang maintained that although the leg from Davao to Manila was already paid for, he really intended to disembark in Davao all along because it was imperative for him to brief his business associate, a certain Jess Quiogue, on what had transpired in Kota Kinabalu. He admitted, however, thathe had made no prior appointment with Quiogue. Yet, instead of calling Quiogue from the Davao airport to find out if they could meet, Huang went to Davao Insular Hotel. He took his time before trying to contact Quiogue, who turned out to be in Manila. So Huang had to take the last PAL flight to Manila.

The Commission also received evidence showing that on 21 November, another aircraft, registered as RP-C410, owned by Agricultural Investors, Inc, an Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr company presently under PCGG sequestration, left Manila at 10:43 a.m. for Bacolod with Enrique Cojuangco, Ramon Ang, and Danilo Gamboa, as passengers.109 The aircraft arrived in Bacolod at 11:57 a.m. and stayed there until 12:06 noon of 22 November, at which time it flew to Malita, Davao del Sur with Cojuangco and Ang as passengers. Gamboa was left behind in Bacolod. At 4:33 p.m. of 23 November, RP-C410 flew from Malita to Manila allegedly with Enrique Cojuangco and Ang as the only passengers.110

These two flights present a number of coincidences. For instance, all the pilots are somehow connected with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The pilot of RP-C410, Capt Jose Castillo, admits to having piloted for Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr several times in the past. He met with him personally at least once, between 23 November 1989 and 30 November 1989 at Cojuangco’s residence at Balete Drive, Quezon City. The co-pilot of RP-C585, Capt Vergeire, was a pilot of the Cojuangcos for 14 years. He too admitted that he met with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr at his residence after he had learned of his return. Morales initially denied knowing Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr personally, but later, in his sworn statement of 7 September 1990, he confirmed what Castillo had stated under oath, namely that “Morales,… taught them [Eduardo and Enrique Cojuangco] how to fly years ago . . .”111

In addition, both Vergeire and Castillo were aware of each other’s whereabouts on 23 November without having actually talked to each other. When Vergeire left Manila, as pilot of RP-C585 on 20 November, he did not know that Castillo was going to fly RP-C410 the next day. But Vergeire claimed to have known that Castillo was flying near Davao City on 23 November in the afternoon because he allegedly “heard him through the radio.” Castillo also admitted knowing Vergeire’s whereabouts at the same time because he “heard his voice over the radio.”

It must be noted that by the time Vergeire in RP-C585 flew into the Davao Airport at 4:45 p.m., Castillo had already taken off from Malita about twelve minutes earlier. Morales admitted that he and Vergeire started radio contact with the Davao International Airport tower only when they were over Cotabato. Furthermore, the Aircraft Flight Logbook Report (No 6301) of RP-C410 reports its “microphone weak” and “radio altimeter out”. Still, both pilots claimed they knew where the other one was during this time.

What seems significant to the Commission is the admission made by Morales that RP-C585 could have flown from Kota Kinabalu and landed at Malita before proceeding to the Davao International Airport112 without the government authorities finding out. Malita is on the direct line of a flight from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City. Morales insisted that they did not land at Malita. However, it took them two hours and 45 minutes to fly from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City and only two hours and ten minutes to negotiate the nearly equal distance from Davao City to Manila.113 Varying flight conditions could possibly account for the difference of 35 minutes, although such time could also be used to land and unload a passenger in Malita.

B.3. Government Activities

In the meantime, bits and pieces of information related to a coup attempt were either gathered by or filtered into the various intelligence services of the Armed Forces.

B.3.a. National Capital Region

In Manila, on 3 November, BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG, National Capital Region Defense Command (NCRDC), detected that a coup attempt was shaping up and that there would be an alliance between the RAM-HF and the Loyalists.114

B.3.b. Camp Aguinaldo

On 21 October, in Camp Aguinaldo, elements of the security force of Vice President Laurel under Maj Gamos and Lt Calimag were reportedly preparing plans, vehicles, codenames and numbers, and sketches of streets and buildings, all presumably in preparation for the coup.115

At Camp Aguinaldo, on 28 November, an unconfirmed report was received from the Intelligence Office of the Philippine Marines regarding the plan of some officers to launch a coup within the week. FSRR elements were pinpointed as participants. The wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola was identified as the source of the report. Mrs Cachola revealed that her husband and another officer undergoing Scout Ranger training in San Quintin, Pangasinan were called to FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio and were briefed on the forthcoming coup. Lt Cachola relayed this information to his wife with instructions to report it to the Philippine Marines.116

B.3.c. Fort Bonifacio

In Fort Bonifacio, also in October 1989, Col Raul Urgello recommended to MGen Manuel Cacanando, CG PA, the relief of Capt Lim and Lt Julius Flores from their positions as FSRR’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G3) and Intelligence Officer, respectively, based on Urgello’s observation that said officers had united the Scout Rangers against BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR.117

On 2 November, on suspicion that the Scout Rangers and the Marines would participate in a coup attempt, an artillery battery consisting of five pieces of 105 mm Howitzers were pulled out of the Rangers leaving the FSRR with three defective ones.118

Before 30 November, BGen Cardones received reports that certain FSRR officers were holding meetings which he believed were for the purpose of motivating people to participate in a coup. Moreover, before 1 December, he received reports of visits made by BGen Blando to FSRR HQ which were not cleared with him, contrary to military protocol. Cardones also observed that Blando continued to have contacts with Purugganan, Lim, Galvez and Sanchez, all FSRR officers.119

B.3.d. Villamor Air Base

In June 1989, Ebuen was reported to be visiting PAF bases recruiting officers and men for the coup.120

On 3 October, the PAF Intelligence Office received reports about a RAM-HF plan to undertake a coup attempt during the visit of President Aquino to the United States in November 1989.121 The following day the Air Intelligence and Security Group received information on the formation of a group calling itself the Young Officers Union (YOU) reportedly poised to stage a coup if the Aquino government did nothing about the Uzi-Galil-Car-Buko scandals.122

On 27 November, PAF received information about YOU’s plan to stage a coup, making their first move in Sangley.123

B.3.e. Cavite

In October 1989, a group of military personnel was reported to be recruiting at Sangley Point for another coup attempt, allegedly offering P10,000 to P20,000 to each recruit.124

B.3.f. Central Luzon

In November, elements of the Angeles Metropolitan District Command (METRODISCOM), Pampanga PC/INP Command, Olongapo METRODISCOM, Zambales PC/INP Command and SUBCOM were purportedly recruited for a coup attempt.125

B.3.g. Laguna

In August, Capt Rafael Cardeno, reportedly of the PC Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), visited his PMA classmate, Capt Melito Mabilin, police station commander of San Pedro, Laguna, at the latter’s office, and gave Capt Mabilin 10 to 15 photocopies of infor-mation sheets on the YOU, which was said to be composed of officers from the ranks of captains to majors only. According to Mabilin, his wife burned the papers.126

B.3.h. Pampanga

In Angeles City, before the opening of classes in June 1989, Capt Felizardo Serapio, Jr, CO 174th PC Company, was visited by his compadre and PMA classmate (Class 77), Capt Roque Maranon. At that time, Maranon was under detention for his alleged involvement in the 8legeof Camp Olivas during the 28 August 1987 failed coup. Maranon was allegedly out on pass from detention to attend a court hearing. Although Serapio disclaimed that Maranon tried to recruit him, he did not discount the possibility that Maranon’s mention of his “assets” in Angeles City was the latter’s indirect way of recruiting him. Serapio also said that, by that time, he had received information regarding recruitment efforts in his area by rightist elements in the Constabulary.127

B.3.i. Cebu

During the PC Day Anniversary celebration in Cebu City in August 1989, Fusilero spread the news that a coup would take place.128

At Punta Engano, Lapu-Lapu City, in September, an enlisted man under the Negros Island Command (NICOM) was approached by unidentified persons to join Fusilero in the planned coup. Members of the “Lost Command” of ex-Col Carlos Lademora were reportedly in Cebu meeting with some coup plotters.129

Maj Alphonsus Crucero, NICOM Staff Officer for Intelligence, overheard FSRR officers complaining about the military leadership and about reforming the whole system.130

In October, BGen Palma held a meeting with major unit commanders in Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu City, to discuss rumors of a coup and to emphasize the importance of following the chain of command. A separate meeting was held with BGen Comendador, who, when asked what his stand was, allegedly answered that he would follow the chain of command.131

B.3 j. Negros Occidental

In the first week of September, Fusilero and other suspected RAM-HF leaders were reportedly in Negros Occidental courting the support of officers and enlisted men.132

At Negros Occidental, in the second week of September, Lt Col Anthony Lim of the 5th Scout Ranger Battalion (5 SRB) and Lt Col Roy Kyamko, CO 7 IB reported to BGen Jarque, CG NICOM, that Bibit was soliciting their support for a coup attempt.133 In Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, in the fourth week of October, ex-Lt Col Bibit arrived with a group at the wake of the late MSgt Tomas Angostura PC. He also inquired from Lopez, CO 332nd PC Company, about the peace and order situation and the morale and welfare of the men. When asked why he was in the area, Bibit said that he just wished to condole with Angostura’s family and that he was going around visiting “friends”.134

At Bacolod City in August, Bibit was seen with an unidentified companion at the Alice Log Cabin; he was also seen by MSgt Zoilo Ramos at the Golden Field Complex.135

In September, a conference was reportedly held on the island of Pulupandan near Guimaras attended by some prominent businessmen and military officers. A separate report was received on the frequent meetings between some hacienda owners and disgruntled PC officers concerning a coup attempt.136

In Bacolod City, on 4 November, it was learned that a coup had been planned to be carried out during President Aquino’s visit to the US. However, it was allegedly aborted because the RAM-HF could not secure full support from its contacts. Continuous rebel recruitment to the level of battalion commanders and officers of NICOM was being monitored.137

B.3.k. Dumaguete City

At Dumaguete City in the third week of November, P/Capt Rogelio Bais, INP, Deputy Station Commander for Administration of the Dumaguete City police station, received a call that some armed men were at the South Sea Hotel & Restaurant. A team responded and reported that the armed men were military personnel led by Fusilero. No further action was taken by the police authorities.138

B.3.l. Davao City

On 20 November, an alleged study group from the Special Intelligence Training School (SITS), ISAFP, under a certain Capt de Guzman of the PAF, arrived in Camp Catitipan, Davao City, supposedly to conduct a survey among officers and enlisted personnel, directed by the CSAPP. Questions asked related to the probability of a coup d’etat.139

On 23 November, Capt Gerry Diamante appeared at the 8 IB HQ, Camp Catitipan, Davao City and talked to the Battalion Executive Officer (EX-O), Maj Roberto Bara, warning the latter of the movement which had started its “countdown” and that it would soon “explode”.140

The local government officials in Davao del Norte were alerted of rumors of coup d’etat which would take place at Davao City and the Central Bank branch therein would be the target of rebel soldiers.141 On 20 November 1989, the study group of SITS, ISAFP was tasked to survey the military camps in view of the information of a pending coup d’etat. Hence, full red alert status was enforced in all units by BGen Baccay, who also called an emergency conference. It was learned that some junior officers had been conducting clandestine meetings in Davao City for the past few days with 2Lt Cesar Mancao as one of the active participants in the meeting.142

B.3.m. Agusan del Sur

On 22 November, Capt Diamante appeared at 401 Bde HQ, Agusan del Sur, to inform the Brigade Commander, Col Cristobal Gurrea, and staff officers about the “Movement to Free Mindanao,” which he said would be launched within the month. Initiated by young military officers, the movement plans to sever Mindanao from Luzon and establish a revolutionary government. Diamante stated that the revolutionary government would be organized in coordination with other secessionist groups.143

Other pre-coup activities which form an integral part of certain events are left out of this section and are included instead in the respective battle zone narratives.

[Figure V-2. REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN METRO MANILA. December 1989 Coup Attempt]

[Figure V-3. REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN LUZON. December 1989 Coup Attempt]

[Figure V-4. REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN VISAYAS and MINDANAO. December 1989 Coup Attempt]






C. Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base

The takeover of Fort Bonifacio was critical because of the tactical importance of the camp. Fort Bonifacio has the biggest ammunition depot in the Philippines where the Light Armor Brigade (LABde) with their armored vehicles, plus armories of high-powered weapons and combat equipment are found. Howitzers based in Fort Bonifacio can lay its deadly ammunition all the way to Malacanang and Camp Aguinaldo. Another reason was that the headquarters of the elite fighting units of the AFP, the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Army and the Philippine Marines (PMAR) of the Navy, are based inside the camp.

Signals of a Coup

After hearing several reports of an impending coup, a group of Philippine Army Intelligence Officers of the 15th Intelligence and Security Unit (ISU) held a meeting in the morning of 29 November at their headquarters.144 However, the conferees merely confirmed receipt of such information and dismissed the same as rumors.

Unfortunately, the unconfirmed reports proved to be true. On the evening of 29 November, Scout Rangers of the 14 SR Coy, FSRR, under Capt Jaime Junio based in Tagaytay, attacked the PAF Repeater Station in Tagaytay City. This was to signal the start of the attempted coup.145 By 10:00 p.m. of 29 November, reports were received that elements from this company had destroyed the antennae of the PAF Repeater Station.146 However, they failed to cut the cable of the communications equipment This enabled the radio operator in Tagaytay to contact the duty operator at VAB and was able to report the incident to Col Dominador Salac, PAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (A2), at about 10:15 that evening.147

This message was relayed to Col Rene Dado, PA Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, (G3), who was at the Army Operations Center (AOC). The AOC is near the Communications Center (COMCENTER) which houses the communications facilities of the Army. As Operations Officer of the Philippine Army, Dado issued a directive to the Post Commander of Fort Bonifacio to strengthen the security of all vital installations. He also directed the CO of Task Force Bonifacio to send elements of his unit to beef up security at the AOC.148

There were indications that the attack in Tagaytay was premature. In subsequent interrogation of the arrested rebels by men under BGen Rene Cardones, (CG FSRR), one of the men arrested remarked to the investigator: “Napauna lang ‘yung tira namin doon kagabi, [actually] mamayang gabi pa yung pukpukan.” (Last night’s attack was premature, the action is later tonight).149 As pointed out by BGen Loven Abadia, WingCommander 205 HW, Junio “got his signals crossed” as the attack “got everybody curious”.150

C.1. Movement of Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio

C.1.a. 30 November

Preparation of Scout Ranger Troops

At 2:00 a.m., Capt Jose Agdeppa, course director of the FSRR on training instructed his trainees to withdraw their rifles and ammunitions. He issued M-16 rifles and 60 rounds of ammos with magazines per soldier. It must be noted that at this time, aside from the FSRR HQ staff and trainees, there were no Ranger units assigned in Fort Bonifacio as all other units were deployed outside the camp. Most of the Rangers inside the camp were trainees at the Retraining Center under Agdeppa. The Rangers were supposed to graduate by 28 November but to allow them to stay longer in Fort Bonifacio, their graduation was deliberately delayed.151 Capt Lim coordinated the other Scout Rangers who belonged totheHQ Company.152

It was reported that the sudden increase in the number of Scout Rangers inside the camp was due to the arrival of personnel comingfrom other SR units, like the 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez stationed in Isabela, the 9 SR Coy under Capt Albert Yen at Fort Magsaysay, and the 14 SR wyunder Junio in Tagaytay City. These troops moved from their home base to Fort Bonifacio, and “infiltrated” or un-officially joined the other Scout Rangers based inside the camp a few days before 30 November 1989.153

By early dawn of 30 November, intelligence officers were receiving mounting information which pointed to an impending coup. There were reports that Honasan and Bibit were present at Ilang-ilang St, North Cembo in Fort Bonifacio. Counter-intelligence operatives conducted surveillance in the area but found no sign of them.154 Thirteen of the soldiers who raided the AFP communications station in Tagaytay were arrested by CAPCOM troops. The arrested soldiers belonged to the 14 SR Coy.155 Three of these soldiers, Pfc Joseph Soriano, Sgt Eduardo Acevedo and Cpl Maguillen were investigated by personnel of BGen Cardones.

Meeting of PA Officers

At 8:00 a.m. of 30 November, seeing that the veracity of the reports about an impending coup was becoming clearer, Capt Jaime Yangzon, Assistant Chief, Operations Branch G3, PA called a conference of all junior battle staff officers to disseminate the information received about the coup. He then ordered the officers to take the necessary security measures in the event that the reported coup materialized.156

At 10:00 a.m., Col Dado instructed the intelligence officer of the Headquarters and Headquarters Service Group (HHSG) to monitor activities of Scout Rangers within Fort Bonifacio.157

Also by this time, Col Cesar llano, Commander of the PA Security and Intelligence Service Group (SISG), received a report from Capt Ralph Villanueva, Commander 3 ISU, that a coup was to be launched in the evening of the same day or early dawn of 1 December.158 llano called a conference of officers of the SISG. He asked his EX-O, Lt Col Rodolfo Garcia, to preside over the conference, so that the former could call up his chief, Col Raul Urgello, PA Intelligence Officer (G2). Urgello, however, was tired and dizzy from lack of sleep due to the interrogation he conducted on Junio, and so he in structed llano to inform MGen Cacanando directly.

At 3:00 p.m., llano went to HPAbut did not find Cacanando whowas then in Baguio attending the launching of the “No Hazing Movement” and the Recognition Day rites at the PMA. llano instead met Dado and told the latter of the impending coup. At that time, Dado was preparing to leave for Bataan the following day (1 December) to assume the command of the 702 Bde. He told llano that if a coup occurs after his departure, Lt Col Jaime Ligot, the Deputy Operations Officer, can take over. llano rejoined the conference of the intelligence officers, who were still waiting for him, at about 5:30 p.m.159

Cacanando left Baguio at around 3:00 p.m.160 On his way to Manila, he first heard about the impending coup at 7:00 p.m. when President Aquino called him by phone and asked “What’s this startling report, General?”, referring to the reported attack by the Scout Rangers on the PAF communications facility in Tagaytay City. She also asked him to cancel his 4 December trip to the US.161

Cacanando immediately called his General Staff by phone and ordered that a conference be held at his quarters later that evening upon his arrival. He also ordered Col Abraham Paray to put all armor assets within Fort Bonifacio on alert status, to which the latter complied.162 At about 5:00 p.m., the junior battle staff of the AOC was activated to direct, monitor, and prepare contingency forces.163

Meanwhile, the number of Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio had swelled to include elements of the 4 SRB from Isabela, which arrived in batches at Brgy Militar (Brgy Sto Niño) in Fort Bonifacio. They reputedly were the same elements who were monitored at about 1:15 p.m. by the NuevaEcija Constabulary Command, passing through the area aboard three 6 x 6 trucks, one jeep and one pick-up.165

In the early evening of 30 November, Col llano went to the G2 (PA) (Col Urgello’s) office to wait for MGen Cacanando. There, Maj Rodolfo Espiritu, Intelligence Chief Operations Officer, reported the entry of civilians carrying bayongs on board jeepneys and going to the FSRR HQ. This information was submitted to the G2.166 By 7:00 p.m., ISU Operations Officer Capt Percival Abu had obtained information about a plan to hold Cacanando hostage by the Special Intervention Platoon (SIP) under Lt Vicente Gregorio Tomas, who was reported to have sided with the rebels.167 Ironically, the SIP was supposed to be the unit assigned to protect the CG PA in case of a coup. Likewise, Tomas was a most unlikely coup participant. He was with Col Dado in Camp Aguinaldo during the August 1987 coup attempt, when they both defended the government against Honasan. During that engagement Tomas was wounded.

At 6:30 p.m. llano prepared a written report of the intelligence information he gathered.168 He sent copies thereof to Cacanando and to theother units. The copy for Cacanando was delivered by Capt Rodrigo Maclangand was received by Maj Yano at the quarters of Cacanando.169

The Scout Ranger rebel troops were consolidated and made combat ready at about 8:00 p.m. of 30 November. In preparation for the planned attacks, Maj Purugganan and Capt Lim held a third meeting at the office of the G2 FSRR to finalize their plans. It will be recalled that their first two meetings were held in October and early November.

At this third meeting, the group already included Capt Ed Malabanjot j Leovino Valencia. They were informed that the “activity” would If place by 3:00 a.m. of 1 December 1989. Their task included the takeover of HPA, AOC, 808 Custodial Company, INP TRACOM, and Gates 1 and 2. Capt Jose Cruz, FSRR Logistics Officer, was assigned to provide supplies and equipment.170

At 9:00 p.m. the rebel Rangers had started to move in different directions. Thirty minutes later, they took control of the Area Research Center. Further information revealed that Marcos Loyalist troops were ready to lend their support.171 Rebel soldiers aboard two 6 x 6 trucks passed through the vicinity of the HPA and moved towards the AOC.172

At about 10:00 p.m., MGen Cacanando arrived at his quarters. He convened the Staff Conference which he had called for while en route from Baguio City. This was attended by the General Staffof the PA with selected Post Unit Commanders.173 Cacanando and the Staff discussed the reports about the attack on Tagaytay and on the reported coup. The former ordered the security at Gates 1, 2 and 3, including the detention centers, strengthened. He gave further instructions to his officers to meet him in a conference at the AOC with the entire Battle Staff. They then proceeded to the AOC at about 12:00 midnight.174

The Takeover of the Headquarters Philippine Army

Lt Col Ligot was at his office inside the HPA when rebel soldiers on board the two 6 x 6 trucks passed by the vicinity of the HPA reception area. He called the AOC, to which Dado had proceeded upon Cacanando’s instructions, to verify if the troop movement was authorized. He learned from Capt Edgardo Gurrea that the soldiers were not friendly troops. BGen Lisandro Abadia called from Camp Aguinaldo and, upon being briefed about the development instructed Ligot to lock the HPA doors and not to let the troopers enter. Ligot complied.

Lt Col Julius Javier, the PA EX-O, who was at the AOC, tried to call HPA but to no avail as he found the phone lines dead. Ligot then ordered the accounting of personnel who were also told to stay dispersed inside the Army Operations (G3) office. Capt Glorioso Miranda who was among the armed troopers outside, went to the HPA to talk to Ligot, who was the highest ranking officer present at that time. Miranda gave the assurance that there was no intention to harm anyone and requested that the door of the building be opened. Upon hearing this, Ligot acceded but only Miranda was allowed to enter the building. The latter also requested that the offices of MGen Cacanando and BGen Ramberto Saavedra, Chief of Staff PA, be opened.

By 10:00 p.m., the rest of Miranda’s troops had assumed control of the HPA.175 Government personnel did not resist because they were outnumbered. The rebels pointed their guns and rifles at Government personnel and demanded their surrender. The latter were disarmed and told to follow whatever instructions the captors would give.176 The raiders were led by Capts Pablo Casalme and Miranda and 2Lt Arnulfo Pajarillo.177

Then at 10:30 p.m. power lines in Fort Bonifacio were cut, resulting in a total blackout.178 Rebel troops took over Gate 1 of Fort Bonifacio at Pateros. These troops were students of the Mortar Gunnery Course of the FSRR They took their firearms, M-60 machine guns with 300 bullets each, from the Regimental Troop School. Supply room personnel did not want to allow the withdrawal of the firearms, but were prevailed upon to do so by Capt Fidel Legiralde, Jr.179 There were reports that Capts Cruz, Agdeppa, Lim, and Jose Barao and Lt Cesario Almendras supervised and distributed firearms, ammunition, and equipment to rebel Rangers.180

The intelligence information gathered by Capt Abu about Lt Tomas of the SIP siding with the rebels came as a surprise. Upon learning this from Abu by phone, Lt Danilo Estropia of Cacanando’s Security Services team confronted Tomas about the report. Tomas confirmed it saying “Go na sila (referring to the SIP)”.181

The situation became serious as the very platoon tasked to guard the AOC had joined the rebels. Worse, the AOC was the venue of MGen Cacanando’s conference with the PA staff officers scheduled at about midnight of 30 November.182

Lt Estropia then went to the ISG Office and broke the news to Col Ilano. At about 11:00 p.m. of 30 November, Estropia and llano went to fre AOC and tried to warn Cacanando, who was not yet there when the two arrived. llano then relayed the information to BGen Saavedra who in turn asked Capt Morales what troops were below the AOC Office. The latter said they were the SIP. Overhearing this, Col Dado interrupted and said “atin yan” (They are ours). llano warned the personnel at the AOC not to let them come up because they would capture Cacanando. Thereafter, llano left the AOC and went back to his office.183 It remains unconfirmed, however, whether Saavedra received llano’s report.

As recounted by Col Paray, Lt Tomas was manning a checkpoint near the Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ) in Fort Bonifacio at about 11:40 p.m. of 30 November. Paray was allowed to pass through and proceeded to inspect the 4th Light Armor Company Separate (4 LACS) to check on the readiness of armored vehicles and crew in case of any eventuality.184 Then, he went on to the AOC for the staff meeting called by Cacanando. Paray reached the AOC at 12:35 a.m. 1 December and saw Cacanando, Saavedra, Col Dionedo Villanueva, PA Personnel Officer (Gl), Col Dado, Col Reynaldo Gopilan, PA Logistics Officer (G4), Majs Benjamin Magday and Cesar Javier, Capts Gurrea, Yangzon, Jesus Abante, and some other AOC junior officers.185

C.1.b. 1 December

Escape ofMGen Cacanando from the AOC

Before midnight of 30 November, rebels had already taken over the HPA, located some 100 meters from the AOC. Col Gopilan at the AOC received a report from Capt Carlos Holganza of the PAPlans Office(G5) about the presence of rebel Rangers around the HPA.186 At this time, Lt Estropia asked MGen Cacanando’s Aide-de-camp, Lt Ronaldo Manahan, “Alam na ba ni CG na si Tomas angpapasok dito?” (Does the CGknow that Tomas will take over here?). Surprised, Lt Manahan relayed this to Maj Carlos Calanog.187 Immediately, Calanog led Cacanando out of the AOC, boarding a wagon together with two aides, Lts Manahan and Sayson.188

At the same time, Rangers entering the AOC compound stopped the outgoing wagon at the gate. They pointed their guns towards its occupants and shouted “Halt! Halt!” Pretending to be with the RangerB, Estropia shouted back “Clear na yan. Si Maj Calanog yan.” (That vehicle has clearance. Maj Calanog is inside). The wagon was allowed to pass leaving Estropia behind. He later noticed that Lt Yogyog was leading the team of Rangers manning the gate.189 Cacanando and his group then proceeded to the HHSG about one kilometer to the left of AOC. Phone lines at the AOC were suddenly cut.190

FSRR elements aboard two trucks arrived at the AOC at about 12:40 a.m. of 1 December. No resistance was put up by the SIP under Tomas. By 1:00 a.m., all SIP elements wore the rebel forces’ countersign. The guards previously manning the gates were herded to one side and instructed not to make any false moves.191

Because MGen Cacanando was incommunicado, Gen de Villa appointed BGen Galido as acting CG PA.

The officers at Cacanando’s conference were held hostage by rebel Rangers. Among the rebels were Col Sanchez, Lt Col Galvez, Majs Valencia and Purugganan, Capts Yen, DominadorPagulayan, Fernando Abuan, Ernesto Cutiyog, and Essel Soriano and Lts Galvez, Tomas, Alvin Tiamwatt and Agane Adriatico.192 The rebel Rangers also took control of the nearby JUSMAG compound.193 Capt Yen, together with some FSRR radio operators, sent out communications in the name of MGen Cacanando.194

Apparently the transmitted misinformation was used to move troops stationed in the north.195 One of the messages was addressed to BGen Marcelo Blando, CG 7 ID.196 The rebel Rangers also broadcasted radio messages in the name of MGen Cacanando, stating that the whole PA was fully supporting the rebel forces in their alleged effort to reform the political structure, and urging all Army units to contribute to the attainment of this objective. BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, received the radio message at about 8:00 a.m. of 1 December while he was aboard a Huey helicopter bound for Tarlac. However, he disregarded this message since no radio telephone contact with the HPA could be established for verification. It was instead referred to BGen Lisandro Abadia.197

Col llano said he sent Capt Abu and Capt Maclang to go around and try to obtain information about the Ranger’s activities. Maclang and Abu wore rebel countersigns allegedly to be able to move freely. After the attempted coup, the two were relieved by MGen Cacanando. He also relieved Col llano of his command for the failure of his intelligence operations.198 llano denied the imputation, claiming they were in fact able to establish the occurrence of the coup several hours before it began.199

Takeover of Vital Installations

The Scout Rangers led by Capt Legiralde moved swiftly. Aside from securing the HPA, AOC, the JUSMAG compound, Gates 1 and 2, they also attacked the 808th Custodial Company at the Army Detention Center. A firefight ensued at the area, including the vicinity near Gate 1.200 The Scout Rangers prevailed. They disarmed the personnel at the 808th Custodial Company and released the 1987 coup detainees from the detention center.201

The Scout Rangers also rushed to COMCENTER. They disarmed the personnel there, including Capt Feliciano Fernandez, Communications Officer, PA Signal Group, who was in charge of the COMCENTER. An unidentified Ranger announced a coup d’etat, the capture of AOC, G3 HQ, and the PALAR and instructed that wmmunications and power lines be destroyed. However, Capt Fernandez was able to negotiate and the Rangers agreed not to blow up the communications system; instead, they disconnected the telephone lines at the main distribution frame.202

By 2:00 a.m., the rebel Rangers had already taken control of HPA, AOC, COMCENTER, JUSMAG compound, the 808th Custodial Company, Gates 1, 2, 3, including the INP/NCRDC Field Force,203 and the National Mapping and Resource Inventory Authority (NAMRIA) where they took the firearms of the security guards and nine vehicles which they used subsequently in transporting officers and hauling supplies and equipment.204

A group of about 20 Scout Rangers searched the quarters of key military officers including those of MGen Cacanando and BGen Cardones.205 One company of Rangers led by 2Lts Raymundo Acorda and Angel Adrian Sievert arrived at Cacanando’s quarters and disarmed the guards assigned at the gate. The Rangers then made the guards drop to prone positions. Lt Estropia, who proceeded to Cacanando’s quarters after leaving the AOC, talked to the Ranger officers and noting that Cacanando was not there, ordered them not to search his quarters. The Rangers obeyed and proceeded to man the JUSMAG.206

BGen Cardones was also not in his quarters when the Rangers arrived, since he was attending the Command Conference held by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo. When he returned to his office at the FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio, and upon hearing that Scout Rangers had taken over major points in Fort Bonifacio, he took temporary refuge in the quarters of Lt Col Javier. Cardones hid by the creek, staying there the whole night and then escaped by going over the wall towards Dasmarinas Village.207

Build-up of Rebel Ranger Logistics

After taking control of various vital facilities and locations in Fort Bonifacio, the Scout Rangers sought to acquire additional arms. The troops of both “B” Company and “C Company, 1 SRB, FSRR were instructed to withdraw their M-16 rifles with magazines and 140 rounds of ammunition.208 The rest of the 14 SR Coy based in Tagaytay City arrived in Fort Bonifacio by 4:30 a.m. of 1 December and stayed in the Liaison Office of the FSRR HQ.209

Later, they were called to formation and boarded a 6 x 6 truck with Lt Galvez and were brought to man Gate 2.210 At 6:30 a.m. Lt Col Salvador Limsiaco, Chief of Staff of LABde, Lt Col Paypon of PAFC, Maj Nescarito Ramos of SSBde and Maj Pablo Bayot of Gl, LABde were stopped by FSRR elements at Gate 2 on their way to their offices. They were made to board a white Land Cruiser of NAMRIA and they were brought under escort to the FSRR Officers Lounge where they were detained for 11 hours.

Limsiaco later reported the presence at the lounge of officers who were not organic to the FSRR and were wearing rebel countersign patches, namely, Lt Col Franklin Brawner, Lt Col Ldgot, Col Leopoldo Aliac, Capt Soriano and Capt Cutiyog. Ligot, however, said that he had to wear the patch because otherwise he could not have left the AOC.211 He requested Col Sanchez and Capt Lim to allow him to go to his office, promising to return. He was then allowed to leave.212

Presence of BGen (Ret) Felix Brawner

Limsiaco saw BGen (Ret) Felix Brawner, Jr and MGen (Ret) Jaime Echevarria, both in civilian attire, moving about freely in the area near the Officers Lounge. Limsiaco requested BGen Brawner to contact his (Limsiaco’s) wife to assure her of his safety.213

By morning, Capt Lim and other Scout Ranger officers had gone to theAOC.214 Col Dado and the rest of MGen Cacanando’s staff were still beingheld there as hostages. Some of the rebels at the AOC, particularly LtCol Galvez and Lts Adriatico and Tomas, tried to recruit him to join the rebel cause. He refused.215 In his testimony, Col Dado confirmed the presence of BGen Brawner in the area. Col Paray, one of the officers hostaged at the AOC, stated that at about 10:00 a.m., BGen Brawner visited the AOC and spoke to him about the “importance of the armor” saying “if the rebels had them, this would hasten what they (the rebel Rangers) were doing.” When Col Paray did not agree, BGen Brawner left and walked towards the HPA and there conversed with Col Sanchez and Maj Valencia.216 By this time, the rebels had intensified their defense Position at the AOC by placing a V-150 and establishing lookouts and flm emplacements at every corner of the AOC complex.217

Recruiting the Light Armor Brigade Commander

Knowing the importance of the assets under the control of Col Paray, Lt Col Galvez, Valencia, Lim and other FSRR officers exerted efforts to convince him to release the 4 LACS and place it under the FSRR. Paray refused. Lim told him that some of his men had sent feelers wanting to Jon the rebels. While Paray was confident none of his men would join the rebels,he agreed to go to the 4 LACS area to ask for the stand of his men.

At 3:00 p.m., they proceeded to the 4 LACS compound and the personnel there immediately took defensive positions so that the Rangers could not approach them. Only Paray was allowed to step forward. He spoke to Capt Amado Contreras, Company Commander, who reaffirmed the company’s position to follow orders only from Paray. Paray then went back to the Ranger officers and told them his unit would not join.218

Before the coup, as a precautionary measure, Paray instructed his men that if a coup occurs, the 4 LACS should obey only orders given by him personally.

Lim persisted in trying to convince Paray, who continued to refuse. In their heated argument, the former dropped the name of BGen Blando who he said was expected to arrive at the AOC by helicopter.219 There were also reports that a helicopter was sent in the morning to Fort Magsaysay to fetch Blando. The latter, however, did not arrive at AOC. Maj Purugganan was heard to ask “Bakit wala pa si Tatang One?” (Why is Tatang One not yet here). Among the Rangers, “Tatang One” was the code name for Blando.220

Seeking Artillery Equipment

Aside from the armor, the rebel Rangers also sought artillery equipment. At 9:00 a.m., Capt Constante Pante, Operations Officer of the Honor Guard Battalion (HGB) HHSG, PA, with a RAM-HF countersign placed on his left arm, went to the firebase (the place where the 105 mm Howitzer guns were located), gave Capt Eugenio de los Santos,head of the Battery Command, six pieces of countersigns, and tried to convince the latter and his personnel to wear them. De los Santos refused.

At 3:00 p.m., de los Santos saw Pante, Galvez, Lim, Soriano, Cutiyog and Paray at the 4 LACS area, which is beside the Battery Command. All except Col Paray were wearing countersigns, and Capt Pante said to the others “atin yan” referring to Capt de los Santos. At 11:30 p.m., Pante returned to the firebase and approached de los Santos with a map and instructed him to compute the “data” of Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang. As used in the military, “data” mean the calculations needed to aim the 105 mm Howitzers, which have a firing range of about 11 kilometers. Both Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang are well within the range. Pante also instructed de los Santos to “lay the guns,” but de los Santos stalled, saying it was too late in the night. Pante, who claimed to be the new HGB Commander, allegedly threatened de los Santos that if he would not join the rebels he would be liquidated.221

Regrouping of Rebel Rangers

Failing to persuade the COs of the 4 LACS and the Artillery unit of HGB, the Rangers had to make do with only five armored vehicles which they took from the Maintenance Depot, and two platoons of the HGB.222 By this time, PAF jets had destroyed the rebel air assets in Sangley Point and BGen Blando had failed to arrive at Fort Bonifacio. The Scout Ranger officers sought to regroup. They left the AOC by early afternoon of 1 December.223 Some of the hostaged government officers were released by that time.224 At about 2:30 p.m., Capt Lim and Lt Col Galvez arrived at the COMCENTER and instructed its personnel to restore one hot line at the AOC to the FSRR headquarters and one local line at the AOC.225

At the FSRR Officers Lounge, Col Sanchez released Lt Col Limsiaco and Maj Bayot, but instructed for them not to leave the camp compound. The two reported to the LABde.226

By late afternoon, Sgt Logan of the monitoring team had reported that some Scout Rangers and AWOL soldiers numbering about 300 had been observed changing their white countersigns to red countersigns.227 The monitoring team under SSgt Oscar Obenia, HQ Intelligence Company, reported to the NCRDC Command Operations Center the sighting of 100 Scout Rangers in full combat gear aboard two V-150s and two 6 x 6 trucks moving from Fort Bonifacio towards Ayala Avenue and EDSA.228

C.1.c. 2 December

Early in the morning, Lt Tomas and his security, wearing the RAM-HF countersign, arrived at the firebase and asked de los Santos to tow one 105 mm Howitzer to the AOC building. The latter refused and said that unless Col Dado or Maj Magday instructed him to do so, he would not comply.229

Shortly thereafter, Capt Pante arrived again and asked de los Santos to bring out the 105 mm Howitzers to defend Fort Bonifacio in case of an attack by government troops from SOLCOM.230 De los Santos again refused.

Government Troop Movements

Between 8:00 to 10:00 a.m., the 4 LACS personnel maneuvered and redeployed all their armor vehicles away from the area near the firebase. They then consolidated at the LABde HQ to rescue the remaining hostages at the AOC.231 At the same time, the personnel at the HHSG, which is just across the AOC, began to take defensive positions.232

FSRR elements, noting the movement of the armor vehicles, alerted Maj Valencia;he then asked Col Paray to explain the 4 LACS movement The latter took this opportunity to request that he be allowed to leave AOC to meet the men. His request was granted and he went to the Brigade HQ to talk to his officers and men. He reminded them to remain loyal to the duly constituted government. He also wrote a note to BGen Lisandro Abadia regarding the situation which was delivered by courier.233

The maneuver of the 4 LACS which resulted in all the armor moving out of the firebase left the Howitzers of de los Santos without protection. To avoid having the artillery fall into rebel hands, de los Santos instructed his men to remove the firing pins of the 105 mm Howitzers, bury them in the nearby field, and to leave their post.234

Feelers for Negotiation

By 9:00 a.m., the Scout Rangers at the AOC had received reports that General Headquarters was planning to stage an offensive operation against them, employing two brigades under the NCRDC.235 This news led Capt Agdeppa to instruct his troops of “C” Company, 1SRB, FSRR, to establish a defensive perimeter against government troopers.236 By mid-morning, some Scout Rangers started abandoning their positions in Fort Bonifacio. At about 11:00 a.m., feelers for a dialogue were received by Cacanando shortly after Maj Valencia and Capt Lam arrived at the AOC for this purpose. Col Dado held a short dialogue with the two. One of their requests was for the CG PA or G2 to call former CG PA MGen (Ret) Rodolfo Canieso of NICA and discuss some demands of the Rangers.237

In the meantime, Capts Yangzon and Gurrea slipped out of AOC through the back exit and established contact with the PA Battle Staff at HHSG.238 They briefed Cacanando on the situation at the AOC.239 Gurrea and Yangzon returned to the AOC, informed Dado about then-contact with Cacanando, and presented their escape plan in case the negotiations failed. Dado then went to see Cacanando.240 The latter sent Col Urgello, who was designated as his official emissary, and Dado to talk with the rebel leaders of the Scout Rangers241 to settle the matter peacefully. Col Sanchez, Lt Cols Galvez and Ochosa, Maj Valencia, Capts Lim, Yen, Pagulayan, Abuan, Cutiyog, Soriano and Tiamwatt, and Lts Tomas, Galvez and Adriatico met with Cols Urgello and Dado, Maj Magday, and Capts Gurrea and Yangzon at the G2 section of the HHSG building.242 Urgello revealed that Tomas was disgusted because he thought they were just being used in a power play.243

Capt Lim served as spokesman for the rebels. As a result of the negotiations, it was initially agreed that there would be no fighting inside Fort Bonifacio and that the rebels would recognize the authority of MGen Cacanando. They also agreed to assemble at HPA Grandstand for accounting of personnel and inventory of equipment.244 Lim, however, indicated that the matter must be cleared with Maj Purugganan, giving rise to the impression that Purugganan was the leader of the rebel Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio.245

At 1:00 p.m., as the rebel Rangers abandoned AOC, government troopers led by the Headquarters Intelligence Security Group (HISG) immediately secured the building.246 The Rangers also left the C0MCENTER with instructions not to restore the communications system without their clearance.247 At around 2:00 p.m., they started pulling out from the areas they occupied, as earlier agreed upon. However, instead of assembling at the HPA Grandstand, they consolidated at the Golf Club area near Gate 2 fronting McKinley Road at Forbes Park.248 About 350 rebel Rangers, excluding those who may have left earlier, under Maj Purugganan, Lt Col Galvez, and Capt Lim, instead of returning to barracks went to the Makati Commercial Center. Some 66 Rangers under Col Sanchez, Lt Col Ochosa and Maj Valencia returned to barracks.249

Retaking of Fort Bonifacio by Government Forces

HPA personnel immediately took control of all vital installations in Fort Bonifacio250 as soon as the rebel forces vacated the occupied areas in the camp.

MGen Cacanando then directed the reorganization and consolidation of his forces to man designated areas including vital installations such as the AOC, HPA Building and COMCENTER. He directed HHSG to strengthen the security of Gates 1, 2, 3, the detention center, and the ammo dump. BGen Cabanlig’s Marines manned Gate 3. The Command Contingency Task Force was reorganized under Col Paray. Inventory of equipment and physical accounting of personnel were conducted by all Post unit commanders.251 At the COMCENTER, Capt Fernandez ordered the restoration of normal operations and the inventory of all equipment, firearms and ammunition.

C.2. Movement of the Rangers to Makati

It is not exactly clear why the rebel soldiers, contrary to prior agreement reached with Dado and Urgello, marched from Fort Bonifacio and occupied Makati’s commercial district. The government forces did not anticipate the rebel seizure of Makati’s tall buildings. When everything was over and done with, they theorized that it was simply a delaying tactic to allow rebel reinforcements to arrive and to prevent additional government forces from assisting the defenders of Camp Aguinaldo.252

On the other hand, the Mayor of Makati, Jejomar Binay, called it a “last ditch” stand taken by the rebels who had been defeated at Fort Bonifacio.253

In an interview with rebel-at-large Maj Purugganan conducted by journalist Sheila Coronel of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism on 14 January 1990, Purugganan said that Makati Commercial Center figured in the planning prior to the December 1 activity as a defensive fallback position. Said Maj Purugganan: “Now, if you will take note, “there are I think more than 40 embassies there and . . . 109 multinational centers in Makati. And that position, if you will be able to occupy that, and lookingfrom other areas adjacent. . . the place is like a fortress. And controlling that area is practically controlling the whole of Makati.”254

The Makati takeover was a very costly incident. Lives were lost; property was destroyed; the tourism industry suffered a very serious blow; and for several days the financial life of Metro Manila, and to a considerable extent of the entire country, was paralyzed.

C.2.a. 1 December

Although various reports indicated rebel presence in the Makati Commercial Center on 1 December, nothing foretold the events that were to occur the following day. At around noon, ex-Lt Col Honasan was sighted at the Coffee Shop of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila (Intercon).255 In the early evening, DZRH reported rebels pulling out of the PLDT Building, in Legazpi Village.

Commo Calajate dropped off Navy Capt Ison from his beige staff car, somewhere along PasongTamo Street sometime around 7:30 p.m. From there Ison proceeded to his sister’s house in Quezon City where, sometime later, he was picked up by the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) personnel after surrendering to Commo Pio Garrido, Jr, PCG Commandant.256

C.2.b. 2 December

Things began to stir by midmorning. At about 10:00 a.m., reports were received by Mayor Binay that about 20 rebel soldiers, riding in four private vehicles, were converging at the area around the Intercon257 where a meeting of the Central Committee (CENCOM) of the Nacionalista Party (NP) was scheduled to be held at 1:30 p.m., to be followed by a press conference at about 3:00 p.m.258

Evidence received by the Commission disclosed that sometime between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m., Amy Castillo from the Office of Vice President Laurel called up Emelinda Santos, Banquet Coordinator of the Hotel Intercontinental (Intercon), and reserved the Dasmarinas Room for 30 to 35 persons.259 The charges for the room and the snacks served amounted to P3,715.00. It was paid for in cash and covered by an official receipt numbered 399281, dated 2 December 1989, made out to the Nacionalista Party.260

As early as 1:00 p.m. rebel soldiers were seen massing at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA. About 30 Army troopers were scattered on the sidewalk beside the Hotel Intercontinental and in the car park behind. An armored personnel carrier was parked at the sidewalk along Ayala Avenue north of the Intercon.261

The NP CENCOM Meeting started as scheduled at 1:30 p.m. Although the press conference was scheduled to follow only later at 3:00 p.m., media people came early so that the meeting of the CENCOM was also covered by the media.262 The press conference ended by 4:00 p.m.

It is not clear at what time the rebels first entered the Intercon; whether it was before or during the Nacionalista Party press conference. Newsman Ramon Isberto declared that he saw no uniformed soldier inside or in front of the Intercon during the press conference; but Mayor Binay testified receiving reports saying that the hotel’s elevators were manned by rebel soldiers. Gloria Diaz, who was at the coffee shop of the hotel testified that the rebel soldiers entered the hotel lobby, “after lunch, merienda time.”263

The exact time for the entry of the rebels could have been easily pinpointed had two hotel officials, Chief of Security Pedro G. Rojo,264 and Resident Manager Jean Pierre Etroit,265 who were most of the time in the lobby of the hotel, during this period, been either more observant, or more cooperative as witnesses.

Etroit, liberally embellished his testimony with “I don’t know” or “it is difficult to say” and other vague responses. To the question “can you tell us more or less in the evening what time they [rebel soldiers] went into the hotel?” he simply replied: “It was still light outside, so I believe 5:00, 6:00 or 5:30, something”.266

Rojo, whose office was located at the ground floor of the hotel, claimed twice before the Commission (first on 1 March and then on 25 June 1990) that he learned of the Nacionalista Party press conference, which was held on 2 December, only on 6 December 1990 and from a television news report at that. He averred

As far as I can recall on December 2, 1989, regarding the presence of soldiers, all I can say was on or about 6:00 in the evening of December 2 that was the only time that a group of soldiers entered the hotel lobby and asked me where the way to the second floor was. But before that time all I can remember was there were really soldiers but not inside the lobby but outside the hotel.267

The firmness by which he clearly remembered 6:00 p.m., however,is a stark contrast to his recollection of his whereabouts between noontime and 6:00 p.m. He said

I cannot exactly say where I am between that time but I’m sure I’m in the hotel.268

In any case, it was established that at about 2:00 p.m., around 500 Scout Rangers had entered the Makati Commercial Center and began the occupation of the area.269 Part of the group headed by Capt lim entered the Intercon around 3:00 p.m.270 Another group led by Galvez proceeded to the parking lot behind the hotel and then went to Twin Towers where they stayed most of the time.271

In quick succession, and meeting very little resistance, the rebels set up their positions in 22 buildings and establishments in the Makati Commercial Center.272

By about 3:30 p.m., DZRH reported the presence of snipers in almost all of the tall buildings in the commercial center, notably the Twin Towers, the Hotel Nikko Garden (Nikko), the Intercon Hotel and the PCIB building.273

GHQ AFP could not immediately send its own reaction forces since Camp Aguinaldo was still under attack from the rebel forces at the White Plains area under Lt Col Gojo.274 Instead, MGen Montano assigned the task of confronting the rebels at Makati principally to the available units of the PC275 under BGen Aguirre, who was at Camp Bagong Diwa waiting for instruction to go to Camp Aguinaldo and assist in its defense.276 The government forces, composed of elements of PC Lagunaunder Lt Col Edgar Aglipay, PC Batangas under Lt Col Regalado, and the Regional Special Action Force of RECOM 4 (RSAF 4), and an assault force of MPFF under P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto supported by SWAT teams, left Camp Bagong Diwa at about 3:45 p.m. They arrived at Makati at about 4:00 p.m.277

The MPFF, composed of 92 enlisted men, in full battle gear encamped at Ugarte Field, established a blocking force at the intersection of EDSA and Pasay Road, and positioned troops along the left lane of EDSA (going to Quezon City) fronting San Lorenzo Village.278

Upon its arrival, the Laguna PC deployed its units. Elements of the RSAF 4 and the 229 PC Coy under Capt Rodolfo de Garcia established an advance command post near the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Herrera Street. The 223 PC Coy under Maj Ismael Rafanan and PHQ elements under Capt Ricardo Marquez conducted reconnaisance at the vicinity of the Mandarin Hotel and along Makati Avenue. The 224 PC Coy under Capt Felipe Buena occupied various buildings at the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas. The 226 PC Coy under Capt Leo Kison augmented the Batangas PC command at the corner of Pasong Tamo and Pasay Road while the 228 PC Coy under Capt Luisito Palmera occupied de la Rosa Street.279

To prevent loss of civilian lives and to minimize possible damage to property, the government forces decided to retake Makati from the rebels “block by block, building by building… sniper to sniper.”280 The general plan was to slowly constrict the area under rebel control until the rebels realize that, having been surrounded by a superior force, it was time to give up.281

Although initially the government forces were not as heavily armed as the rebels, they nevertheless were able to chalk up some immediate successes.

At 5:40 p.m. DZRH reported that the Paseo de Roxas and the Makati Greenbelt areas were clear of rebels but the glass walls and doors of the Interbank Building were shattered.282 At around 7:00 p.m., elements of the 15 RSAF 4 occupied the Pacific Star Building at the corner of Makati and Sen Gil Puyat Avenues as the rebels retreated towards the Mandarin Oriental Hotel (Mandarin).283 DZBB reported a stalemate at Ayala Avenue,284 while DZXL reported that there was sporadic firing going on at about 9:40 p.m. at the other end of Paseo de Roxas and at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue.285 At 10:00 p.m. government troops attacked the rebels occupying the PCIB Building.286

The day ended with government forces suffering some casualties. At about 11:30 p.m., while some MPFF elements were with Patrolman Macalino and a certain G. Mojica, a civilian police aide, checking their road block near San Lorenzo Village, rebels riding a dirty-white Hi-Ace van came by and opened fire killing Macalino and Mojica and wounding Maganto. The latter, after instructing P/Capt Renato Valeria to take over the operations, was rushed together with other casualties to the Makati Medical Center. Reinforcements from the RSAF 4 arrived and positioned themselves at the overpass infront of Mantrade.287

C.2.c. 3 December

At 4:00 a.m. on orders of the Commander of the Task Force Makati, the MPFF pulled out of their roadblocks and returned to the Command Post to provide perimeter security. The troops were divided into three teams: one team under Capt Valeria was deployed in the vicinity of the Sean Philip Building; another, under P/Capt Vicente Vargas at the Makati Fire Central Station; and the third, under P/Lt Jose Rayco at the Makati Medical Center.288

At about 8:30 a.m., the elements from the 15 RSAF 4, under Capt Ronald Sabug and Capt Philmore Balmaceda, occupied and secured the DBP Building.

At 9:30 a.m., 15 RSAF, four elements encountered rebels at Ayala Avenue. One V-150 of the government was hit by rebel anti-tank weapons. Two enlisted men were killed and Capt Tagaca and five other members of his assault group were wounded.289 Shortly there-after, P/LtNelson Yabut was also wounded as rebels fired their 90 mm recoilless rifles while he was boarding the V-150. Finally, at 10:45 a.m., a V-150 was neutralized by rebel soldiers while it was on a reconnaissance mission at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue.

BGen Aguirre believed the rebels had “an oversupply of sophisticated communication … not [of the kind] from the basic supplies of the military” which were able to jam the radios of the government troops.290

At 2:00 p.m., MGen Montano ordered the Task Force Makati to assault any target where the presence of Honasan is confirmed.291

About 3:00 p.m., elements of the Eastern Sector Command under Col Jewel Can son, Rizal PC Commander, arrived at the Makati Advance Command Post to reinforce the government troops at the corner of Paseo de Roxas and Puyat Avenue.292

At about 4:00 p.m. 3 December, a BO-105 helicopter with tail number RP 183 belonging to the PC Aviation Group, piloted by Lt Col Alfredo Silapan with Capts Tito Ticman and Dante delos Trinos, and under the guidance of Lt Col Meynardo Carpio, CO PC RIU, took off from the CAPCOM helipad and proceeded to the Makati area. The helicopter maneuvered over Fort Bonifacio and delivered several rounds of 50 cal HMG fire at the rebels located at the multi-level parking lot behind the Intercon. On its second and third attempts, the helicopter gun malfunctioned forcing the aircraft to return to CAPCOM headquarters.293

At about 5:30 p.m., shortly after elements from the Rizal PC arrived at the Task Force Makati Advance Command Post, a convoy of three cars wandered into a no-man’s land in the area of Makati Avenue by the DBP Building and was met with heavy rebel fire. One car had to be abandoned; two security personnel and BGen Aguirre were wounded.294

Close to midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade moved its tactical command post from the corner of EDSA and Boni Serrano Avenue to the area between Ayala Avenue and Pasay Road, to act as a blocking force.295

At an undetermined time, Pedro Samatela, a security supervisor of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and Jesus Nava, an assistant, were executed by the rebels who occupied the building. This was recorded in the firm’s closed circuit television, unfortunately, the perpetrators could not be identified through the video tapes.296

C.2.d. 4 December

At 8:00 a.m., the government troops from the 15 RSAF 4 occupied the Mandarin.297 At 10:00 a.m., elements from the PC Batangas had an encounter with rebel soldiers at the vicinity of Gibson’s at the Landmark Building.298

With the Mandarin in government hands, troopers of the 15 RSAF 4 exchanged fire with the rebels at the Grand Atrium, PCIB and UCPB Buildings.299 Meanwhile, at the Rustan Commercial Corporation’s store at Ayala Avenue, rebels sought permission from Rustan’s Security Chief, PC Col (Ret) Virgilio Poblete to plant snipers on top of Rustan’s Building. Poblete was able to dissuade them from doing so. Instead, at the request of the rebels, he gave them two cases of sardines and a case of coffee.300

At 3:00 p.m., Gen de Villa, on account of feelers received from the rebels that they wanted to talk to BGen Arturo Enrile, PMA Superintendent, called the latter to Camp Aguinaldo to establish contact with the rebels. From Camp Aguinaldo at 11 p.m., BGen Enrile was able to establish telephone contact with Lt Col Galvez at the Tuscany. The latter informed the former that they, the rebels, intended to hold on until President Aquino resigned or until they died in the process. At 11:45 p.m., contact was also made with a certain Lt Dario at the Twin Towers. BGen Enrile impressed on him the futility of further resistance and asked that he be allowed to talk directly to the rebel group. Lt Dario said he would inform their leader.

During the night, the Mandarin hired a fleet of taxis and safely evacuated its guests.301

At about midnight, PMAR troops under BGen Cesar Abella, after conducting patrols at the Forbes Park area, arrived at the Task Force Makati Command Post. They were deployed along Paseo de Roxas, Pasay Road, Ayala Avenue, EDSA vicinity Mantrade, and McKinley Road.302

C.2.e. 5 December

At 1:00 a.m., the 2nd Marine Battalion Landing Team (MBLT2) established a blocking position at McKinley Road together with the Command Group, 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) which had its tactical command post at the San Antonio Arcade.303 Heavy fighting occurred very early in the morning. The Marines at McKinley Road, at about 2:00 a.m., were fired upon by the rebels posted at the high-rise buildings in the commercial center. The firefight lasted for two hours.304 At about 4:30 a.m., rebel snipers at Nikko also engaged the MBLT 2 at the corner of Pasay Road and Palm Avenue.305 An encounter occurred at 5:00 a.m. between the rebels and the 2 Marine Coy MBLT 2 at the multi-level car park behind Intercon. Twelve government troopers were wounded.306

At 6 a.m., the 15 RSAF 4 troopers under Lt Leodegardio Regis and Lt Rogelio Moral attacked the Grand Atrium under covering fire provided by the team commanded by Capt Romeo Sabug.307

While all this fighting was going on, the Department of Tourism, between 4:00 to 6:00 a.m., established contact with the rebels through feelers from the rebels wanting to find out whether the Department was really acting in good faith in seeking the safe evacuation of tourists trapped in the hotels controlled by the rebels. At around 9:00 a.m., Tourism Undersecretary Rafael Alunan, with an announcer of DZAM acting as intermediary, received a call from Maj Purugganan who wanted to hear directly from Alunan about the government’s intentions. After a brief discussion, the evacuation was agreed to in principle, and with the assurance from Maj Purugganan that they were ready to open the gates of Makati at 10:00 a.m., Alunan agreed to meet with the rebels in an hour at the Petron Station outside the Dasmarinas Village gate on Pasay Road. Because it took some time to mobilize buses, Alunan got to the meeting place only at about 11:00 a.m. By then he was told that the evacuation would not push through because the rebels complained of “intermittent firing”. Alunan was advised to settle the matter with BGen Aguirre.

The intermittent firing complained about must have been the firefight at the Grand Atrium at about 6:00 a.m., when the 15 RSAF 4 troopers attacked, and at 10:00 a.m. when the rebel snipers fired again at the Marines on Pasay Road.308

At any rate, Undersecretary Alunan with Tourism Secretary Peter Garrucho, personally went to the Headquarters of BGen Aguirre and asked for the troops to cease firing. Aguirre gave them 30 minutes, extendable upon request, to iron out the details with the rebels. Aguirre agreed also to give two hours for the actual evacuation of the tourists.

At about the time that the Tourism officials were negotiating with the rebels, BGen Enrile, together with volunteer-negotiators, Lt Col Edilberto Adan, Capt Ricardo Morales, Lt Jose Manuel Faune, Lt Clemente Enrique and Capt Arturo Ang, all of the Philippine Army, proceeded to the FSRR Headquarters to gather information about the rebels. There they were informed by BGen (Ret) Emilio Luga that he was also able to establish telephone contact with Galvez, Purugganan and Iim at the Intercon. Enrile accordingly invited Luga to join the negotiating team.

Garrucho and Alunan returned to EDSA to meet with Purugganan only to find that they were at the Intercon being interviewed by the media. After thirty minutes of mingling with rebel soldiers at Nikko, Garrucho and Alunan were invited to meet with the rebels at the Intercon. After an hour and a half of discussions, the negotiations encountered a hitch as the rebels demanded that the government troops should move back one kilometer from all sides. Since that was a military issue, the talks were suspended and both parties agreed to meet again the following morning.

It must be pointed out that even while the negotiations were going on, sniping from both sides continued. Garrucho noted that he was at one point so close to the shooting that he personally saw a guy on a motorbike get hit during one of the exchanges.309

By about 3:30 p.m., a portion of the Insular Life Building caught fire after being hit by rebel mortar. Nevertheless, by this time, about seven buildings had already been retaken from the rebels.310 There was one incident of intense firing at about 4:00 p.m., with the government suffering one casualty, Pfc Acosta.311 Heavy sniper fire harassed the Marines who did not fire back.312 At about 5:50 p.m., the combined forces of the government captured the Grand Atrium as the rebels retreated to the Manila Peninsula and the Makati Tuscany.313

Two rebel soldiers, Pvt Clarito Bongo and Pvt Mario Anos, trying to escape in civilian clothes and under cover of darkness, were intercepted at 7:00 p.m. along Ayala Avenue.314 An hour later, MPFF elements were dispatched on orders of the Task Force Makati Commander to secure the BPI Building and others along Ayala Avenue. The MPFF troops were divided into three groups: one, under P/Lt Rayco which secured the Philbanking Building; another group under P/Capt Santos took the Banco Filipino Building and the third under P/Capt Vargas took the new Makati multi-level car park.315

Ceasefire was announced at 8:00 p.m.

At 9:00 p.m., Lt Col Galvez called to ask for the evacuation of their two wounded soldiers to the Fort Bonifacio General Hospital. To prove the government’s sincerity, the request was granted and the two wounded rebels were picked up by a Red Cross Ambulance at about 9:45 p.m. Upon being informed by BGen Enrile, Lt Col Galvez agreed to consider Enrile’s proposal for them to return to barracks. He also promised to call back Enrile. At 11:45 p.m., an unidentified caller told Enrile that the rebel officers were ready to receive him at Nikko. In response, Enrile asked the caller to contact the Chief of Staff by phone and thereafter call him.

At 12:00 midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade established a blocking force at vantage points in EDSA at the corners of McKinley and Pasay Road.316

C.2.f. 6 December

Fifteen minutes after midnight, BGen Enrile was again contacted by the unidentified caller, who claimed that de Villa had been contacted and that the rebels were waiting for him at Hotel Nikko. With the clearance from de Villa, the government negotiators left Fort Bonifacio at about 1:20 a.m. in two private cars owned by BGen Enrile and a certain Capt Pangilinan. They passed through the Dasmariñas gate and then to Nikko. Galvez, Purugganan, Lim and five other members of the rebel group were waiting for them at the hotel lobby. It was revealed at this time that ,the contacts made by the unidentified caller were arranged by Galvez.

At 2:15 a.m., BGen Enrile reported to de Villa that he and the negotiating team had established face-to-face contact with the rebels, who agreed to release all the hotel occupants and residents of the rebel-controlled buildings at daylight. De Villa ordered a total ceasefire317 and prohibited troop movements.318 At about 4:00 a.m., de Villa advised Garrucho to bring the evacuation buses to the Makati Commercial Center at about 6:30 a.m.

Negotiations specifically for the return to barracks started at 2:45 a.m. After two hours, the parties decided to recess and resume negotiations after the evacuation.

The guests in the occupied hotels and the residents of the condominium buildings under rebel control started leaving the area at about 7:00 a.m. Some 20 tourist buses under the supervision of Tourism Secretary Garrucho and Undersecretaries Narzalina Lim and Alunan were made available for evacuation. Alunan, who had the opportunity of meeting with Galvez and Purugganan during the evacuation, observed that Galvez looked demoralized, except when he was talking to media. He described Maj Purugganan as “gung-ho.”319 He further told the Commission that while the evacuation was going on, he heard from foreign journalists that Alona Alegre, aknown Marcos loyalist, was seen at the top of the Intercon wearing a red cross uniform together with some armed persons dressed as civilians.320

From Nikko, the government tourism officials proceeded to the Intercon, then to the Manila Peninsula Hotel, and the other buildings thereafter.321 At about 11:00 a.m., the evacuation of about 878 guests and civilians was completed.322 Most of them were brought to the Fiesta Shopping Center Complex near the NAIA.

Things were not, however, at a standstill on the military side. Garrucho reported that just before he left Makati after the evacuation, he saw a Fiera-type vehicle transporting ammunition to the rebels at the Intercon.323

Enrile sought to resume negotiations with the rebels but was unsuccessful on account of continued rebel complaints about government troop movements. Talks were formally resumed at 4:00 p.m., and continued on and off until about 8:00 p.m.

At about the same time the 15 RSAF 4 were occupying the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the rebels were consolidating their forces at the PLDT, Allied Bank, Ritz Tower and Twin Towers.324

Finally, after the rebels were informed by BGen Enrile that they had only up to midnight to finish their negotiations, an agreement for a return to barracks was reached at about 8:00 p.m. However, it was agreed that no media announcements would be made until the next day. The rebels were to remove the mines they had planted in the area during the night.325 Purugganan was not present during the last phase of the negotiations. It was learned later thathe slipped out just before the final talks.

C.2.g. 7 December

After arrangements were made for the turnover of the buildings to the PA soldiers and the safe passage of the returning rebels to Fort Bonifacio, BGen Enrile ordered their return to barracks at 7:00 a.m.

By 8:30 a.m., the rebels came out of their positions in the still occupied buildings—PLDT, Allied Bank, Ritz Towers and Twin Towers. Shortly thereafter, the government forces at the Pacific Star, the Mandarin, PCIB, UCPB and the Grand Atrium buildings advanced and conducted mopping up operations to make sure that the buildings were free of mines. Afterwards, the buildings were turned over to the civilian security guards to prevent looting and other untoward incidents.326

On their way back to Fort Bonifacio, the rebels were able to project before the television cameras and the onlookers at the sidewalks a victorious image. At about 3:00 p.m., the government held a Makati victory parade for the forces that defended the Constitution and the duly constituted authorities.

C.3. Philippine Marines Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio

C.3.a. 30 November

Doubtful Red Alert

At about noon, BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant PMAR, claimed that he instructed all units, including the Marine Battalion LandingTeam 4 (MBLT4) under Maj Cesar de la Pefla, to go on red alert. He said he sensed unusual happenings. He learned on 28 November from the Marines, who were training with the Scout Rangers at Fort Bonifacio, that their graduation was postponed because they were to move to Pangasinan. Then, in the morning of 30 November, YOU posters were noticed along EDSA and in the Makati area. At that time too, he was informed of the Command Conference called by the CSAFP to be held at 5:30 p.m. in Camp Aguinaldo.327

It appears, however, that the instruction was not implemented. In the list of red alert declarations from 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989 for the Philippine Marines HQ submitted by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations PMAR, Lt Col Armenio Cristal, Jr,328 no red alert was declared on 30 November 1989. The last was on 3 November which was downgraded on 13 November.

BGen Cabanlig attended the Command Conference in Camp Aguinaldo where they were briefed of the impending coup which was to occur at 2:00 a.m. the following day. Thereafter, he returned to his HQ and upon arriving at his HQ at 10:30 p.m., he immediately held a conference among his officers.329 The conference was attended by Capt Jonathan Martir, Operations Officer of the MBLT 4, and other officers of the battalion namely, Capt Basilio Calimag, EX-O; Capt Romualdo Gualdrapa; Capt Ben Chavez, Logistics Officer; Capt Celestino Ferrera, Intelligence Officer; Capt Santos Petalio, a company commander, and other junior officers. BGen Cabanlig briefed the officers about the impending coup330 and instructed Capt Calimag to prepare the MBLT 4 to move to Camp Aguinaldo (LOGCOM/NCRDC) HQ because Maj de la Peña had not yet reported having been on “pass” since 25 November.

Interestingly, according to Cabanlig, Lt Col Gojo, a relative of Honasan, was also on leave for 15 days before the coup attempt allegedly because of family problems.

Meeting of Marine Officers

After the meeting, they went back to the Battalion HQ. Capt Martir was surprised to see three officers and 12 enlisted personnel who were not organic to the battalion. These officers were Capt Ariel Querubin of the Western Command (WESCOM), Capt Jaime Napoles of LOGCOM and Capt Juancho Sabban of SUBCOM.331

Querubin and Sabban, who were Martir’s classmates at the PMA, were involved in the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. With Kapunan, they attempted to bring down to Manila from Baguio the PMA cadets to support Honasan. These non-organic officers had with them VHF radios which were not a regular issue of the Marines. Querubin tried to convince Calimag not to move yet and just to wait because if he moved to LOGCOM or NCRDC HQ, he would be pulverized by artillery fire as the Army artillery were already pointed towards GHQ (meaning Camp Aguinaldo). Calimag said that his unit would follow the chain of command and would move. Querubin was furious; Calimag turned around and told Martir to find out how many men they have and to start arming some of their personnel within the battalion quarters for there may be a firefight to stop them from moving.332

Martir moved to his section (S3) and instructed his operations chief, MSgt Fortes, to direct all personnel to go to the armory and get their issued firearms and prepare for a possible firefight. While he was giving instructions, Martir saw the personnel of the intelligence unit (S2) already wearing white patches on their left shoulders; he already doubted that Capt Querubin had actually controlled some of the MBLT 4 officers. When he was about to confront those wearing patches, Capt Ferrera entered the room with an Ultimax weapon and machinegun, and proceeded directly to the quarters. Martir, who followed him with Calimag, confronted Ferrera and asked why he did not say that he was committed to YOU during the conference with Cabanlig. Ferrera, answered that he is not YOU and “this is another thing and it is the instruction of their Battalion Commander” (referring to de la Peña). Calimag just remained quiet.

When Martir went out, he saw de la Peña who looked haggard and tired. It turned out that he arrived from Iloilo at 7:00 p.m. that day but he proceeded to his Antipolo residence. Martir told him that Querubin and Sabban came to convince Calimag who did not give in. De la Pena instructed Martir to call all officers of the battalion for a conference. De la Peña went to the radio room and directed the radio man to announce through the public address system for all officers to proceed to his office for a conference.333

Martir returned to the office of de la Peña where he saw him and Calimag talking; de la Peña told Martir to lock the doors and to join them. Just as he had seated, there was a loud knock on the door. When he opened it, he saw Lt Col Gojo who pushed the door, proceeded to where Maj de la Peña was, extended to him his right hand and said, “Cesar, ‘yung pinag-usapan natin” (Cesar, don’t forget what we had discussed). De la Peña stared at Gojo who had with him a VHF radio and extended to him his hand. De la Peña walked towards the quarters with Martir and Calimag. When asked by Martir, “Sir, ano ba ito? (Sir, what is this?), de la Peña did not answer but merely reiterated his instructions to call all officers for a conference.334

While the officers were entering the office of de la Peña for the conference, Capt Petalio was seen holding a bunch of countersigns similar to those of the S2 personnel. Martir also saw Lt Rolando Cal, another company commander who was holding a radio similar to that of Gojo. De la Peña asked the officers to follow the tanks wherever they would go. Martir told de la Peña that his order is in opposition to that of the Commandant; but the latter insisted that they should follow the tanks. He told de la Peña “hindi ako puede diyan, sir” (I can’t go along with your plan, Sir). He went to his office and got his cal .45 pistol and M-16 rifle. Before he was able to report to Cabanlig what happened, de la Pena approached him and said that they are still friends.335

At about 11:30 p.m., just before Martir arrived at the office of his Commandant, BGen Biazon called up BGen Cabanlig and requested for PMAR 6 x 6 trucks to ferry the elements of MBLT 4 to Camp Aguinaldo to be escorted by CAPCOM mobile cars. Col Millena, Logistics Officer PMAR, called up the motor pool to prepare all available trucks to ferry the troops and one 60 RR mounted on an M151 truck to be attached to the MBLT 4. However, BGen Biazon called up again to get confirmation if MBLT 4 had joined the coup because when he called up MBLT 4 to direct them to intercept two truckloads of unidentified soldiers at the South Expressway, he was informed that “Bumaliktad na kami.”336 (We have joined the rebels).

At about midnight, Cabanlig talked to the Marine trainees; he learned later that when they marched back to their barracks with their officer-in-charge, Capt Castillo, rebel officer Lt Liwag pointed a gun at Castillo and Liwag was able to persuade 71 of the more than 200 trainees to join him.337

At this point, Martir arrived at Cabanlig’s office to inform the latter that the MBLT 4 was committed to YOU and reported on what transpired at the MBLT 4 Headquarters. Cabanlig was surprised; he ordered his Aide-de-camp, Lt Romeo Tanalgo, to call de la Peña by telephone. No contact was made as the lines were busy. Cabanlig ordered his Operations Officer, Col Salazar, to block the gates and not to allow the MBLT 4 to go out. Salazar then directed the placement of barricades and ordered the MP detachment to stop the MBLT 4 from getting out.338

C.3.b. 1 December

Since his Aide-de-camp failed to contact Maj de la Peña, Cabanlig sent the Intelligence Officer of the PMAR, Col Buenaventura, to try to convince Lt Col Gojo, and for the MBLT 4 to desist from participating in the coup.339 In his testimony, however, Cabanlig stated that he sent his Intelligence Officer to meet Maj de la Peña. At two minutes past midnight, while his Intelligence Officer was on his way, four LVTs and two V-150s followed by troops numbering about 200 rammed Gate 3 and left for VAB. There were, however, elements of the unit still being formed and so Cabanlig ordered Buenaventura and MSgt Renato Villanueva to talk to them. These elements told them that they have “crossed their bridges” and that they are leaving the camp.340

Mobilization of Marine Units

Evidence further discloses that by late afternoon of 30 November, the Marine officers had already started to mobilize the MBLT 4 based in Fort Bonifacio. Sworn statements by Marine enlisted personnel show that many of them were ordered to mobilize on the evening of 30 November without knowing that the action was intended for a coup. The troops were moved to different locations. One enlisted personnel narrated his experience

An armed man in fatigue uniform bearing no nameplate arrived at the Headquarters of the Philippine Marines (PMAR HQ) and ordered the drill inspector to order the men to withdraw their rifles. Hence, firearms were issued and troop formation was done in front of the station of tanks at the PMAR HQ.341

The Marine troopers were informed that they will be participating in the “Balikatan Exercise” at Subic Base.342 There was a consolidation of a large number of Marine troops by early evening of 30 November. Later, the troops of MBLT 4 were ordered to assemble in front of Brown Hall of the Marine HQ.343 The company commanders were instructed to report to de la Pena and Calimag.344 These were the troops which were ordered to move out of Fort Bonifacio and to proceed to occupy VAB by late evening.345

The 34 Marine Company (MC) of MBLT 4 was directed by its CO, Lt Cal, to pack-up for the following day’s Exercise Balikatan. The troops then fell in with their firearms and proceeded to Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio. There, Cal and his men boarded a ten-wheeler truck which brought them toPTV-4.346

At about 4:00 a.m. of 1 December, Cabanlig went out of Gate 3 and got in touch with some commercial radio patrol units like DZRH, DZEC and DZMM. He announced to the Marines through the radio that he was for the government. He told them not to be deceived by any of the officers and asked them to march back to camp.347

In the afternoon of 1 December, Cabanlig sent Col Romeo Daranchang, PMAR Chief of Staff, with Lt Col Jose Cordero and Capt Andayan to VAB to convince the Marines to go back. Daranchang was able to talk to Gojo, who appeared to be the one “calling the shots.” However, Gojo refused saying “they have burned their bridges.”348

Cabanlig devoted the whole day of 1 December to the consolidation of his forces. He was able to gather a force of 700 men.

C.3.c. 2 December

Thinking that Fort Bonifacio was still under rebel Ranger control, Cabanlig said that he decided to launch an attack against the FSRR HQ. As they were ready to move, he received a telephone call from the Army Chief of Staff, BGen Saavedra, advising the former to stop from attacking as Fort Bonifacio had already been cleared. Cabanlig received a call from de Villa who ordered him to prepare the Battalion he had formed to reinforce the troops in Malacañang on de Villa’s orders.349

C.3.d. 3 December

On this day, the PMAR continued to consolidate forces; it remained at standby to reinforce Malacañang forces.350

C.3.e. 4 December

At about noon, BGen Aguirre called BGen Cabanlig to request the latter to move his battalion to Paseo de Roxas in Makati. When Cabanlig cleared this with de Villa, the latter granted him authority to move; he then coordinated with the Mayor of Makati, but this movement did not materialize.351

C.3.f. 5 December

At about 5:00 a.m., the 11th Marine Battalion was deployed with CAPCOM at Makati Commercial Center.

At 12:00 midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade established blocking forces at a vantage point in EDSA, on McKinley and Pasay Roads.352

C.4. Villamor Air Base

C.4.a. 30 November

Declaration of Red Alert

Because of the intelligence reports on the Tagaytay City relay station attack at 10:30 p.m. the previous day, CG PAF MGen Jose de Leon, declared a red alert in all PAF units.353 BGen Rogelio Estacio, CG PAFSECOM placed the 805th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) on standby alert by 10:40 a.m. of 30 November.354 At 2:00 p.m., BGen Loven Abadia, the Commander of the 205th Helicopter Wing (205 HW), put his unit on red alert.355 By evening, Estacio received intelligence reports that the coup would be staged at dawn of 1 December. He requested one V-150 from the PAF Operations Officer to help in securing NAIA but this was denied.356 Col Felipe Abando, Jr, Commander of the 100th Training Wing, Fernando Air Base, Lipa City, received similar intelligence information, and ordered that base security be increased.357

Immediately after the adjournment of the Command Conference called by CSAFP in Camp Aguinaldo, MGen de Leon called up his office to inform his officers to be ready for a conference. Upon his arrival, de Leon convened the conference with the various COs of the PAF, the Unit Commanders in VAB, and the HQ staff at the Hall of Flags on the third floor of the PAF headquarters (HPAF).358

C.4.b. 1 December

Marine Troopers Enter Villamor

The conference started by about midnight.359 As de Leon broke the news to his officers, saying: “Gentlemen, there is this fantastic news about. . .” he was cut short by gunfire from the direction of Gate 2 of VAB.360 Immediately after, two LVTs with two V-150 Commandos, two 6 x 6 trucks and other armored vehicles led the troops of the MBLT 4 under de la Peña, along with the Marines under Gojo towards VAB. The vehicles rammed Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio and followed by about 200 troops following, crossed the bridge across South Expressway and moved towards Gate 2 of VAB.361 An LVT rammed through Gate 2 of VAB.362 They rumbled along Sales Street in VAB. Immediately, the VAB Unit Commanders rushed back to their units while de Leon, Vice Commander BGen Protacio, BGen Leopoldo Acot and the HPAF Staff rushed to the adjacent Command Operations Center (COC) which was also on the third floor. The entries to the third floor were sealed with iron grills and barricaded by office tables.363 BGen Loven Abadia rushed to the 205 HW HQ.364 BGen Estacio rushed out of the conference rooms, stopped by his quarters for his arms and slipped through the golf course into NAIA.365

The Marines were composed mainly of MBLT 4 from Fort Bonifacio led by Maj de la Peña and Capt Calimag, and other units like the 4th MC under Lt Filomeno Macahilig, 2Lt Jarius Gelverson III and 2Lt Oscar Ramos, the 24th MC under 2Lts Delfin Actas and Memel Roxas; and the 44th MC under Lt Santos Petalio, 2Lt Adonis Fernandez and 2Lt Oscar dela Pena. Elements of the 31st MC, MBLT 1 stationed in Sta. Catalina, Bata, Bulacan and led by 2Lt Francis Carandang and 2Lt Gerry Tagle later joined in attacking VAB.

Within an hour, the Marines gained control of VAB.

Takeover of 520 ABW

The first move of the rebels was to capture the armor assets inside VAB assigned to the 529th Special Operations Squadron (529 SOS) which is under the 520th Air Base Wing (520 ABW). The SOS was organized by then CG PAF MGen Sotelo after the August 1987 coup as an anti-coup force. It was provided with two V-150s, four recoilless rifles, ten machine guns, and other armaments. Yet, when the time came for the squadron to defend VAB, not a shot was fired. In fact, its two V-150s were used by the rebels to attack Camp Aguinaldo on 3 December.366

Capt Robert Yusay, EX-0 of the 529 SOS, while proceeding to his HQ, met the Marines following the LVTs.367 Yusay immediately radioed the Wing Commander (WC) of the 520 ABW, who advised him to check out the movement. Yusay then proceeded to the 520 ABW barracks, woke up TSgt Armando Padilla and his men, and ordered them to take out the two V-150s with body number F-301 and F-302.368 The men boarded their tanks. Yusay then radioed the WC to report that his unit, including the two V-150s, was ready for action upon orders. The advise was to maintain the stronghold.369 Likewise, 2Lt Abner Awang, Light Armor Commander PAF, sought clearance from his superiors to engage the rebels but was told not to confront them.

In the meantime, 70 to 80 armed soldiers led by Lt Hernando “Boy” Caraig of 16 IB, PA, based in Quezon, surrounded the tanks while the personnel of the 529 SOS readied themselves inside the tank. Noting the superior number of Caraig’s men, the tank commander, Lt Domingo Balitaan, directed the crew to disembark but to lock the tank’s door. TSgt Padilla was brought to Lt Caraig and was asked where the crew were. Padilla refused to answer. This prompted Caraig to threaten Padilla with bodily harm. Later, Caraig’s men destroyed the door locks of the tank and Padilla was ordered to drive and tow the van used by the Marines. The van was stuck after overshooting the corners of Zetzer and Andrews Avenues. After doing so, Padilla requested Caraig to allow him to disengage. This time, the latter allegedly threatened Padilla with death if he did.370 The rebels took complete control of the 529 SOS, and later, left at 1:30 a.m. of 1 December, making sure all the communication lines were out.371 Meanwhile, they had stored the firearms they gathered from the 529 SOS personnel in the two V-150s they had commandeered.372

Attack on the 205th Helicopter Wing HQ

Other Marine troopers maneuvered to capture the air assets inside the base. After ramming Gate 2, the Marine LVTs went to the flight line of the 205 HW. Fifty Marines marching at the back of the LVTs disarmed the guards at the 505 Air Reserve (AR) flight line, and took hostage four officers and 26 enlisted personnel (EP). Capt Antonio Bautista, Commander of the 209th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, who was still at the flight line, directed two EPs to arm their helicopters. They immediately returned because rebel Marines had already taken control of the flight line.373

By early morning, several trucks with an estimated two companies had entered the flight line to reinforce the rebel troops. Two platoons with the LVTs proceeded to Hangars B and C and immobilized the 452nd First Division Marine Squadron (FDMS) and 451st Special Squadron (SS) personnel.374 Then two V-150s followed and stopped at the 205 HW driveway near the Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ). The Marines in the V-150s shouted at the Wing personnel led by BGen Loven Abadia to surrender but the latter steadfastly held their ground and placed more M-60 machine guns in front of the HQ.375

By dawn, the rebel Marine tanks bombarded the 205 HW HQ area with cannon fire.376 A gunbattle ensued as Loven Abadia and his men gave resistance to the Marines’ attack.377 The firefight lasted ten to 15 minutes.378 Loven Abadia and his men laid flat on their stomachs as the tanks kept firing. Rebel Rangers were seen leading the attack. When one of Loven Abadia’s men was injured, a PAF colonel on the government side waved his cap at the LVTs so that he could approach the wounded soldier. The colonel was mad and he shouted invectives at the Rangers who also approached the wounded man. The Colonel shouted: “Bakit ninyo kami binabaril? Hindi ba kami ang sumasagip sa inyo sa bundok? [Why are you firing at us? Aren’t we the ones who save you in the mountains?]”379

The gunbattle left the 205 HW HQ partially burned and the BOQ razed to the ground. The force of the Marines was overwhelming. They later took control of the 205 HW tarmac. They, however, were not able to fly any of the helicopters and other aircraft because none of the pilots of the 205 HW HQ would cooperate with the rebels.380

Rebel Control of the Gates

Other rebel Marines in Villamor supported by armor took control of Gates 1, 2 and 3. Not knowing about the loyalty of the Marines as they passed the 528th Law Enforcement Squadron (LES) HQ, its EX-O, Capt Jose Maceda, led a team to investigate Gate 2 where Marines surrounded them and confiscated their firearms. Maceda identified the rebel officers as Lt Col Gojo, Lt Col Gasmin, Capt Mariano, ex-Lt Col Bernarte, Capt Querubin, Capt Pineda, and another captain with Serial No: 0-7790381 who confiscated Capt Maceda’s .45 cal pistol.382

Entry at HPAF

The Headquarters of the Philippine Air Force (HPAF) houses the offices of top PAF officers including the COC which coordinates all movements of the PAF. At 4:00 a.m., rebel Marines surrounded HPAF and broke the glass doors of the first and second floors. They checked out every office including those belonging to Air Personnel, Logistics, Comptroller, Dental Surgeon, Chief of Engineers, and the Chief Chaplain. The personnel in the Dental Surgeon’s office were sent to the Dental Dispensary and the Chaplain personnel to the chapel, while the Air Logistics personnel were told to stay in the office but were ordered to keep the doors locked. All telephone lines in the HPAF were cut.383 The Marines ransacked the HPAF Supply Section as the seven supply personnel were disarmed and confined at the office of the Air Comptroller.

Negotiation at the HPAF

Inside the Air Personnel Office, Col Santiago Madrid, PAF EX-O, met the rebel Marines. He asked that he be brought to Maj De la Peña whom he personally knew. Madrid was led to de la Peña and Lt Col Gojo at the hallway of HPAF. Gojo wanted to assault the third floor of the HPAF and gave an ultimatum. Madrid, in an effort to negotiate with the rebels, called the COC at the third floor and was able to relay the ultimatum. Answering the call, the Air Personnel Officer replied that Gojo must deal first with the Commander of the Air Squadron, BGen Acot, before making any move towards the third floor.

Dialogues followed. Col Roberto Sabularse, Air Comptroller EX-O, and Madrid served as intermediaries who relayed messages between the rebels and the PAF officers at the third floor. They managed to convince the former not to attack the third floor because all the personnel there were already immobilized. Madrid also tried to convince Gojo to stop the attack at the 205 HW.

MGen de Leon, in the meantime, was able to maintain constant communication with other unit commanders and to direct the operation of other PAF bases through the COC. Fortunately, the personnel of the Office of the Director for Communications-Electronics under Col Edgardo Rosal, who were on stand by at the third floor, ensured the continuous operation of the radio and telephone in the COC.384

By 4:00 a.m. some tanks and Marine troops, after immobilizing the 205 HW, the BOQ and Hangars B and C, the 505 ARS, 520 ABW and the 452 FDMS, had regrouped at the flight line. Two more Marine platoons crossed Fort Bonifacio to VAB. Armed with bazookas and machine guns, the rebels occupied the overpass connecting the gates of both camps.385

Meanwhile, Lt Caraig, after immobilizing the 520 ABW, ordered the two V-150s to be brought to the gate of the 420 SW HQ. The armor vehicles, upon orders of Caraig, rammed the gate but were fired upon.386

As of 8:00 a.m. the Marine troops were still in control of VAB. They were then consolidating their forces, with some Marine elements looting the firearms supply and cash storage boxes.387 At 9:00 a.m., some Marines started to move out. Members of the MBLT 4 boarded a 6 x 6 truck which brought them to PTV-4.

Aircraft Activity from Villamor

The NCRDC Command Operations Center received a report that a helicopter left VAB for Camps Aguinaldo and Crame at about 5:15 a.m.388 Upon learning this, personnel at the HPAF contacted BGen Jose Comendador, CG 2 Air Division (2 AD), to request for the dispatch of four F-5s from Mactan Air Base (MAB) in order to intercept the rebel planes at VAB. The planes from MAB never arrived. It was later learned that Comendador prevented the pilots from flying the planes.389

The Marines wanted to take control of the helicopter air assets in VAB. Ex-Lt Cols Ceferino Sarmenta and Dante Bernarte tried to persuade, but without success, the pilots of 505 ARS under Lt Col Rodolfo de Castro, Squadron Commander, to fly the helicopters out of VAB.390 Bernarte was also seen talking to Lt Lopito Gonzales, aide of Col Jaime Ileto, at the back of the VAB theatre. Incidentally, both Bernarte and Gonzales were also implicated in the August 1987 coup.391

According to Gonzales, however, he was sent by Ileto from Clark Air Base to return Loven Abadia’s gun. He was still in VAB when the attempted coup occurred, and he talked to Bernarte who was his previous CO.392

Firefight at the 205 HW HQ

The firefight at the 205 HW still raged by early afternoon. The Wing personnel fired at the LVTs and the Marine troops as they approached the HQ area.393 The Marines retaliated with a Howitzer round aimed at the HQ, which damaged the Wing Adjutant’s office, killed TSgt Austria and wounded Sgt Rolando Acevedo, A1C Alex Urnaguing, and Sgt Baccay.394 Personnel of the 529 SOS, 520 ABW with their Squadron Commander, Maj Julius de la Torre, proceeded to the 205 HW HQ after a ten-minute lull in firing. While at the corridor of the building with some personnel of the 205 HW, de la Torre heard two big bursts from an M203 (grenade launcher) fired by the Marines. These hit the 529 SOS building and wounded its seven personnel.

During the lull, women were seen bringing food to the rebels. Loven Abadia tried to contact GHQ AFP to bring reinforcements. However, it was reported that the tank reinforcement sent turned around and joined the rebels.395

Negotiation for a Ceasefire

Col Felix Duenas, Air Plans EX-O, called up Col Paulino Poquez, Duty Officer of the 205 HW, to advise the Wing personnel not to return fire as the former was negotiating a ceasefire with the rebel Marines at HPAF. Col Romeo Daranchang, together with Lt Col Cordero and Capt Andayan, arrived at HPAF to persuade Gojo and de la Peña to return to Fort Bonifacio. Both rebel officers refused.

Duenas and Sabularse spoke to Loven Abadia proposing a ceasefire wherein Abadia was not to take counter-offensive action provided the Marines desist from attacking Abadia and his men. This proposal was similar to an earlier agreement forged with the rebels at HPAF. Loven Abadia refused, insisting that the Marines should leave the 205 HW area first. But as the Marine troopers continued firing, he fought back. Meanwhile, rebel Marines and Rangers surrounded the 205 HW compound and some were able to penetrate the rear, capturing some of Loven Abadia’s men. Abadia moved forward and went inside a building near the 205 HW HQ.

Cols Sabularse, Duenas, and Atayde, Deputy Commander of the 205 HW, met with Lt Gener del Rosario of 16 IB, 2 ID, who referred them to ex-Lt Col Bernarte, who in turn, directed them to Col Reynaldo Samaco. Unable to decide on Abadia’s terms, Samaco escorted them to Gojo who was at the HPAF area. While initially insistent that Abadia and his men first lay down their arms, Gojo finally agreed not to fire as long as Abadia and his men would not fire. Col Sabularse and company returned to the 205 HW area but found the 205 HW personnel already disarmed; Abadia, however, was nowhere to be found. He was still inside a building together with four unidentified lieutenants.396

Atayde stayed behind while Sabularse and Duenas proceeded to the Air Force Research and Development Center. The two were tasked to see Gojo at the HPAF area to arrange a meeting with either BGens Acot or Protacio.397 Acot was able to talk to Gojo.398 The rebel Marines at the 205 HW area were then fetched by trucks, later consolidating at the HPAF.399 Loven Abadia managed to escape, and boarded a taxi for Camp Aguinaldo.

Then at about 3:00 p.m., news of a government offensive was received. Poquez received a call from Capt Edgardo Samonte, CSAFP Aide, that loyal F-5s strafed and destroyed the rebel air assets in Sangley. Unconfirmed news that the F-5s will also go to VAB to target the tanks at the 205 HW flight line made Poquez instruct his personnel to retreat behind the HQ. The F-5s did not arrive. Instead, three USAF F-4s flew over VAB on persuasion flights.400

President Aquino made a call at 3:34 p.m. to Capt Eustaquito Manalo, Wing Commander, 205th Presidential Airlift Wing. Manalo briefed the President about the situation in his area.401

Movement of Rebel Marines to Camp Aguinaldo

The Marines disabled the helicopters located at the VAB tarmac and those inside Hangars B and C by breaking their chin bubbles and cutting the electrical wirings.402 After doing so, the Marines left the hangars and started converging near the HPAF.

At about 10:00 p.m., a large number of Marines prepared to leave the HPAF. Three LVTs, three V-150s, two of them with serial nos F-301 and F-302, and several trucks, joined the Marines.403 2Lt Gelvezon ordered his troops to move.404 The 4 MC MBLT 4 left Villamor and headed north.405 Some of his men thought they were returning to Fort Bonifacio; but instead, they headed for EDSA on foot. There was some shooting as they crossed the Magallanes overpass, but they were able to continue towards White Plains.406 The rebel Marine troops passed through Mandaluyong, then Valle Verde and ended up near the Mormon Church at White Plains.407 Although some of the Marines returned to barracks during this night march, the rebels numbered about 600 by the time they were in the vicinity of Camp Aguinaldo.408

BGen Gerardo Flores, PC-INP Intelligence Chief (C2), received a report on the departure of the rebel Marines from VAB. The 701 Bde under Col Edgardo Batenga was dispatched from Camp Aguinaldo to block the rebel Marines at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue.409 At around 1:00 p.m., the Marines (with some PA and GHQ troops) under Lt del Rosario were fired upon by a government Sikorsky helicopter as they were headed towards White Plains, causing them to retreat to an abandoned house.410

C.4.c. 2 December

Government Forces Retake Control of VAB and Assess Damage

By midnight, rebel Marines had completely withdrawn from VAB, and government troops once again took control of the base.411 Capt Lauro de la Cruz, Security Officer, went down from the third floor and assessed the damage at the HPAF.412 2Lt Abner Awang with 14 men, took over the 529 SOS building. The commander of 529 SOS also found that their armory had been ransacked, and the cabinets plus table drawers were forcibly opened. An inventory was made of the supply and the armory. The 529 SOS personnel were then directed to secure Gate 2. The DACE and 501 CS personnel worked round the clock and reinstalled 28 AFP and PLDT telephones that were disconnected in the HPAF offices, including the PLDT cable destroyed during the firefight at the 205 HW.413

As a precautionary measure against a possible return of the rebels, the Explosives Detection and Demolition Team (EDDT), was directed to plant claymore mines and improvised bombs (drums of gasoline) at Gates 1 and 2 of VAB to prevent possible re-entry of rebel tanks. The EDDT also scoured the area for bombs that may have been planted by rebel forces. In the process, they discovered three boxes of ammunition taken from the 205 HW HQ and the Presidential Airlift Wing and a PLDT transmission line in a plastic container at the 520 ABW Commander’s Office.414

C.4.d. 3 December

The AFP TRACOM convoy under BGen Pedro Juachon, which included two V-150s and a crew from NCRDC, arrived at VAB at early dawn with instructions from MGen de Leon to stay in VAB, defend the base from possible enemy attacks, and apprehend withdrawing rebel forces holed up in Makati or Manila intending to regroup at VAB.415

C.5. Manila Domestic Airport and Cavite Coastal Road Incident

To the rebels, control of airports is necessary to stop the movement of government troops from other areas and to facilitate the arrival of rebel troops and armaments from the provinces.

C.5.a. Before 30 November

Planning for the Takeover of Manila Domestic Airport

As early as 15 and 16 November 1989, a group composed of ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang and Maj Jose Gamos, TSgt Inocentes Dionesa and some members of the NAIA Police led by P/Lt Romeo Raquion held a conference at the office of Viking Brokerage located at the old Manila International Airport (MIA) in preparation for the launching of a coup d’etat. During the meeting, Raquion assured Gamos that he could supply 15 of his men, mostly members of the Guardians.416 It seemed that the purpose of the meeting was to recruit volunteers to augment rebel forces in their takeover of NAIA and the Manila Domestic Airport (MDA). Raquion, however, denied any participation in the coup.417

C.5.b. 30 November

Mobilization of the Guardians

In the early evening, Rodolfo Morit, Jr, a ranking national officer and Honasan’s co-incorporator of the Guardian Centre Foundation Inc (GCFI), went inside the prison reservation of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and gathered about 30 Guardians.418 Morit was dressed in a military uniform. He directed them to attend a meeting of the Guardians at Baltao Subdivision in Paranaque, Metro Manila that same evening.

The 30 Guardians were composed of 26 prison guards, including Manuel Garces, Jr, the founder and leader of the Bureau of Corrections Muntinlupa Guardian Brotherhood Inc Chapter, and four civilians identified as Baggy Sacco, Rolando Pascual, Eduardo Franco and Roger Borja.419

The group left Muntinlupa at about 10:00 p.m in three civilian vehicles (two Harabas and a jeepney) driven by one Brasil, Garces and Sacco. On their way to Baltao Subdivision, Morit told them that their mission was to assist the government forces at the NAIA against the expected attack of NPA rebel forces.420 They arrived at Baltao Subdivision at around 11:00 p.m.

The movement of the prison guards was reported by Bureau of Corrections Superintendent Vicente Apurongto Prisons Director Meliton Goyena, a retired PC brigadier general. Goyena was told that the reason for the movement was to assist the RAM-HF soldiers stage a coup in Manila.421

Troop Movement of Maj Jose Gamos and ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang

At about 11:00 p.m., some 70 uniformed armed men led by Maj Gamos and ex-Maj Tugbang, met at the Barangay Hall of Brgy Vitales, Parañaque.422

C.5.c. 1 December

This group of 70 armed men proceeded to MDA.

At about 1:35 a.m.,the government monitoring team at VAB reported heavy exchange of gunfire at the vicinity of MDA.423 The PAFSECOM soldiers, defending the airport terminal, fought the RAM-HF forces. At around 2:00 a.m., another heavy exchange of gunfire in front of the area took place lasting for ten minutes.424

Danilo “King” Cruz, a broker representative, received a radio call from ex-Lt Col Bibit to proceed to Baltao Subdivision fronting the Cargo Terminal at NAIA. Cruz was PRO of the Customs Gun Club when Bibit was the president. Cruz is said to be an ex-PC Sergeant and former bodyguard of Jackie Ponce Enrile. At the NAIA, Cruz saw Bibit and 40 other armed men, one of whom was Tugbang. From NAIA, the group proceeded to MDA.425

Gamos arrived at Baltao Subdivision with his armed companions and led them and the Guardians from the Bureau of Corrections to the Ding Velayo Sports Complex across MDA, arriving there at 5:00 a.m. Gamos instructed the Guardians to stay there and await the delivery of food.426 The group of Gamos positioned themselves at the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service office at the old MIA.

About 100 RAM-HF soldiers arrived at the Baggage Terminal Area of MDA and demanded from Lina Precalla, a lady security guard, the keys to the parked vehicles outside. Since Precalla did not have the keys, Capt Bistro, the leader of the rebels, ordered the rigging of the ignition system so the vehicles could be used.427

By 5:45 a.m., the forces of Gamos and Tugbang, now numbering about 100, had taken control of the MDA Terminal Building. They overpowered the PAFSECOM personnel guarding the building and herded them into a room inside the terminal.428

By morning the RAM-HF forces began using PAL facilities at MDA. At about 9:00 a.m., a van resembling a PAL delivery truck arrived at the Velayo Sports Complex bringing food in packs similar to that served during in-flight meals. The Guardians partook of the food and shared it with their fellow rebels inside the sports complex.429

At 10:00 a.m., a V-150 with “RAM-SFP” markings430 earlier captured at VAB by the rebel forces led by Lt Caraig, arrived at the MDA.431 Then, three PAL vehicles arrived infront of the PC/INP Hangar loaded with about 20 fully-armed men, either in military or civilian attire. One alighted and talked to P/Lt Ricardo Espiritu, a police officer stationed at the hangar. To avoid armed confrontation and destruction of PC/INP assets, an agreement was reached allowing P/Lt Espiritu and his men to retain their arms and equipment, while the rebel soldiers in the PAL vehicles stayed in the area.432

The V-150 returned to VAB by early evening and then proceeded to the South Expressway to wait for other rebel troops coming from Calamba, Laguna.433 It was reported that these troops stopped upon reaching the Calamba gate of the South Expressway, when a government helicopter flown by BGen Loven Abadia hovered over and poised to attack them if they proceeded.434

Government Troops Take Defensive Action

At the Quick Reaction Center at the old MIA, a Battle Staff was created by the PAFSECOM. There were reports that Bibit used the telephone facilities of DHL office located at the old MIA building.435 A detailed check of DHL phone bills did not disclose any use by Bibit of DHL phones. However, DHL Philippines General Manager Jose Feliciano told the Commission that Crismel Verano has been DHL’s tax consultant for more than ten years now.436 Verano is linked to the coup in the Galido affidavits.437 In coordination with NAIA General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, PAFSECOM personnel barricaded runways 06-24 and 13-31 with fire trucks, baggage containers and other obstruction to prevent the use of the runways by the rebels.438

Withdrawal from the Manila Domestic Airport and Confrontation at the Cavite Coastal Road

By afternoon, the RAM-HF forces led by Gamos and Tugbang, withdrew from MDA and proceeded to the vicinity of Quirino Avenue and Coastal Road in Parañaque. They were blocked by government forces from the South Sector Command (SSC) of PC CAPCOM led by its CO, Lt Col Jose Bandung, Jr. The roadblock was earlier established at 2:00 a.m. by BGen Aguirre to prevent the entry of rebel forces from Cavite.439

The RAM-HF troops sent an emissary in the person ofTSgt Inocentes Dionesa, PC, to request Bandung not to block their way. Because Bandung would not give way, a firefight lasting for about two hours occurred.440 After a while, Gamos again sent a feeler to Bandung and when that effort failed, shooting erupted between the contending forces until the rebels started to withdraw towards Tambo, Parafiaque.441

At about 5:00 p.m., the troops of P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto, CO MPFF, in two 6 x 6 trucks, arrived at the Coastal Road area to augment the blocking force of Bandung and to establish another road block there.442

During the firefight, Bandung, PC SSgts Leonardo de la Rosa, Melvynne Luzuriaga, Reynaldo Montforte, and Chito Mercado, all of the government side, were wounded.443 On the rebel side, Cpl Uy was killed and others were wounded including Danilo Cruz. A Red Cross volunteer was similarly wounded and Airport policeman Ruben de la Cruz was killed.444

Withdrawal of the Guardians

The Guardians from Muntinlupa stayed in front of the Ding Velayo Sports Complexup to 3:00p.m., waitingfor the promised delivery of guns and uniforms. No delivery was made. When the RAM-HF soldiers occupying MDA left, the Guardians felt abandoned.445 They started leaving the place one by one; the last one to leave was Manuel Garces, Jr. According to the latter, they abandoned their three vehicles prior to their return to Muntinlupa to avoid detection.446 They were able to return to the New Bilibid Prison Reservation in Muntinlupa that same afternoon, unnoticed by the guards at the main gate, despite the augmented guards and the two machine guns earlier mounted at the main entrance of the prison reservation.447

No formal administrative investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Correction officials and no formal report had been submitted to the Department of Justice about the activities of these guards during the last coup.448 The Commission, through Resolution No.089449 dated 4 July 1990, recommended to the Department of Justice their investigation.

RAM-HF Soldiers Withdraw

By 9:30 p.m., majority of the RAM-HF soldiers inside MDA had pulled out and moved towards VAB on board private cars and vans.450 Moments after, the armed group that arrived at the PC/INP Hangar premises also left the area.451

C.6. PTV-4 Incident

C.6.a. 30 November

The takeover of the government television station, PTV-4, located at Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, was crucial for the coup considering that television is a vital medium for propaganda. When informed about an impending coup, Conrado Limcaoco, network manager of PTV-4, instructed his security aide, MSgt Jesus de Guzman, to advise 2Lt Alfredo Javillonar, PC OIC Security Platoon assigned at PTV-4, that a red alert had been declared at about 5:00 p.m. Javillonar was then at his camp at Bago Bantay.452 Later that night, Javillonar went to PTV-4 and briefed his personnel, assigning some of them to the entrance gate at Scout Albano St and the others to the barracks inside the compound.453

Movement of Rebels to PTV-4 Complex

At about midnight, the 34 MC oftheMBLT 4 under Lt Rolando Cal, arrived at the PTV-4 compound from VAB aboard two ten-wheeler civilian trucks, taxis, and Ford Fieras, accompanied by two V-150s. According to Pfc Cadera,454 the movement was upon orders of Gojo. Other units were also mobilized by the RAM-HF troops.

C.6.b. 1 December

At around 1:40 a.m., Capt Nestor Bernardino, CO 221 PC Coy stationed in Taytay, Rizal, told his men of the directive for them to establish checkpoints in Taytay. However, instead of doing so, he brought his men to PTV-4 compound where they were met by several soldiers upon their arrival at around 2:00 a.m. Three unidentified officers fetched Capt Bernardino. When he returned, he distributed white patches to his men for countersign purposes. Some soldiers withdrew from the area and returned to their station455 because they sensed that Capt Bernardino deceived them.

By 1:00 a.m. an undetermined number of RAM-HF soldiers stopped a ten-wheeler truck (Plate No CFL 333) at the Nichols underpass. The truck driver, Anastacio de la Cruz, said that he was delivering construction materials to Pasay City when he was commandeered by men in military uniform.456 The truck was brought to PTV-4 at about 3:00 a.m. where the soldiers disembarked.457

Attack at PTV-4 Complex

At 1:10 a.m., some 250 Scout Rangers and Marines clad in black and comouflage uniforms, respectively, with one Scorpion tank and a V-150 arrived and deployed at Scout Esguerra and Albano Streets near PTV-4.458 Lt Col Ernesto Salvador, CO of the NCRDC Security Battalion, called 2Lt Javillonar and instructed him to prepare as rebel soldiers were likely to enter the area.459 By 1:30 a.m., two ten-wheeler trucks loaded with uniformed men followed by two V-150s and one APC tank approached the PTV-4 gate. The two trucks stopped at the pedestrian gate and the men under Lt Cal rushed in side the compound and occupied strategic points. The V-150s and the APC proceeded to Scout Albano St. Javillonar ordered the duty technicians to immobilize the television and radio stations.460 Cal asked Javillonar to join them but he refused.461

A reinforcement platoon from Alpha Coy, Security Battalion, under Lt Manuel Visperas and 2Lt Oscar Fajardo, was dispatched to PTV-4 to aid Javillonar and his unit.462 The platoon, abdard a 6 x 6 truck, arrived at PTV-4 at 1:40 a.m.463 Fajardo, was instructed by Lt Col Salvador through the radio to assault the rebel forces. Fajardo hesitated because the rebel forces were superior in number. Moreover, government troops and civilian employees of PTV-4 were still inside. Instead, Visperas tried to negotiate for the peaceful and safe evacuation of Javillonar and his men.464 Javillonar introduced Cal to Visperas. Cal gave Visperas the choice of either joining them or remaining neutral. Salvador arrived to personally assess the situation. He negotiated with an unidentified soldier who told him that the rebels were led by Kapunan and Batac. After negotiations, civilian employees and government troops were allowed to leave the PTV-4 compound.

Javillonar then proceeded to their barracks situated at PTV-4’s tennis court which was also surrounded by rebel forces. One of his men reported that the armory of the Security Platoon was opened and unidentified Scout Rangers took, among others, three M-16 rifles, one .50 cal machine gun, and a recoilless rifle. It was reported that “RAM boys” entered the barracks and held at gunpoint SN1 Ricardo Peña, Sgt Tambot PAF, JN1 Galit, Cpl Bataan, A1C Canlas, and SSgt Baybayan. Personal belongings such as fatigue uniforms and shoes were also taken. He then directed his men to join Visperas’ men at the gate of PTV-4.465

Salvador ordered Javillonar to move to GMA-7 and Visperas to proceed to Broadcast City.466 At the main gate, Salvador ordered his men to move out since they were outnumbered.467

Government Troops Regroup

Salvador’s men regrouped at GMA-7 at about 3:30 a.m. and from there proceeded to Broadcast City where they linked up with the unit of Maj Marcelino Yacat, PMAR, head of the military detachment at the Batasang Pambansa. BGen Biazon gave orders for Salvador to act as negotiator with the rebels at PTV-4, and for Yacat to lead the combined units of the Security Battalion and the Marine forces to launch a tactical assault against the rebels should the negotiations fail.468

At 4:00 a.m., some Officer Candidate School (OCS) students of AFP TRACOM led by Maj Wilhelm Doromal arrived at PTV-4 to support the rebel forces.469 Meanwhile, armed men with white armbands entered the PTV-4 penthouse. A certain Mr Bilbao recognized “Red” Kapunan among them.470

By 5:00 a.m., the streets leading to PTV-4 were blocked by the rebels with the assistance of some civilians. Rebel troops blocked the corner of Quezon Blvd and EDSA with a ten-wheeler truck.471 NCRDC COC received a report that rebel Scout Rangers and Marines were also blocking the vicinity of Bohol Avenue and Scout Albano St.472 Cal pulled out the 34 MC from PTV-4 and stationed it at a nearby street corner.473 Some rebels went to Quezon Blvd staying there till nightfall of 1 December.474

Government Troops Try to Retake PTV-4

At 5:00a.m., the four platoons ofthe Marine Security Group (MSG), with orders from higher HQ arrived at PTV-4 to retake it. At the back of PTV-4, RAM-HF soldiers started firing at the first MSG platoon. An exchange of gunfire ensued. A grenade from an M-79 grenade launcher exploded, injuring Pfc Binanitan and Pfc Tironez.475

The other government troops moved to the intersection of Quezon Blvd and EDSA. The fourth MSG platoon under Capt Javier and the 22 MC MBLT 2 under 2Lt Ramon Mitra III moved towards south of Quezon Blvd while the other platoons turned left towards Cubao. At the vicinity of Aristocrat Restaurant, about 200 enemy troops were positioned. As Capt Javier’s troops were taking cover, heavy fire came from a Tora-Tora Plane killing Pfc Villaces and Cpl Galpo and wounding Sgt Lasang, Sgt Rafallo, Cpl Rudam, Pfc Rivero, TSgt Catbugan, SSgt Hernandez, Pfc Caasi, and Sgt Vitales.476

The government troopers returned fire, retaliating with their V-150. The first, second and third platoons under Capt Bucsit stationed themselves at the corner wall of PTV-4 in Mother Ignacia and Scout Albano intersection. Another firefight started at about 5:30 a.m. During a lull in the fighting, Maj Yacat took the opportunity to negotiate for the surrender of the rebels.

Meanwhile, the fourth platoon was deployed by Capt Javier within 50 meters from PTV-4. They planned to redeploy by squads. When they were about to do so, they were hit by gunfire from 90 RR mortar and bombing from a Tora-Tora plane.477

The elements of the MSG and the Marine Contingency Battalion failed at this time to retake PTV-4 due to strong enemy resistance and the presence of civilians. They instead established blocking positions at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Blvd.478 At 6:45 a.m., armed confrontation continued. While the 22 MC MBLT 2 soldiers were resting at a corner not far from PTV-4, enemy soldiers fired at them. They fired back causing the rebels to retreat.479

Enemy Airstrikes and Reinforcements

At 7:00 a.m., the 15 SW Operation Center monitored that PTV-4 was a target of the rebel Tora-Tora planes.480 Upon sighting the convoy of government troops heading for PTV-4, two Tora-Toras strafed them, killing a number of civilians and soldiers at EDSA and Quezon Blvd. The rebel planes were also observed flying over Camp Aguinaldo and bombing NCRDC Headquarters by 7:20 a.m.481

At 8:00 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky helicopter joined the two Tora-Toras in strafing government forces under Salvador and Yacat.482 The helicopter also bombed NCRDC Headquarters.483 It attacked elements of the Security Battalion positioned at the transmitter of RPN 9 in Panay Avenue.484

At 9:00 a.m., the 44 MC MBLT 4 left VAB on board a 6 x 6 truck, and proceeded to PTV-4 to reinforce the 34 MC MBLT 4. With the former were Capt Romulo Gualdrapa, Capt Edgardo Cabalquinto, Lt Santos Petalio, and 2Lt Adonis Fernandez.485

From late morning till noontime, radio reports were heard about ongoing negotiations between government forces and the rebels. DZRH reported the negotiations between Capt Javier representing the government, and for the rebels, Lt Paterno Reynato Padua of the Scout Rangers and Lt Rolly Tan of the Marines. However, the negotiations were interrupted due to the presence of civilians (“uziseros“).486

DZRH also reported that Marine Sgt Lloma, one of the APC personnel, defected to the rebel side, allegedly because, their leader Maj Marcelino Lakap was gone and they had no support nor reinforcement from Camp Aguinaldo. Speaker Ramon Mitra, through the radio, urged Sgt Lloma to take charge of the command and not to defect.487 Subsequent information disclosed that this was a rebel psywar tactic.

At noontime, rebel troops posted at EDSA corner Quezon Blvd were able to surround two government APCs near the Ninoy Aquino Park.488

Rafael Recto Arrives at PTV-4

At about 8:00 a.m., rebel soldiers under Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan took over PTV-4 and established a temporary command post in the office of Network Manager Conrado Limcaoco on the third floor.489 Around 2:00 p.m., a group led by Rafael Recto arrived at PTV-4. With Recto were Joaquin Rodriguez and Edgardo Castro, an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs and one of those involved in processing the issuance of a passport to Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. Both Rodriguez and Castro testified that they accompanied Recto to PTV-4 because he (Recto) claimed his daughter Plinky was at the adjoining ABS-CBN station and he wanted to fetch her.

According to PTV-4 Chief Security Officer, Orlando Fontanilla, Recto’s group was allowed entry into the compound by a rebel Scout Ranger officer who instructed him to bring Recto and his group to the third floor of PTV-4. Fontanilla complied and brought Recto and his companions to Limcaoco’s office where Recto inquired from the rebel officers there about a press conference.490 One of the rebels replied, according to Fontanilla, “wala daw presscon, walang order na may presscon491 (There’s no presscon. We have no orders for a presscon). With that, Recto and his group departed from PTV-4. Fontanilla testified that Recto neither entered the premises of ABS-CBN nor asked him about Plinky. In their testimony before the Commission, Rodriguez and Castro also confirmed that Recto did not enter ABS-CBN.

In his sworn statement, Fontanilla stated that he saw Lito Gorospe in the Master Control booth of ABS-CBN with a written statement which Gorospe intended to read and 12 videocassettes which he would show, if they were able to operate ABS-CBN.492 However, both ABS-CBN and PTV-4 had been disabled so none of these events took place.

Government Troops Retake PTV-4

The rebel soldiers left the PTV-4 premises at 9:00 p.m.493

Rebel MBLT 4 troops which occupied PTV-4, moved to Ortigas Avenue.494 Some of them regrouped at the nearby JUSMAG area while the others, at the vicinity of Camelot Hotel.495

At 9:30 p.m., Salvador, and a composite team from GHQ, reoccupied PTV-4.496 At 10:00 p.m., 2Lt Javillonar returned to PTV-4 and inspected the building together with the Administrative Manager, Emmanuel de Asis. They discovered that the vault (of money) had been forced open. The lockers of the soldiers assigned at the station and the armory in the general manager’s room on the third floor were likewise ransacked. Guns, ammunition, and personal belongings of the soldiers were gone.497

At 11:30 p.m., Maj Ducusin, CO MBLT 2, left Camp Aguinaldo and established blocking positions at the vicinity of corner EDSA and East Avenue, Quezon City.498

C.6.c. 2 December

At 1:30 a.m., rebel troops left ABS-CBN for Timog/Circle, accompanied by some civilians in T-shirts and “maong” pants and escorted by two V-150s.499 One of the V-150s (Body No. 401) developed engine trouble and was abandoned. Elements of the Security Battalion under MSgt Tangonan recovered the V-150 and towed it to their HQ.500

By 5:00 a.m., MGen Ramon Montano ordered BGen Cesar Nazareno, RECOM 3 Commander, to block all enemy forces withdrawing from PTV-4 heading towards Camps Crame and Aguinaldo.501

By 6:00 a.m., the 34 MC MBLT 4 under Lt Cal had moved to the Camp Aguinaldo area near White Plains to join their comrades.502

D. Camp Aguinaldo and its Vicinity

It appears that the ultimate objective of the rebels were to take over Camp Aguinaldo because this meant the fall of the symbolic seat of military power and to gain control of the center for AFP military operations. Inside Camp Aguinaldo are the headquarters of the AFPs top military officers, the main office of the Department of National Defense, the Logistics Command (LOGCOM) which controls and supplies the fire power, ammunitions and equipment requirement of the entire AFP, and the Joint Operations Center (JOC) which Col Edgardo Batenga, CO 701 Bde, describes as “the heart and soul of GHQ AFP.”503

D.1. Pre 30 November Events

Intelligence Receives Mixed Signals of a Coup

As early as June 1989, the AFP Intelligence Office (J2) received information on a joint Zumel-Honasan attempt to destabilize government on the first or second week of June 1989. The plans did not materialize, although there was information of recruitment inside PAF bases by ex-Lt Col Neon Ebuen.504

Information on recruitment continued to be received up to August 1989 when Honasan was reportedly meeting unidentified top military officers and government officials.505 During this month, the Bureau of Customs uncovered a shipment of one million primers used for the manufacture of ammunitions for .45 cal guns consigned to Honasan. The Bureau turned them over to the PC Firearms and Explosives Unit (FEU).506

Around 26 November, NCRDC Intelligence under Col Benjamin Libarnes received information that a coup would be staged either on 1-5 December, 16-21 December, or 28-31 December of 1989, or 15-16 January 1990 by the joint forces of Marcos-Ver Loyalists and the RAM-HF.

There were also information about other plots. Military intelligence believed that the so-called “Peoples’ March for Justice” from Ilocos Norte to Manila from 26 October to 4 November was preparatory to a coup. When the coup failed to materialize, a second “Peoples’ March for Justice” was planned for 16-20 December with the Pambansang Salubungan Para Sa Katarungan (PSPK), an affiliate of the Movement for Filipino Ideology, as the front group.507

NCRDC Intelligence further reported that the security force under Gamos assigned to Vice President Laurel was preparing plans, code names and numbers, sketches of streets and buildings, and vehicles for a coup. The most compelling evidence was the information given by the wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola, who was undergoing Scout Ranger training in San Quintin, Pangasinan.508 Upon instruction of her husband, Mrs Cachola revealed to the Philippine Marines that her husband and another officer who was also undergoing training, were called to the PSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio and were briefed on the forthcoming coup.509

Infiltration from Within

On rotation, a Senior Command Duty Officer (SCDO) is designated for the 77-hectare Camp Aguinaldo Complex. By practice, the SCDO’s lasts for a period of two weeks.510 A Command Duty Officer (CDO) at LOGCOM is likewise designated. On 30 November, rebel officers Commo Domingo Calajate and Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Operations Officer LOGCOM, were SCDO of Camp Aguinaldo and the CDO of LOGCOM respectively. LOGCOM occupies two-thirds of the land area of Camp Aguinaldo. AFP GHQ occupies the remainder.

In September 1989, Navy Capt Manuel Ison, the newly installed CO of the Maintenance Depot of the AFP LOGCOM, completely reorganized and reshuffled the unit, replacing key personnel with his own. His recommendee, Lt Joel Cantos, took charge of the keys to the warehouses which contain oils, lubricants and spare parts. Ison also replaced some of the personnel of the Supply Accountability Office (SAO) with his own men and at the same time restricted Josue Duque, SAO Officer, from entering the warehouse.

On 29 November, troops started to mass in Camp Aguinaldo. NCRDC Intelligence failed to assess the importance of the arrival at LOGCOM that day of a Marine company from MBLT 511 based in Bulacan headed by Capt Wilfredo Codiacal, EX-O, with a V-150. Pfc Marcelino Peralta said that the company was ordered to proceed to LOGCOM by Capt Codiacal without revealing their mission.512 This company first went to VAB, then proceeded to LOGCOM. Another Marine guard company, which was assigned to escort supplies to be picked up from LOGCOM, arrived on 30 November from Olongapo.513

D.2. 30 November

At about 11:00 a.m., Col Thelmo Cunanan, CO 202 Bde 2 ID, came to the office of Commo Virgilio Marcelo, CG GHHSC, and told the latter “There is gonna be a coup to be staged by the Marines and the Rangers”. Thereupon, Marcelo mobilized all his troops and by 4:00 p.m., they were all ready. At the same time, he relayed the information to BGen Roman Gavino, Jr, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and asked for confirmation. The latter could not confirm.514

At 5:30 p.m., a group of soldiers held a meeting at one of the houses at the Enlisted Men’s Barrio inside Camp Aguinaldo near Gate 5. They discussed plans to ransack the Civil Relations Service (CRS) for arms. Commo Marcelo received information that ex-Lt Col Bibit’s group was already inside the camp to seize its armories.

Government Holds Top Command Conference

The Tagaytay incident led Secretary Ramos, together with Gen de Villa, to call a Command Conference which was held at ISAFP in Camp Aguinaldo starting at 5:00 p.m. The General Staff, the major service commanders, BGen Cardones, BGen Cabanlig, BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, BGen Tereso Isleta, CG 15 SW, BGen Biazon, BGen Galido, BGen Loven Abadia, Commo Calajate and other major unit commanders attended the conference which lasted until 10:00 p.m.515

The major service commanders, relayed to Gen de Villa their assessment of the military situation in relation to the previous day’s attack by Scout Rangers on the AFP communications system in Tagaytay City. After the conference, Gen de Villa informed the country through a nationwide broadcast that a coup d’etat was about to be carried out by rightist forces. He added though that it had been aborted.516

BGen Biazon, in order to augment the forces defending the camp, told Gen de Villa: “I am calling our reserve (MBLT 4) from Fort Bonifacio to Aguinaldo”.517 However, Biazon was told that his reserve MBLT 4 had gone over to the rebel side.

That evening, Col Edgardo Batenga, CO 701 Bde, placed his command under BGen Biazon’s control. Batenga went to Sta Rosa, Laguna to consolidate his forces. He told one of his battalion commanders, Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, CO 72 IB, to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo with two armored vehicles and to engage all rebel troops coming from the south.518

D.3. 1 December

Early Signs of Rebel Activity at Camp Aguinaldo

At 2:00 a.m., half of the First Marine Brigade Contingency Force left LOGCOM aboard two V-150s for Fort Bonifacio to join the rebels.519

By 3:00 a.m., some unidentified armed soldiers entered the AFP Finance Center (AFPFC) and woke up the enlisted men, saying the camp has been infiltrated.520 The armed men allegedly forced them at gunpoint to join their cause.521 These men were ordered to join the mutineers by Capt Pimentel, a finance officer, on the pretext that the exercise was “para sa kinabukasan ng ating mga anak” (for our children’s future). They gave the men M-16 guns and ammunition. They then took some AFPFC vehicles—three mini-cruisers and one hi-ace van—and proceeded towards the Enlisted Men’s Barrio near Gate 5.522 Sgt Borbe, one of those in the group, said he saw many armed troops.

One of the vehicles was driven by Cpl Lucio Cabil of AFPFC. With him were SSgt Manlangit, SSgt Aloquin, and Wenceslao Lagradilla. The others riding the other vehicles included SSgt Asuncion, SSgt Borbe, Sgt Juni, Sgt Aguirre, Cpl Encotro, Edwin Velcorsa, Sixto Rodriguez and others. The men got off when they reached the area near Gate 5.523 At Gate 5, several government soldiers suddenly arrived with a V-150 and arrested them. Only then, claimed SSgt Asuncion, did he realize that he was with the rebel group.524

At the same time, about 50 armed military men were reportedly seen at the vicinity of Lambat Disco and Euro Car Sales near the corner of EDSA and P Tuazon St in Cubao, Quezon City.525 TSgt Henry Aquino recognized former NISA Lt Col Rodolfo Tor as one of the armed men who fired upon the NCRDC intelligence team monitoring Euro Car Sales.526

Ransack of the Civil Relations Service Office

Inside the GHQ premises, rebel troops started to mass. The AFP Civil Relations Service (CRS) armory was ransacked by 12 to 14 armed men at 4:30 a.m.527 Sgt Macario Mabazza narrated that, while sleeping at the CRS, armed men wearing masks woke him up and forced him to jump over the wall and flee.528 Some of the men were recognized as organic personnel of CRS. Later it was discovered that various firearms were stolen.

At about 5:00 a.m., some Military Police (MP), believed to be rebels, arrived at Camp Aguinaldo aboard a 6 x 6 truck, a pick-up and a V-150. However, Capt Duque rounded them up and brought them to the grandstand of Camp Aguinaldo, then to the HSC stockade. Confiscated from the rebel MPs were four M-14 rifles and one M-16 rifle.

First Rebel Airstrikes at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame

As the rebel MPs were being brought to the stockade at about 7:00 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky and Tora-Tora planes started bombarding Camp Aguinaldo.529 Sgt Aloquin, along with the other detainees, escaped as everyone scampered to save their own lives.530 LCdr Vicente Botero, CO, HHSG instructed his men to defend NCRDC HQ.

At 7:00 a.m., Biazon ordered the establishment of a Tactical Command Post at Camp Aguinaldo Grandstand in view of reports that rebel planes would hit Malacañang and military camps.531 By 8:00 a.m., this command pose was set up.532

Later, government F-5 jets were seen encircling the rebel Tora-Tora planes. The two rebel Tora-Tora planes augmented by a Sikorsky helicopter, again attacked and bombed Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame at 9:15 a.m.533 HPC in Camp Crame was hit while Gen de Villa’s residence and other buildings in Camp Aguinaldo were razed to the ground.534

At 9:45 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky helicopter fired rockets at Camp Crame hitting the Narcotics Command, HPC, and the COMMEL buildings. The PC-INP forces in Camp Crame fired at the aircraft using .30 and .50 cal machineguns. Because of the burning of HPC, a tactical and operations command post was organized at the Constabulary Security Group (CSG) building and at the Constabulary Adjutant Building.535

The rebel Tora-Toras and the Sikorsky helicopter again went back to strafe and bomb different strategic areas inside Camp Aguinaldo after bombing Malacañang, Camp Crame and strafing PTV-4.536

Commo Domingo Calajate Convinces LOGCOM to Join Rebels

At 8:00 a.m., Commo Calajate convened the officers and soldiers of LOGCOM at the front of the LOGCOM main building. At the meeting, Calajate said that there was already a failure in the chain of command and that GHQ was no longer functioning as of 4:00 a.m. He further revealed his affiliation with the rebels after telling them that he was the highest link in the AFFs chain of command. He then said that he was joining the rebel cause and urged “everyone to do the same”. At the meeting, Calajate asked the men who were with him.537 Many raised their hand. Among them were Cmdr Maligalig Jr, Capt Manuel Ison, Lt Col Narciso Dauz, Lt Col Nicolas Cabrera, Maj Raul Heredia, and some doctors and nurses.538 All those who did not want to join were given 15 minutes to leave. Col Manuel Mariano, Deputy Commander LOGCOM, after reflecting, approached Calajate and told him thathe would not join the rebels,539 after which Mariano left.

The other soldiers were ordered to take measures to secure LOGCOM against government forces.540 Pfc Antonio Kabigting said that Calajate ordered them to defend the camp. Lt Col Ramon Palad gave Kabigting masking tape to attach on his left sleeve as a countersign. Maligalig, also wearing a countersign with a drawing on it, told him and the men to withdraw firearms and bullets and secure their offices.541 Calajate, meanwhile, ordered the Philippine flag inverted. At this point, LOGCOM stopped supplying NCRDC with ammunition. Calajate also instructed that the gate at the Administration Building be barricaded.542

Also at the meeting with Calajate were Col Francisco Deocaris and Capt Manuel Santos. After the meeting, they returned to the Logistics Training Center. Fearing that there may be instructions to shoot those who went out of the camp, Deocaris stayed put and instructed Capt Santos to secure the office and safeguard their things.543

Cmdr Maligalig Takes Over JOC

After the meeting, Maligalig with 50 LOGCOM personnel went to the JOC located nearby and tried to take it by force. When BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3), heard this, he and troops from 72 IB under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, began operations to retake JOC.544 JOC was then surrounded by Cmdr Maligalig’s troops. LisandroAbadia confronted the rebels atabout 11:00 a.m. and without a shot being fired, Maligalig and his renegades withdrew to LOGCOM. Some laid down their arms after the confrontation.545 JOC was again safely in GHQ’s control.

Government Consolidates Troops

Realizing Camp Aguinaldo’s vulnerability on 1 December due to lack of men and defection ofhis reserves, Biazon had to waitfor reinforcements from the commands of BGens Blando, Galido, Nazareno, Carbonell, Abella and Juachon.

First of the government reinforcements to arrive in Camp Aguinaldo were the 72 IB troops of Lt Col Lasan, followed shortly by additional soldiers led by Lasan’s commander, Col Batenga of the 701 Bde. Their first task was to assist BGen Lisandro Abadia to clear JOC of rebels. They succeeded and even captured Maligalig. However, after the rebel Tora-Toras attacked, Maligalig escaped.546

Batenga’s and Lasan’s troops were divided: half was assigned to retake LOGCOM and the other half to defend the grandstand. Just about then, troops led by BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, and troops from AFP TRACOM under BGen Juachon, arrived and took over the attack of LOGCOM.547

Over the telephone, BGen Carbonell tried to persuade Commo Calajate to surrender. When the latter refused, the government forces advanced.548 There was a firefight followed by the surrender of the rebels.

During the firefight, some of the 400 officers and men at LOGCOM started to escape. At 2:30 p.m., Calajate, Maligalig, Ison, and 2Lt Ragasa escaped on board Calajate’s staff car.549 They proceeded to VAB.550 By 3:00 p.m., the flagpole which originally had the inverted flag was now replaced by a white one. Col Edgardo Kasilag, Chief of Staff of AFP LOGCOM, told the men defending LOGCOM that Calajate had left, and that they were to follow the chain of command.551 Kasilag led them in surrendering to BGens Lisandro Abadia and Carbonell at the CSG grandstand.552 The surrenderees were processed by Col Manuel Mariano, Acting Chief of AFP LOGCOM. The troops from the 701 Bde secured LOGCOM by 4:00 p.m.

RECOM 3 troops arrived at 5:27 p.m. to reinforce Camp Aguinaldo.

The order to consolidate troops from the 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) under BGen Cesar Abella deployed in Bulacan was given the night before. By 11:45 a.m., one battalion had arrived in Norzagaray. The second battalion was ready to move from their headquarters in Malabon by 2:00 p.m. The two battalions, MBLT 1 and MBLT 2, plus three separate companies, 52 MC, 61 MC and the HQS Coy, left Norzagaray by 4:00 p.m. These Marines arrived in Camp Aguinaldo at 7:00 p.m.553

During the whole day, 202 Bde and 203 Bde under Col Thelmo Cunanan and Col Clemente Mariano, respectively, were consolidating their troops preparatory to moving them to the vicinity of Camp Aguinaldo.554

MGen Montano ordered a PC Special Action Force (SAF), acting as a reserve and maneuver force, to proceed to Camp Crame with armor elements. The PC and elements of the WPD were directed to deploy blocking forces.555

Rebel Marine Troops Start to Consolidate

The major force of the rebels composed of the Marines from MBLT 4 and their armor vehicles started to consolidate at Camp Aguinaldo by late afternoon of 1 December.

By early evening, the rebel Marines at Gate 3 of Camp Aguinaldo started moving to the Mormon Church area, together with the tanks.556 At 10:00 p.m., three Marine companies (HQ Coy, 4 MC, 24 MC) MBLT 4, supported by tanks and armor vehicles and led by Maj de la Peña and 2Lt Delfin Actas, moved from VAB through EDSA towards Camp Aguinaldo. Shooting ensued when these troops moved through the overpass by Mantrade Bldg in Makati.557 The Marines reached the EDSA-Ortigas Avenue intersection by 11:00 p.m., after breakingthrough the blockade at Guadalupe bridge set up by Regional Special Action Force. The 701 Bde and elements of the 1st MBde, established blocking positions at the intersection of EDSA-Ortigas Avenue to prevent enemy movements towards Camp Aguinaldo. When they reached the White Plains area by midnight, government forces engaged them in afirefight which resulted in the death of Lt Ireneo Galigana on the rebel side.558

D.4. 2 December

At 1:00 a.m., the 34 MC and 44 MC, also of MBLT 4, joined other rebel Marine units in White Plains559 area and came under attack by government aircrafts. Some of the rebel Marines took shelter in nearby residences, as well as in the Christ the King Parish in Pasig.560

The Second Wave – Breaking through the Barricade

To fortify defensive positions, Maj Amando Melo, CO MBLT 1, moved his Command Group Bravo Coy from EDSA-Ortigas Avenue to the Green Meadows-White Plains area.561 BGen Cesar Abella, CG 1 MBde, dispatched two V-150s (with body nos. M418 and M421) to augment the blocking forces of MBLT 1.562 MBLT 2 under Maj Edgardo Ducusin relocated their blocking position from EDSA-East Avenue in Quezon City to EDSA-Aurora Blvd.563

Seeing the blockade of two 6 x 6 trucks set up by Maj Melo’s forces, rebel MBLT 4 officers led by Maj Antonio Bisenio and Capt Calimag sought to speak with Maj Melo. Eventually, negotiations transpired between Melo and Gojo with the former appealing for the MBLT 4 to return to Fort Bonifacio. Gojo, on the other hand, along with Lt Col Felimon Gasmin, Majs Bisenio, Franklin Casipit, and Capt Ariel Querubin tried to convince Melo and his men to join them. The rebels proved more persuasive. Forty-four enlisted men of Maj Melo, with one V-150 (body no M421) defected to the rebel side.564

At 3:00 a.m., rebel attacks began. Using an LVT, Gojo’s troops rammed through two 6 x 6 trucks blockade put up by the MBLT 1 forces at Katipunan corner White Plains Roads.565 The LVT maneuvered along Katipunan Avenue followed by V-150s and went towards Gate 1.566 Lt Col Jerry Albano was reported seen manning a V-150 (body no F-302) moving together with another V-150 (body no F-301).567

Arrival of Government Reinforcements

The 202 Bde and 203 Bde arrived at Guadalupe about 2:00 a.m. and linked up with the 701 Bde at corner Ortigas Avenue and EDSA. Col Cunanan’s 202 Bde, together with two LVTs, proceeded to the area of Green Meadows and White Plains. Their mission was to pursue the enemy and hit them from the rear.568 By 5:00 a.m., the 202 Bde and Batenga’s 701 Bde used 90 mm recoilless rifles and 105 mm Howitzers to deter the LVTs and V-150s from entering Camp Aguinaldo.569

NCRDC dispatched one company from AFP TRACOM under Cmdr Mario Ollero to augment the troops from MBLT 1 and the 203 Bde at corner Katipunan and White Plains to form a blocking force against enemy attempts to break through Gates 3, 4 and 5.570 The blocking force was subjected to assaults by rebel troops, and one LVT tried to break through at the concrete northeast wall near the AFP LOGCOM watertank. The rebel tanks continued to attack until 6:00 a.m.

Government Air Strikes Continue

At the same time, government air strikes continue. One UH-1H (Huey) helicopter piloted by Loven Abadia made three air strikes. Rebel gunfire wounded his co-pilot. Likewise, PAFF-5s and Sikorsky helicopters made two airstrikes along Katipunan, dropping bombs at rebel positions. Unfortunately, the bombs hit the men of the 202 Bde under Col Cunanan who were mistaken for rebels since they were moving towards Boni Serrano St.571 Five of Col Cunanan’s men perished while 30 others were injured. Of this event, Col Cunanan relates

The Chief of Staff asked me to assemble the brigade and he went there and he apologized to the soldiers in public for the sad incident and he said . . . Gen de Villa said, ‘I accept full responsibility for this’. And this was a very big boost to the morale of the soldiers.572

Arrival of Marine Troops from PTV-4

The 34 MC MBLT 4 under Lt Cal, upon arriving at White Plains area in the morning, was attacked by government Sikorsky helicopters. To lessen their vulnerability to air attacks, Cal ordered his men to proceed to Gate 1 of Camp Aguinaldo.573

A number of rebels had become discouraged by this time. Some left their units and entered nearby houses, changed into civilian clothes, and joined other civilians in evacuating the area.574 The rockets fired by the Sikorsky forced the soldiers to seek refuge in houses in White Plains.575 At 10:00 a.m., the NCRDC Tactical Command Post received telephone calls from rebel Marine soldiers at the Mormon Church negotiating for surrender.576

Government aircrafts continued strafing, firing rockets, and bombing rebel positions at various times of the day.577

The Third Wave – More Attacks by Rebels

The subsequent sporadic burst of rebel artillery fire hit the JOC compound. Tasked to defend the GHQ area,578 the 72 IB troops under Lt Col Lasan received information that enemy Marines with LVT support were on their way to assault their positions at 4:30 p.m.579 Together with the soldiers from the 203 Bde, they repulsed the rebel offensive which attempted to break through the AFP LOGCOM perimeter on Katipunan Avenue. More shooting occurred until 7:00 p.m.580

Camp Aguinaldo Defense Plan Implemented

A conference was held at about 8:30 p.m. to coordinate plans for the defense of Camp Aguinaldo and offensive action against rebel positions. At the ISAFP Battle Staff room, de Villa and Ramos met the COs of the 203 Bde, 701 Bde, andthe PC SAF Commander. The 203 Bde was tasked to secure the AFP LOGCOM area.581 Elements from the GHQ, HSC, 203 Bde, MSG and the trainees of the AFP TRACOM under Col Yamzon would secure Camp Aguinaldo. The 72 IB was assigned as a screening force.582

At 11:30 p.m., the government launched its counter attack. BGen Biazon directed one section of the weapons platoon of 72 IB under 2Lt Miravello Miranda to counter attack the advancing rebel forces at LOGCOM. They immobilized one rebel LVT with two shots of their 90 RR. A second LVT withdrew after encountering heavy fire from Miranda’s troops. Miranda then re-directed the artillery fire at rebel positions at the Veteran’s building.583

D.5. 3 December

The Final Wave – Massive Assault of Rebels

By early morning of 3 December, the rebels prepared their most massive offensive to take over Camp Aguinaldo. Heavy gunbursts of different calibers, cannons, as well as mortars were heard all over Camp Aguinaldo.584 The 34 MC under Lt Cal persisted in entering the Camp through Gate 1 at about 1:00 a.m. But as they neared the gate, they were repelled by mortar fire.585

At the same time, more than a thousand RAM-HF soldiers coming from White Plains started simultaneous attacks at GHQ with supporting fire from 81 mm mortars, 105 mm Howitzers, V-150s and three LVTs.586 The preparation fires were followed by ground assaults, spearheaded by tanks and armor vehicles on the northern and eastern perimeter.587 The rebels intensified their effort to break through Gate 1.588

Other rebel forces initiated assaults using combined artillery and mortar attacks to enter Camp Aguinaldo alternating between Gates 1 and 2 near LOGCOM. The men of the 203 Bde under Clemente Mariano defended the gates with heavy fire,589 causing the attacking Marines to retreat.590

The government fortified their defense positions. The 32 MC, MSG, which arrived earlier from PTV-4 retaliated with their 105 mm Howitzer and hit one of the LVTs.591 Recoilless rifle fire from the troops from GHQ HSC and the 701 Bde and 105 mm Howitzer fire from the 1 MBde and the 202 Bde repulsed the LVTs. The troops of Maj de la Pena were able to enter Camp Aguinaldo behind the burning LVT and took positions at the St Ignatius Chapel, AFPCES and the GHQ Medical Dispensary. The rest of the rebel forces withdrew and consolidated atl8th and 20th Avenues in Cubao.

Surrender Feelers Sent

By 5:30 a.m., surrender feelers through Lt Col Rodolfo Gallardo, Camp Aguinaldo Post Chaplain, were received from Maj de la Pena, who with his men were trapped at the area of St Ignatius Chapel.592

At 9:00 a.m., negotiations pushed through with the assistance of Col Daranchang. At first, Maj de la Pena refused to surrender, vowing to fight to the last man. However, Col Daranchang tried to talk him out of his decision, warning him that Biazon was ready to give the signal to “wipe them out.”593 At 11:00 a.m., about 203 Marine officers and men from 44 MC, 24 MC, 34 MC, and 4 MC led by dela Pefta and Calimag surrendered.594

At 4:00p.m., Ramos and de Villa held a press conference to formally announce the government victory. The Government reported that NCRDC and other units deployed 6,932 men. They said, government forces suffered one officer and 31 enlisted men killed in action, 29 officers and 224 enlisted men wounded in action.595

The Government also reported that rebel forces suffered one officer and 16 enlisted men killed in action, and 8 officers and 84 enlisted men wounded in action. A total of 390 firearms, 15 military vehicles, six tanks, and a civilian delivery truck were recovered from the rebels.596

E. Fort Magsaysay – Greenhills

E.1. Before 30 November

Various Activities at Fort Magsaysay and BGen Blando

BGen Marcelo Blando became the CO of the 7th Infantry Division (7 ID) based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, on 8 August 1989. In the August 1987 attempted coup, Honasan’s main force came from Fort Magsaysay. It is also the training center of the Scout Rangers and one of the venues of Exercise Balikatan 1989. The area of operation of the 7 ID cover the Army units deployed in the provinces of Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan, Zambales and parts of Rizal, Cavite, and Laguna.597

Prior to taking command of 7 ID, Blando was CG of the FSRR and was given by the Scout Rangers the code name of “Tatang One”.598

By October 1989, using his prerogative as CG 7 ID, Blando removed the operational control of the First Scout Ranger Company from Col Oswaldo Villanueva, Brigade Commander, 703 Bde, and placed them under 56 IB of Lt Col Levy Zamora.599

Blando’s closeness to Zamora, Lt Col Arsenio Tecson, CO 68 IB and Maj Alfredo Oliveros, CO 24 IB, was shown by his frequent visits to their commands which were done without the normal advise to their respective brigade commanders.600

Col Villanueva noticed this “closeness” between Zamora and Blando to the point that there were several instances when Blando would visit 56 IB and Zamora without informing him. Col Villanueva testified that before the December 1989 attempted coup, BGen Blando seemed to act suspiciously. He said

I do not have any premonition whatsoever, on his [BGen Blando’s] participation in the coup d’etat but it was quite strange that whenever he visits my unit, he does not tell me, [he] just tried [to] proceed directly to 56th EB that is Lt Col Zamora and then Lt Col Zamora will not also tell me what they took up together and it is not only once that he did it, he [did] it repeatedly . . .601

Sometime in September 1989, MGen Cacanando visited the 703 Bde. When he found out that Maj Ernie Amboy, who was involved in the August 1987 coup attempt, was the EX-O of Zamora, he directed that Amboy be assigned elsewhere. Cacanando also found out that the 56 IB had transferred four sacks of firearms to the rear command post. This was reported to Blando, but the latter seemed unconcerned.602

Blando ordered the 73 IB under Lt Col Rolen Erasmo pulled out from the control of the 703 Bde and had it assigned to Fort Magsaysay for retraining and cross training with US Armed Forces under Exercise Balikatan.603 There were reports that the RP-US Exercise Balikatan was used as a cover for the build up and movement of troops by the rebels.604

Sometime in October 1989, President Aquino visited Fort Magsaysay. Col Villanueva, who was the Honor Guard Commander of the Brigade for the ceremonies in honor of the President, narrated

. . . When President Aquino was our guest, one of the honor guards there [was] caught with one live ammo inside the chambers of his rifle, although we were told that BGen Blando himself was the one who inspected personally the guards before they were called in front of the Division headquarters.605

The soldier, from whom the live ammo was discovered, was investigated by the Inspector General and Provost Marshall of 7 ID.606 The report that Blando himself inspected the guard came from Col Josefino Manayao, 7 ID Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training.607

At Fort Magsaysay, at about 6:00 p.m. of 30 November, Lt Lucero informed Blando that Maj Nestor Senares and ex-Lt Col Eduardo Matillano, both of whom were involved in the 1987 coup attempt, were sighted in Cabanatuan City.

E.2. 30 November

Order for Roadblocks in Nueva Ecija

At 1:15 p.m., troops in full combat gear aboard 6 x 6 trucks, one jeep and one pick-up were monitored by Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command under Col Ferdinand Lagman, PC Provincial Commander, passing through Nueva Ecija. After verifying the movements with Lt Col Artemio Cacal PA, based in Camp Aquino, Tarlac, Col Lagman learned that the movement was authorized.608

However, Lagman entertained doubts which made him take other actions. He testified

. . . in my mind however, I was already in doubt because said troops were in full combat gear. So I [gave] instructions to all my company commanders to implement OPLAN Regal609 and at the same time informed the Regional Tactical Operations Center of my action. I requested clearance to implement OPLAN Regal immediately. I also instructed my intelligence officer to proceed to the Commanding General of the 7 ID, who is BGen Blando, to find out if such troops came from his unit.610

Meanwhile, in the afternoon, Lagman found out that no troops from the 7 ID moved out of Fort Magsaysay. He concluded that the units he saw were Scout Rangers coming from Isabela and he became convinced that the troop movements were signals of a forthcoming coup. Hence, at 11:40 p.m., after conferring again with his operations and intelligence officers, he instructed all company commanders to establish roadblocks as part of OPLAN Regal.

Using trucks and other vehicles as obstacles, PC elements established road blocks along Maharlika Highway in Nueva Ecija particularly in Brgy Malasin in San Jose, Brgy Baloc in Sto Domingo, Brgy Sumacab in Cabanatuan City and in Brgy Castellano in Gapan.611 Verbal instructions were given to Capt Brigido Undan, CO 182 PC Coy, to establish road blocks at Brgy Kita-Kita in San Jose City. Capt Undan also ordered Lt Ronald Estilles to establish road blocks at Brgy Cebar.612

E.3. 1 December

Consolidation of Troops under Blando

Lt Col Rolen Erasmo, while sleeping at the bivouac area at Fort Magsaysay, was awakened at about midnight of 30 November and told to report to the Office of the Operations Officer, at the Division HQ to attend an emergency conference with Blando.

At 1:30 a.m., Blando held an emergency conference at the Division HQ in Fort Magsaysay, attended by the General and Special Staffs and Post Unit Commanders. Blando, in civilian clothes but fully armed, gave instructions to prepare to reinforce government forces in Camp Aguinaldo.

PC SAF Company Leaves Fort Magsaysay

At 2:00 a.m., a PC Special Action Force (PCSAF) Company led by Lt Dennis Peter Pefia, composed of six officers and 54 enlisted personnel left Fort Magsaysay for Manila aboard a 6 x 6 truck, a Kennedy jeep, a communication van, a Ford Fiera and Dodge van. MSgt Mendoza, Duty Officer NOLCOM Operations Office, called up Fort Magsaysay to verify the movement of the troops. NOLCOM cleared the movement. They reached Manila without any incident but it was not clear what happened to them there or what they did.613

In the meanwhile, BGen Antonio, CG NOLCOM, contacted CSAFP de Villa, and was directed to organize and lead one battalion from Fort Magsaysay. The NCRDC COC also received a report from AFP JOC regarding the movement of the PC SAF.614

Twenty minutes after the PC SAF left, CSAFP and NOLCOM called to hold the troops. The group, however, had already left and could not be recalled.615 At 2:25 a.m., the NCRDC COC received a report from AFP JOC that NOLCOM has cancelled the movement of PC SAF.616 This made the troop movement of the PC SAF unauthorized.

Lt Col Erasmo’s 73 IB Troops Mobilized

At 6:00 a.m., Antonio called Blando to ask if the battalion was ready. By 8:00 a.m., 73 IB under Lt Col Erasmo, composed of 15 officers and 294 enlisted personnel, were already assembled at the grandstand. Blando briefed the men, asking them to support the duly constituted authority. According to Col Alejandro Trespeces, Chief of Staff 7 ID, Blando also insinuated that he might not leave or go with the troops to Manila.

Erasmo commented that his troops could have moved for Manila by early morning. However, no adequate transportation facilities for his entire battalion were available until 10:00 a.m., when cargo trucks arrived at Fort Magsaysay. Blando ordered Erasmo to proceed to GHQ jn Camp Aguinaldo and then report to Lisandro Abadia at JOC for instructions. Later, Blando told Erasmo “Mahirap yata ang sitwasyon sa Maynila (The situation in Manila is bad). I think we better stay put. Just stand by for any further orders”.617 Thus, Erasmo’s troops did not move until after lunch.

Mobilization of Scout Ranger Trainees

According to Capt Herbert Avinante, Deputy Commander of the SR Training Center (SRTC) FSRR, Blando ordered him at about 8:00 a.m. to prepare a company of Rangers to go to Camp Aguinaldo. Capt Avinante claimed that the movement was to support GHQ upon orders of de Villa and Antonio.618 It should be noted that since the SRTC is located at Colado Village inside Fort Magsaysay, the 7 ID under Blando can use the Scout Ranger students for operations. Blando, however, denied giving such orders to Avinante, saying that the Scout Rangers merely attached themselves to his troops on their way to Manila.619

Avinante then ordered Lt Felipe Sangalang, Administrative Officer, SRTC to alert one company to be led by him. After 124 officers and men were assembled, they moved out from the SRTC to the 7 ID HQ, where they joined other troops from 73 IB. Other elements from 3 LABde and armor units from the Headquarters Service Battalion also joined the troops under Blando.620

Mobilization ofMaj Gutierrez’s 71 IB Troops

Because de Villa asked Blando for another battalion, Blando instructed his Operations Officer, Capt Baylon, to direct Maj Pedro Gutierrez, CO 71 IB, to consolidate his battalion from Munoz, Nueva Ecija and proceed to Fort Magsaysay. Upon receiving the orders, Gutierrez called for the different units of the 71 IB, composed of about 250 officers and men, to regroup.621 Gutierrez tried to reach his Brigade Commander, Col Villanueva, at his Command Post for instructions and guidance on what is happening. However, Col Villanueva was not there.622 He was then at his quarters in Fort Bonifacio. By 9:30 a.m., the units of the 71 IB, except one company, had regrouped at Mufioz, Nueva Ecija.623 Capt Undan intercepted two platoons of soldiers belonging to C Coy, 71 IB under Lt Canes on board one 6 x 6 truck and two ten-wheeler trucks which were stopped by the road blocks set up at Brgy Malasin, San Jose City.624 Gutierrez went to Brgy Malasin checkpoint, and talked to Undan to intercede for the passage of his troops. Undan asked permission from his commander, Col Lagman, who granted clearance.

Gutierrez arrived at Fort Magsaysay at 11:30 a.m. with 14 officers and 266 EPs. He reported to Blando at the Office of the Division Sgt Major. Blando was with Col Trespeces, Lt Col Josefino Manayao, Lt Danilo Lucero, Lt Rafael Valencia and Capt Herbert Avinante. Blando directed Gutierrez to proceed to Metro Manila and report to NCRDC at Camp Aguinaldo but to return to Nueva Ecija if the situation does not permit. BGen Blando decided to accompany the 71 and 73 IBs.625

Helicopter Sightings at Fort Magsaysay

During this time, the rebel Rangers in Fort Bonifacio were waiting for Blando to arrive by helicopter. There were unconfirmed reports that Blando would be CG PA if the coup succeeded.626 At about 1:00 p.m., one Sikorsky helicopter gunship with white RAM-SFP markings on its side landed at the Aeroscout area in Fort Magsaysay.627 This helicopter, believed to be refueling, was piloted by Lt Gregor Panelo, PAF.628 The helicopter took off at 3:00 p.m. without Blando and headed east of Fort Magsaysay.629 It was later confirmed that this helicopter was the same one found abandoned and covered with dried leaves at Fort Magsaysay after the attempted coup.630

BGen Blando Prepares Troops for Convoy

The troops from 73 IB and 71 IB were ready for movement by 1:30 p.m. Blando gave a pep talk to the men at the 7 ID grandstand. He reportedly said: “Sayang ang pagpunta natin sa Maynila kung babaliktad kayo” (It will be useless for us to go to Manila if we end up joining the rebels). He talked about the plans to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo to reinforce government forces.631 Blando still remained in contact with Antonio who instructed him to move for Manila right away.

Blando instructed Trespeces to assemble all the vehicles along the road in preparation for loading the troops in the following order: the first column of vehicles would be utilized by elements of 71 IB under Maj Gutierrez, followed by the command group composed of Blando’s close-in security, then elements of the 73 IB under Lt Col Erasmo, and finally, elements of the Scout Rangers. The whole group comprising of more than a thousand men, used two V-150 commandos, 17 M-35 trucks, 13 Kennedy jeeps, two Land Rovers, one van and two cars.632

Blando rode the V-150 going to Manila, leaving behind Trespeces, who was designated to be the OIC of Fort Magsaysay with orders to get in touch with Blando by radio from time to time.633

The convoy, led by Blando, left Fort Magsaysay at 3:30 p.m.634 He traveled from Fort Magsaysay to Cabanatuan, then Gapan and Cabiao, in Nueva Ecija, then Arayat and San Fernando, in Pampanga, and then south through the North Expressway.635 The convoy passed through the PC checkpoints in Nueva Ecya after Col Samonte, CS NOLCOM, at around 4:00 p.m., instructed the Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command to give Blando’s troops safe passage. The convoy was reportedly cleared at the Nueva Ecija checkpoints at 6:00 p.m.636

Meeting at Malinta, Bulacan

Blando maintainedradio silence duringthe trip from Fort Magsaysay. The convoy was stopped at Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, by roadblocks placed by government troops and the Bulacan provincial government. To check the movement of the group, Col Satumino Dumlao, an emissary from GHQ, met the convoy at about 10:00 p.m.

Dumlao talked to Blando who was at the middle of the convoy. Curious as to what caused the stop, Gutierrez, who was at the front column, went to see Blando who was by then meeting with Manayao, Avinante and Dumlao.637 While the officers were conversing, Erasmo, who was at the back of the convoy, went forward and joined the group which included Valencia and Crucero.638

According to Gutierrez, Manayao and Avinante were trying to persuade Blando not to go to Camp Aguinaldo, and suggested that they go to Fort Bonifacio instead and consolidate there.639 As reported by Erasmo, Blando gave instructions to proceed to Fort Bonifacio saying “Let us make that our last stand.”640 Blando, however, denied that he wanted to go to Fort Bonifacio. In his testimony, he said that a certain “Officer-in-charge of the Rangers who was a Captain” threatened him at gunpoint not proceed to Camp Aguinaldo and that they should support the rebels.641 Capt Avinante, the head of the Rangers which joined Blando’s troops, however, denied that he threatened Blando.642

Knowing that the rebels already controlled Fort Bonifacio by that time, Gutierrez objected to the instruction and threatened to break away from the group and return to Fort Magsaysay. In view of his objection, it was decided to proceed to a neutral ground instead.643

E.4. 2 December

The group left Malinta at about 12:00 midnight and proceeded to Metro Manila, passing through Balintawak and Munoz Market until it reached Ortigas Avenue. It then turned towards the Greenhills area in San Juan. The convoy avoided passing through EDSA because of reports that it was blockaded. They stopped at the area near the Greenhills Commercial Complex at about 3:00 a.m.644

Tired and hungry, the men and officers of the convoy rested at different areas around the parking lot of the Greenhills Commercial Complex. Because of Blando’s stand to stay neutral, Erasmo had discussions with Gutierrez regarding the matter. According to Erasmo, they were both by this time harboring doubts as to the loyalty of Blando.

Erasmo suggested that they call Blando for a “no-holds-barred discussion” to which the other officers like Crucero and Valencia agreed.645 By 5:00 a.m., Blando agreed and a conference was held, attended by Blando, his HQ staff and all officers of 71 IB and 73 IB. Erasmo testified that

. . . as a result of this discussion seemingly majority of the officers present were convinced against the government in order to effect change for the better, finally it was decided by BGen Blando to change his stand from being neutral [to supporting] the Reform Movement. Then he consulted us if he can already declare his stand openly against the government. Maj Gutierrez and myself objected by telling him that we will not commit without also consulting the consensus of our men and BGen Blando readily acceded . . .646

Erasmo explained that, he did not categorically disagree with Blando’s decision to side with the rebels because of his training in “obedience and the custom of the service”. He claimed that his indirect hint “was a better way to tell him [Blando] that he [Erasmo] does not agree with his [Blando] decision”.647

E.5. 3 December

Negotiation at Greenhills

Prior to this no-holds-barred meeting, Gutierrez on the evening of 2 December, informed Col Villanueva by telephone that he was in Greenhills. After the call, Villanueva talked to MGen Cacanando for instructions. Villanueva then proceeded from his quarters in Fort Bonifacio to Greenhills. When he arrived at about 5:30 a.m., he sought to talk to Blando, but the latter ignored him. Villanueva then spoke to Gutierrez and asked to be briefed. The latter related the discussion they had earlier. Villanueva, in turn, reiterated to Gutierrez that his stand was for the government.648

Villanueva reported to Cacanando at around 7:30 a.m. about the situation in Greenhills and that Blando was for the rebels. Cacanando reacted by appointing Villanueva as OIC of 7 ID, relieving Blando of his command. Villanueva talked to Blando, Manayao, and Gutierrez, reiterating his position and asking Blando to give up. Blando refused to listen. Villanueva then talked to the troops and instructed them to follow his orders. He also set up his HQ at the nearby Mandarin Villa Restaurant and there reported to PA Operations Officer GHQ about the situation.649

Firefight with the Scout Rangers

At 8:00 a.m., Capt Avinante briefed his men who were by then wearing rebel countersigns about his plan to go to Camp Aguinaldo and link up with other rebel troops.650 They started moving through the streets in Greenhills towards Camp Aguinaldo. At 12:30 p.m., loyal Marines from 2 MC MBLT 2 under Maj Ducusin backed up by three V-150 Commandos arrived to intercept the Scout Rangers.651

Fighting broke out in Connecticut Street,Greenhills and at the area near Belson House, some 300 to 400 meters away from Greenhills Shopping Center. The firefights were sporadic.652 During the shooting, Avinante was hit in the leg and was brought to Cardinal Santos Hospital for treatment.653 There were reports that reinforcements from 24 IB, 68 IB, and 56 IB were expected by the rebel Rangers. When these troops did not arrive despite the prodding of BGen Blando,654 the SRTC surrendered and were turned over to BGen Manuel Bruan, CO of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.655

Surrender of Blando

In the afternoon, Villanueva ordered Gutierrez to arrest Blando. Gutierrez asked that he talk to BGen Biazon first before arresting Blando. Biazon gave the go signal to Gutierrez. By the time Gutierrez was about to arrest Blando, BGen (Ret) Restituto Padilla, de Villa’s emissary, had persuaded Blando to surrender peacefully.

Blando was then brought to Villanueva who asked him to stop the movement of 24 IB, 56 IB, and the 68 IB. Blando cooperated. He contacted Maj Oliveros, who stopped the movement of 68 IB under Col Tecson. Blando, however, was not able to contact 56 IB under Zamora.656 Blando advised the 7 ID Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations in Fort Magsaysay to stop elements of 56 IB from proceeding to Metro Manila, and gave further instructions to tell the COs of 24 IB and 68 IB that he was revoking his orders to move the troops to Metro Manila.657

At around midnight, Villanueva brought Blando and Manayao to de Villa. Upon instructions of de Villa, Villanueva accompanied the troops of 71 IB, 73 IB and HQ personnel to their respective barracks in the North.658

F. Activities in Northern Luzon

F.1. Scout Rangers in Isabela

Defense of the Cagayan Valley Region was undertaken by NOLCOM under BGen Orlando Antonio. In December 1989, many Army troops were deployed in Cagayan Valley to fight communist insurgency, which was prevalent in the area. Hence, part of the PA units present in the area were Scout Rangers under the FSRR, which the rebels utilized in the December 1989 attempted coup.

F.1.a. 30 November

Antonio Orders Red Alert in NOLCOM

At the 5 ID HQ in Echague, Isabela, a grievance survey was reportedly made a week before the coup. Lt Enriquez and Lt Vinuya, student officers of the Special Intelligence Training School (SITS), ISAFP, arrived with survey questionnaires focusing mainly on issues and problems confronting the AFP and the present administration. Part III of the questionnaire tended to suggest courses of action against the government such as non-violent civil disobedience or a coup. So-called compelling reasons for certain elements in the AFP to resort to a coup were presented in the survey.659

BGen Antonio received an intelligence report about the coup at 1:20 p.m. on 30 November while on troop inspection in Ilagan, Isabela. He then called his Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Col Rubio and instructed him to place all NOLCOM units on red alert. Hence, by 3:00 p.m., red alert status was declared in Fort Magsaysay. Troop movements at night were disallowed.660

Movements of Rebel Rangers in Isabela

In the morning of 30 November, Lt Col Rafael Galvez, CO 4 SRB, directed Capt Lauro Gordula, EX-O 4 SRB, to take charge, since he was going to Manila that evening. Galvez also dispatched a group of Scout Rangers for Fort Bonifacio.661 This group was later monitored to have passed through Nueva Ecija at 1:30 p.m.662

Before leaving for Manila, Galvez had an occasion to talk to Lt Jose Rene Jarque, Operations Officer 4 SRB, who had just arrived at the battalion base in Cordon, Isabela from Manila. Lt Jarque testified

At Cordon, I found out that many of our troops were already gone. They were not in their company headquarters as they were supposed to be, and as the Operations Officer, it was my duty to find out. So, I had a talk with Lt Col Galvez who was then at our Battalion headquarters and he informed me that the troops had gone down to Manila. So, I said ‘OK sir, what is the plan?’ He told me ‘You know’, and I said ‘Yes, sir.’ But he also told me that ‘I am giving you the decision whether you should go to Manila or not’, and I said, ‘OK sir, I will think about it.’ Then, being tired from the travel, it was almost a 9 or 10 hour travel from Manila, I decided to take a rest. At around 8 or 9 in the evening, I was called by one of the of the escorts and he told me that Lt Col Galvez was leaving for Manila along with some escorts. And, as always, he is a Lt Col and I am only a lieutenant. [So] I said ‘Yes, sir.’663

Lt Jarque further explained what Galvez meant by “You know”

Well, there had been discussions before, sir, about that and he told me that they (referring to Lt Col Galvez) were going down to Manila, because, I mean, he explained it further. I asked, and he said, ‘You know, the same as August 27 and 28′. So I said, ‘Yes, sir’.664

Galvez left Gordon, Isabela for Manila with some companions at about 6:00 p.m.665

F.1.b. 1 December

At about 4:00 a.m. of 1 December, BGen Antonio left Ilagan, Isabela and reached the 5 ID HQ in Camp Melchor de la Cruz, Echague, Isabela an hour later. He then instructed BGen Manuel Dizon, CG 5 ID, to prepare a minimum of two battalions to augment government forces in Manila.666 At 6:00 a.m., DZRH interviewed Antonio who confirmed the ongoing coup d’etat staged by RAM-HF soldiers in Metro Manila. Antonio and Dizon announced that they are following the chain of command.

Antonio also directed Dizon to alert the 41 IB and 45 IB with the commanding officer of the 503 Bde as Task Force Commander, to consolidate forces and to prepare to move on orders to Camp Tito Abat in Manaoag, Pangasinan, as NOLCOM reserve for possible deployment in Manila.667 At 7:30 a.m., Maj Mendoza of NOLCOM called for safe passage of elements of 41 IB and 45 IB under Col Guillermo from Isabela to Camp Abat in Pangasinan.

At 8:40 a.m., Antonio arrived in Camp Aquino in Tarlac and immediately called for a conference. He contacted BGen Cesar Nazareno, Regional Commander of RECOM 3 who informed him that troops (68 IB and 24 IB) in Bataan had already left by then. Antonio also talked with BGen Armando Garcia, CG 5th Fighter Wing at Basa Air Base to reiterate his position of following the chain of command.668

F.1.c. 2 December

In the morning, Capt Gordula received orders from Lt Col Galvez, who was in Fort Bonifacio, to bring the Scout Ranger troops to Manila. Gordula assembled about 50 men aboard two 6 x 6 trucks. The 4 SRB troops left Isabela and passed through Nueva Vizcaya. The 4 SRB troops were stopped, however, by roadblocks at Bgy Malasin, San Jose City in Nueva Ecija placed by Capt Undan who was manning the PC checkpoint.669

A company of Scout Rangers headed by Capt Danny Panandigan belonging to the 2 SR Coy, FSRR stationed in Lallo, Cagayan, also moved towards Manila to join the other Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio. They were able to pass through the checkpoint in San Pablo, Isabela at 11:00 a.m. by positioning themselves in prone positions aboard dump trucks. The movement was immediately reported to 5 ID HQ. Instructions were given to the Commander of the 2nd Regional Command Defense Unit (2 RCDU) to intercept the trucks at Camp Upi in Gamu, Isabela. Before reaching Gamu, the rebel Rangers commandeered three aircon buses.670

At about 12:00 noon, the three buses were stopped at the check-point at Camp Upi. The rebel Rangers alighted with raised arms. Capt Panindigan was able to talk with Capt Quilang, the OIC of the checkpoint. Shortly after, the rebel Rangers suddenly boarded the three buses and sped away going South.671

The Rangers led by Panindigan proceeded towards Cauayan, Isabela where they stopped to pick up a platoon of about 25 men from the 4 SRB. There, they were joined by a group composed of five enlisted personnel of the Division Training Unit headed by SSgt Romero and 33 students undergoing CAFGU Cadre Training aboard a ten-wheeler truck and a Dodge pick-up.672

When the group reached Cordon, Isabela by 1:00 p.m., they stopped at the 77 IB 5 ID HQ. Some men belonging to the 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez joined Capt Panindigan’s men. Lt Jarque, at this time was at fteir Division HQ in Camp Melchor de la Cruz in Echague, Isabela. He went there to coordinate matters because of reports about the coup in Manila. Upon returning to Cordon, he found out that the troops moved because of (1) orders given by Capt Lim, Operations Officer FSRR, (2) a personal call by Lt Col Galvez, and (3) a radio message purportedly coming from MGen Cacanando.673

The group of Capt Panindigan was later stopped at a PC checkpoint in Brgy Kita-Kita in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Capt Undan negotiated with the Ranger officers but failed to convince them. Undan then ordered deployment of his troops as the SR officers were determined to break through.674

Lt Jarque said that knowing the temperament of the soldiers and anticipating the roadblocks set up from Isabela to Manila because of the coup, he decided to follow the troops. In his testimony, Jarque said

. . . [as the] Operations Officer, knowing that most of the troops went with the First Scout Ranger Company, my first instinct was to follow them. I followed them with the thinking that there will be roadblocks coming from Isabela going to Manila and knowing the temperament of some of our soldiers I wanted somehow to avert bloodshed on those checkpoints and at the same time, convince them that it’s a losing cause and we should already start to go back.675

He followed the troops with some escorts aboard two Kennedy jeeps and reached them at Brgy Kita-Kita, San Jose City.

Lt Jarque reached the San Jose PC roadblock composed of ten-wheeler trucks, buses and other small vehicles at about 6:00 p.m. There, he met Undan, Panandigan, Gordula and two unidentified officers. Since it was already getting dark, Undan invited the officers to dinner while waiting for the arrival of Col Lagman, PC Provincial Commander. They went to a house where they ate and watched television to monitor the coup events in Manila. They learned from the TV that Lt Col Galvez had already surrendered. In the meantime, Lt Jarque received a radio message from Col Matabalao, CS FSRR, or dering them to go back to their battalion base in Cordon, Isabela. Jarque approached Gordula and Panindigan, who were senior officers, and told them

Sir, ano kaya kung babalik na lang tayo, wala na rin ito. Saka malabo itong dito tayo makapasok, sir (Sir, why don’t we just go back? We are in a very uncertain situation, sir). At the same time I also got the radio message at that point in time, sir. I used that as an excuse to them by saying, ‘Sir, mayroon po tayong order galing sa itaas, and so by virtue of chain of command, kailangan sundin natin ito, sir676 (Sir, we have orders from the top. We have to follow them, sir).

Convinced of the futility of their effort to go to Manila, the rebel officers agreed to go back. By 8:00 p.m., Jarque organized the transportation of the troops back to Isabela.677 Before the troops could leave, Col Lagman arrived and talked to the officers. Gordula informed Undan that they were abandoning their plans and would leave for Cagayan.678

The Scout Rangers left at about 9:00 p.m. and proceeded to their respective stations in Gamu, Isabela and Lallo, Cagayan.679 Col Capulong, CO 502 Bde, who was manning a checkpoint in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, reported that at about 10:00 p.m., the Scout Rangers were moving back North.680

F.2. Movement of Lt Col Levy Zamora’s Troops

F.2.a. 3 December

The 56 IB troops under Lt Col Levy Zamora, CO 56 IB, stationed in Imelda Valley, previously moved in the morning of 3 December towards Manila on orders of BGen Blando. They reached Arayat, Pampanga, at about 5:00 p.m.

RECOM 3’s OPLAN REGAL, which is to check and control troop movements in their area of command with roadblocks, was very effective. Zamora’s troops were checked at Arayat by troops under Lt Col Julius Yarcia, CO, Angeles METRODISCOM. Upon monitoring over the radio that 56 IB troops were approaching the boundary of Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, and knowing that the 56 IB CO is his PMA classmate, Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Pampanga Provincial Commander, called BGen Cesar Nazareno, RECOM 3 Commander, and volunteered to confront the 56 IB.681

Fernandez proceeded to Arayat, specifically to Brgy Camla and there met Zamora. The latter was insisting on pushing through, saying he was under orders from his “boss”, BGen Blando. Fernandez checked with RECOM 3 HQ if the 56 IB movement was authorized. RECOM 3 HQ replied that it was not.682

Fernandez tried to dissuade Zamora from proceeding. He told Zamora that it was physically impossible for Zamora to move forward because “all the people from Arayat to Mexico [Pampanga] have blocked already the highways with vehicles, trucks and jeeps.”683

Once informed of the movements, BGen Nazareno called Col Lagman, who was still in Brgy Malasin, San Jose City, and told him to confront Lt Col Zamora. Lagman immediately went to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, and arrived there at 5:30 p.m. of 3 December. Lagman narrated the position of Lt Col Zamora’s troops as follows

They were strewn [along] the highway, starting about ten kilometers in Cabiao [going to] the boundary of Cabiao and Arayat. Then from there, I walked. I walked for about four kms and as I faced [them] I was already reconnoitering his defensive position of heavy weapons. So, to go there, if I [would] bring my troops, for sure we would do battle. So I decided to go there alone so that I [would] not provoke the soldiers.684

F.2.b. 4 December

Lagman’s estimate of Zamora’s strength was about a hundred men armed with a recoilless rifle, a mortar, M-16s, and machineguns. According to Fernandez, the government side had two battalions, two V-150s, two recoilless rifles and a helicopter gunship.685

At about early morning, Lagman and Zamora had a dialogue, with the former persuading the latter to go back. Zamora, however, said that he would go back only if ordered by Blando. Lagman then tried to contact Blando through BGen Nazareno. The latter informed Lagman that Blando was already in custody. Zamora then decided to give up but requested that they wait for dawn, since his troops were scattered on the highway.686

Troops Escorted Back to Fort Magsaysay

Before midnight of 3 December, Lagman had requested 7 ID at Fort Magsaysay for an officer to join him. Upon orders of BGen Antonio, Col Trespeces was sent to Arayat, Pampanga to escort Zamora and the men of the 56 IB back to Fort Magsaysay.687

Col Villanueva, who was proceeding to Fort Magsaysay with CHPG units as escorts,688 passed through Cabiao, Nueva Ecija from Greenhills with troops belonging to the 73 IB and 71 IB. The 56 IB, escorted by Trespeces, linked with the troops under Villanueva at about 4:00 a.m. and all of them proceeded to Fort Magsaysay.689

The combined troops arrived at Fort Magsaysay by morning and assembled at the grandstand690 where they were formally turned over to Col Trespeces691, while Col Villanueva turned over Zamora to BGen Antonio. On orders of Nazareno, Lagman together with Antonio later escorted Zamora to Camp Olivas, Pampanga by helicopter.692

Other Troops Intercepted

At about 1:30 p.m., personnel manning the checkpoint at Brgy Malasin, San Jose City, intercepted four officers and 12 enlisted men of the 48 IB with assorted high-powered firearms on board a Kennedy-type jeep from Manila. They also intercepted two soldiers belonging to tie HQ and HQ SGB, 5 ID.693

F.3. Aguinaldo’s Support for the Rebels

The then Governor of Cagayan Province, Rodolfo Aguinaldo was vocal in his support for the rebels.

F.3.a. 1 December

By morning, radio stations aired news about the takeover of Fort Bonifacio and VAB by rebels. Aguinaldo, formerly a PC Lt Col, in an interview by DZNC-BOMBO radio’s Grace Padaca and Bong Roxas, expressed his support for the rebel troops, and stated that he would lead troops to Manila to augment the rebel forces.

The airwaves in the Cagayan Valley region became full with counter-statements of support for the government. At 7:44 a.m., Col Aguda expressed his support for the Constitution and the government over DZNC radio in Nueva Vizcaya. At 8:25 a.m., Gov Maning Pimentel of Quirino Province, also stated over DZNC, that the situation in his province was normal and that he was supporting the Constitution and the government. The same broadcast was made by Gov Laurnece of Kalinga, Apayao at 8:30 a.m. PC Col Clyde Fernandez of RECOM 2, stationed in Ilagan, Isabela, expressed support for the government and said that he would prevent Gov Aguinaldo’s troops from passing through Ilagan.694

After his radio announcement, Aguinaldo went to RECOM 2 HQ and spoke with BGen Pedro Sistoza, Regional Commander of RECOM 2 at 8:00 a.m. As reported by BGen Antonio, Aguinaldo urged Sistoza to dispatch troops and join the rebel forces but he reportedly refused.695 Aguinaldo again went on the air by about 10:30 a.m. through DZNC in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and announced that his troops were already Prepared to go to Manila to reinforce the rebels. He urged all soldiers listening to support their (rebels) forces.696

By noontime, Aguinaldo appealed over DZRH to his “fellow soldiers” to join the rebels, referring particularly to the government troops who put up blockades to prevent his men from going to Manila.697 At 5:30 p.m., Sistoza reported to Antonio that Aguinaldo would probably send some members of the 17 IB and some Scout Rangers to augment the rebel troops in Manila. Antonio ordered Sistoza to stop Aguinaldo’s troops. Instructions were also given to Col George Moleta, CO 503 Bde, to control 17 IB. Antonio also talked to Aguinaldo at about 6:00 p.m. and asked the latter to exercise his leadership to maintain peace and order.698

G. Sangley Point Incident

The military significance of controlling Sangley Point in launching a coup attempt is obvious. It is a shared camp housing both the Philippine Fleet (PHILFLEET) of the Philippine Navy and the 15th Strike Wing (15 SW) of the Philippine Air Force.

As later events showed, Sangley Point was in fact quickly occupied by rebels employing a two-pronged strategy: a swift attack from the outside and simultaneous mutiny of some officers and men from within. But, just as quickly, Sangley was recovered on the same day by the government.

G.1. Rebel Troops from Bataan

G.1.a. 30 November

Because of the ongoing preparations for Exercise Balikatan, raw intelligence reports of troop movements received in the morning of 30 November elicited no more than monitoring measures from the military authorities. But, as more definite indications of a forthcoming coup attempt were observed, Sangley Point tried by nightfall to prepare for the worst.699 By then, however, the die was cast for Sangley Point. For a seemingly long span of time from midnight of 30 November to mid-afternoon of 1 December, the fate of the country was to be significantly affected by what was to occur at Sangley.

Sangley was the target of rebel forces coming from Bataan and Laguna.

Movement of Troops from Bataan

In the evening of 29 November, at Camp Aquino, Tarlac, the Commanding General of 702 Bde, BGen Liberato Manuel, received a report that a coup d’etat would be staged in the early morning of 1 December 1989. He immediately declared a red alert, informed Gen de Villa about the report and subsequently called for a conference of all his battalion commanders.

The conference was held the next day, 30 November at 1:00 p.m., and was attended by Lt Col Arsenio Tecson CO 68 IB, Lt Col Romeo Dominguez CO 69 IB, Maj Alfredo Oliveros CO 24 IB, and Maj Rene Rapisura, CO 60 IB. In the conference, BGen Manuel informed them of intelligence reports of an impending coup and emphasized his support for the Republic. After the conference, a despedida party was held for Manuel who was about to retire. During the party, Manuel noticed that Lt Col Tecson was talking to someone on the radio in his jeep. The person on the radio was asking Bakit hanggang ngayon, wala pa kayo sa Maynila? (Why are you still not in Manila?) Manuel later learned that the person on the other line was BGen Blando. Tecson then informed Oliveros that Blando called with instructions to proceed to Sangley Point in Cavite.700

Tecson went to his base at Hermosa, Bataan at 4:00 p.m. and called Lt Siegfred Mison CO Alpha Coy 68 IB. Tecson asked Lt Mison if he was willing to bring his troop to secure Sangley Point in Cavite. The conversation, as told by Lt Mison, was as follows

Col Tecson told me [Lt Mison] that . . . ‘Ako ay nakapag-commit na to . . . dito sa gagawin natin na . . . gagawin bukas’ (I have committed to what we’re attempting tomorrow), and then he told me that, ‘Can you take your company with me to secure Sangley?’, and I said, ‘Sir, nakabibigla naman iyan (That is quite startling), let me think.’ . . . And then he said, there’s no more time to think, wala nang panahon na mag-isip pa (There’s no time to think things over). So you better decide.’ So l told him, ‘sir pass muna ako rito (I can’t do it). I cannot join you sir.’ And then from there, he told me, ‘Okay, you just go with Maj Dimaapi to go to Samal, and he’ll take care of you’, and that was it.701

Tecson instructed Lt Mison to go with Maj Danilo Dimaapi, Battalion EX-O, to the Tactical Command Post in Samal, Bataan, located eight to nine kilometers away from the highway. It must be noted that the company under Lt Mison was not stationed in Samal, but in Orani, Bataan. Lt Mison left for Samal immediately and stayed there for three days before returning to Orani.702

At 8:00 p.m., upon hearing rumors of troop movements in Bataan, Blando instructed Col Manayao to inquire on the whereabouts of 24 IB. Upon verification with CG 702 Bde, the latter reported that Tecson and Oliveros went to Camp Aquino for a conference, and for the despedida in his honor.703

Lt Col Ocampo Meets Lt Col Tecson

At 9:00 p.m., Manuel went to the HQ of Lt Col Ramsey Ocampo, PC Provincial Commander of Bataan, to seek his assistance to stop Tecson and his troops from moving to Metro Manila. Together, they went to see Tecson between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. at the Marsteel wharf in Limay, Bataan. Ocampo and Tecson are third cousins and are PMA classmates.704 Tecson confirmed that he and his troops were going to Sangley705 for the purpose of “securing” it.706 Ocampo understood this to mean securing Sangley “for the rebel forces”.707 Both Ocampo and Manuel failed to convince Tecson not to leave Bataan.708 Tecson told Ocampo that he had a “previous commitment” to BGen Zumel and also, that he was “under orders”.709 These orders, according to Tecson, came from his “immediate Commander” who, Ocampo came to know later, referred to Blando.710 That was what Tecson told him on 4 December 1989 when Tecson was already in military custody at Camp Olivas, Pampanga.711 When Blando testified before the Commission, he denied having ordered Tecson to go to Sangley Point.712

From Marsteel wharf, Ocampo returned to his camp around or past midnight. He reported the matter to Col Agerico Kagaoan, Operations Officer RECOM 3713 for transmission to the Regional Commander of RECOM 3.714

G.1.b. 1 December

BGen Manuel — who stayed behind in the Marsteel wharf — followed Ocampo to his HQ. Around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., Manuel talked to the Aide-de-camp of Gen de Villa, suggesting that some ships be deployed in Manila Bay to stop Tecson’s troops.715

Even before 30 November, Ocampo had heard reports of a”probable destabilization”, i.e., that “there was supposed to be a coup in the offing”.716 He learned about these in Camp Olivas, during one of their conferences with BGen Nazareno. In that conference, Nazareno gave “guidance to effectively prepare to defend or reinforce the seat of government, just in case there would be a coup.”717

Tecson and Oliveros travelled from Bataan to Sangley on board what was initially known as an unidentified fishing vessel. The indications of troop movements in Bataan and the involvement of a civilian fishing vessel figured early in raw intelligence reports. However, intelligence reports and after-battle reports said nothing definite about this boat and it continued to be described as an “unidentified fishing vessel”.

G.2. Finding the Fishing Vessel

The Commission considered the involvement of this vessel significant, not only because it ferried two battalions, but also because being a non-military craft, its full story could shed light on an aspect of civilian resources available to the coup plotters. The Commission, however, had difficulty gathering facts as it was “unidentified” in all the after-battle reports. It was only towards the close of its investigations that the Commission was able to discover that the fishing vessel was actually “Lady Vi-T-1”, owned by Odessa Fishing and Trading Corporation (Odessa) with offices at Navotas, Metro Manila.

G.2.a. Pre 30 November

According to Rufino Tiangco, Chairman of the Board of Odessa, about a week after 1 November 1989, a person representing himself as Artemio Tan of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, went to his office and sought to charter a fishing vessel to be used by the middle of November up to December 1989 and possibly up to January 1990. Tiangco informed Tan regarding the terms and conditions for the charter. Tan left bringing with him a sample copy of Odessa’s standard charter agreement along with other papers pertaining to the vessel.

Although Tan represented that he was from Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the evidence received by the Commission belies it. The Election Registrar of Puerto Princesa said that there is no Artemio Tan listed as a registered voter in Puerto Princesa. The City Treasurer reported that Residence Certificate No. 0828116 allegedly issued in 1989 to Artemio Tan was not issued in Puerto Princesa and that there is no business establishment known as Artemio Tan Trading registered in Puerto Princesa.718 Furthermore, the Station Commander of Puerto Princesa wired the Commission to advise that their efforts to locate Artemio Tan in Puerto Princesa City and in the Province of Palawan were “negative”.719

Tiangco Charters Out Vessel

On 10 November 1989, Tan returned to Odessa’s office and, on that occasion, reached a final agreement with Tiangco for the charter of Lady Vi-T-1. Tan and Gabriel Cruz, the President of Odessa, signed the charter agreement. Tan then paid Odessa the amount of P80,000 in cash, corresponding to one month’s advance rental and one month’s deposit. Carmelita Villanueva, Odessa’s office secretary, confirmed having received the payment which she turned over to Tiangco. Receipt of the money is not recorded in the books of account of Odessa.

On 27 November 1989, Tan went back to the Odessa office, accompanied by a man he introduced as Rudy Jimenez. Upon Tan’s request, Tiangco issued a letter authorizing Jimenez to board and take over the vessel as Tan’s “encargado”. That afternoon, Jimenez went to the Navotas Fish Port where Lady Vi-T-1 was docked, and presented himself, with Tiangco’s authorization letter, to the vessel’s captain, Pepito Dalivenancio. Jimenez was accordingly allowed to board the vessel.

Between 27 and 30 November 1989, two persons on board a service jeep arrived at the fish port, bringing with them five cavans of rice and three boxes of canned goods which they loaded on the vessel. They were allowed to board the vessel, upon Jimenez’ instructions.

G.2.b. 30 November

At 6:00 a.m., Jimenez ordered Dalivenancio to clear (idispacha) the vessel for Palawan. Before leaving the port, Dalivenancio obtained the necessary Coast Guard clearances for the departure to Palawan around 3:00 p.m. of that day. When the vessel crossed the breakwater of North Harbor, Jimenez ordered Dalivenancio to divert the course of the vessel and proceed to Bataan instead. Dalivenancio testified that he was threatened and intimidated by Jimenez and his two armed companions. Dalivenancio accordingly diverted the vessel and proceeded to Bataan, reaching Limay past 5:30 p.m. Before arriving in Limay, at a distance of about a mile from the shore, Dalivenancio, allegedly upon orders from Jimenez, instructed his crew to remove the name of Lady Vi-T-1. This was done by prying loose the piece of wood on which the vessel’s name was inscribed. At this point, Jimenez and his two companions changed to fatigue uniforms.720

Shortly after arrival in Limay, Lady Vi-T-1 shipsided by a tanker. Later on, around 500 uniformed soldiers boarded Lady Vi-T-1 using a barge for this purpose. While still in Limay, countersigns (i.e., square pieces of white paper, with a figure sketched in the middle) were distributed among the soldiers.721

G.2.c. 1 December

From Limay, Lady Vi-T-1 proceeded to Sangley Point at about 8:00 a.m. Dalivenancio reported that upon their arrival, they were met by a Coast Guard vessel which escorted his ship into Sangley. Jimenez and his two companions disembarked hurriedly and so did the rest of the soldiers from Bataan. Dalivenancio and his crew stayed on board the vessel.

G.3. Takeover and Recovery of Sangley – 1 December

Laguna Troops Move Towards Sangley

Another rebel force consisting of around 200 men from 16 IB stationed at Nagcarlan, Laguna, were motoring to Sangley Point. The driver of one of the 6 x 6 trucks carrying the rebels, Sgt Benito Cuaresma, claimed that their initial destination was Mauban, Quezon. However, enroute, he was ordered to proceed instead to Sangley where the troops were to serve as security for Exercise Balikatan.

The rebel troops from Laguna arrived at Sangley close to midnight of 30 November.722 Again, the rebels used the Balikatan Exercise as a ruse and sought entry through the Main Gate by presenting a written authorization signed by Cmdr Maligalig.723 The gate guards refused them entry on orders of PHILFLEET Commander Commo Proceso Fernandez. The rebels led by ex-Lt Cmdr Jaime Lucas, ex-Capt (PN) Felix Turingan and ex-Lt Col Oscar Legaspi PAF disarmed and overpowered the guards and let the rest of the rebel troops in.724

15th Strike Wing Grounded

BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander 15 SW returned to Sangley at around 11:00 p.m. of 30 November. He met his staff to discuss the information he gathered after attending the Command Conference at Camp Aguinaldo. Before 1:00 a.m., he ordered his men to evacuate the aircrafts to Basa or Clark. The rebels at the gate must have overheard his order given through the radio. From the Main Gate, the rebels proceeded to take control of the flight line and neutralized the choppers and other aircrafts. All the units of the 15 SW — 16th Attack Squadron, 594th Air Police Squadron, 20th Air Commando Squadron, 590th Air Base Group — were left intact but effectively neutralized.725 The pilots were taken hostage just before they could takeoff for other bases.726

The government pilots were captured by a team led by Lucas. The pilots were detained in the area of the Tora-Toras. One of the raiding officers, Lt Pierre Robert Pel, identified one of the hostaged pilots, Lt Gregor Mendel Panelo, as a fellow PMA’er. Pel called Lucas’ attention to Panelo. Turingan came to try to convince the hostaged pilots to join the rebels. They refused. Turingan and Lucas took Panelo with them. Legaspi, in civilian clothes, came to their area and allowed them to use the telephone. The hostaged pilots reported their situation to their Wing Commander who told them to stay put.727

Augmenting the troops that came in the 6 x 6 military trucks were some 80 rebels, who were reported to have arrived at about 2:30 a.m. on board a Philtranco Bus with body number 3023.728 The bus passed through the Cavite Gate of the 15SW729 and unloaded its passengers at the supply area730 near the BOQ.731 The bulk of the heavily armed troops deployed themselves at the Armory No. 1.732

Mutiny at the Philippine Fleet

The Philippine Fleet was having its share of problems. Close to midnight of 30 November, Commo Fernandez, upon arriving at the PHILFLEET HQ from Camp Aguinaldo, called for an officers’ conference at his office. In attendance were Capt (PN) Francisco Tolin, Commander of the Fleet Support Force; Capt (PN) Jose Agudelo, Chief of Staff; Commander Naval, Fleet Intelligence Officer; Lt Alfredo Ramos, Special Warfare Group Officer of the Day; Lt Manolito Malig-On, Fleet Security Officer; Capt (PN) Alex Nebres, Deputy Commander, Fleet Support Force; and Cmdr Precioso Filio, CO Headquarters Service Unit. Commo Fernandez discussed the matters taken up during the GHQ conference and instructed that the Fleet be put in readiness. He directed the command duty officer to alert patrol boats PS 29 and 19 for possible deployment.733

While the meeting was in progress, ex-Capt Turingan, Capt (PN) Danilo Pizarro and Capt Fermin Cuison entered the office and tried to persuade Fernandez to join them. Unable to persuade Fernandez, they left.734 Fernandez did not attempt to apprehend the rebels at this point because they were heavily armed. But immediately thereafter, he took steps to secure the HQ and relieved Pizarro as commander of the patrol force, naming Capt Tolin as acting commander. The other officers at the meeting went back to their respective units to prevent them from joining the rebels.

Bataan Rebel Troops Arrive

The two battalions led by Tecson and Oliveros, on board the Lady Vi-T-1, arrived at Sangley mid-morning and disembarked at the Philippine Fleet area.

Attempts to Intercept Lady Vi-T-1

Cmdr Carlos Damian, Commander, Naval Intelligence Security Group II, personally received at around 3:00 p.m. of 30 November a message from RAdm Carlito Cunanan, Flag-Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy (FOIC), which was transmitted at around 10:30 a.m., to verify the reported troop movement by ship from Bataan to Sangley. He relayed the message to his Olongapo Office situated inside the Subic Naval Base. Nothing was done. It was only on 1 December at around 2:00 p.m. that Cmdr Damian received word from his San Felipe Fort, Cavite City Station that the vessel from Bataan had already landed at around 10:30 a.m. in Sangley.735

At around 6:30 a.m. Commo Antonio Empedrad, Commander, Naval District II, received from PN HQ (HPN) a message assigning to him ships/crafts identified as PS 19, LT 502, AU 100, PG 62, and DF 334 for the purpose of interdicting rebel vessels going to the North and South Harbors, Manila. He directed Capt (PN) Romeo Meana, Commander Task Force 21, whose flagship was the auxiliary ship, AU 100, docked at Pier 15, to intercept the fishing vessel loaded with rebel troops coming from Limay, Bataan. The order was given at 7:00 a.m., but AU 100 came under the operational control of Task Force 21 only at around 7:55 a.m.

This was followed by another order at around 11:55 a.m. Meana, upon receipt of this order from Empedrad, ordered all his ships to intercept the vessel. He thought all along that the vessel was bound for Manila and they waited for it at the breakwater of Manila Bay.

A third order was given by Empedrad to Meana at 6:45 p.m., this time to intercept the same vessel withdrawing from Sangley to Bataan.736 Meana confirmed having received this order of Empedrad at 6:45 p.m. He sent out PG 62 and DF 334. The two vessels reached the vicinity of Corregidor and Limay, Bataan but reported that there was no sighting of the fishing vessel as late as 11:00 p.m.737

Commo Fernandez maintained, on the other hand, that his failure to prevent the successful landing of the fishing vessel was due in part to the directive of HPN on 1 December at around 7:00 a.m., which ordered the transfer of some of his vessels to Naval District II.738

When the Lady Vi-T-1 docked at the Philippine Fleet Port, it was escorted by Navy light craft No. 308. At about 11:40 a.m., the troops disembarked and marched towards the Sangley Gate.739 According to Tecson, at 2:00 p.m. he met Turingan who told him to go to Manila and attack the Western Police District HQ. Tecson said he was receiving orders only from Blando who he tried to contact by radio but failed.740 Isleta was allowed to maintain his HQ. He negotiated with Turingan and agreed that he would not attack the latter’s troops, which were in control of the air assets, in exchange for the safety of the WOC and his HQ, from where he continued both to monitor the rebel movements as well as keep in constant touch with GHQ. Isleta claimed that he called for assistance from Capt (PN) Jesus Durian, Naval Base commander, who gave him a cold response.741 Durian denied that Isleta asked for assistance.742

Commo Fernandez reached a similar stand-off arrangement with the rebels led by Capt Pizarro. He was able to retain control of his HQ but could not offer any resistance to the rebels.743

Rebels Briefly Control the Skies

The rebels using three Tora-Toras, one Sikorsky helicopter and an Islander as a forward air controller attacked Malacañang, PTV-4, Crame, and Aguinaldo. The Tora-Toras were piloted by Capt Vergel Nacino, Capt Elmer Amon and Lt Joey Sarroza while the Sikorsky was flown by Lt Panelo. The Islander was piloted by Lt Orlando Caballegan.

At Midday The Tide Turns

Air superiority was regained by the government when Maj Danilo Atienza, at the cost of his life, and other pilots of PAF F-5 jets, from Basa Air Base destroyed the rebel air assets. (For details, see Commission Interim Report No. 2)

The end quickly followed. By about noon, the task force earlier created by MGen Montano, composed of the PC-INP of Cavite under Lt Col Nicetas Katigbak, of Laguna under Lt Col Edgar Aglipay, and Batangas under Lt Col Rogelio Regalado, plus other contingents of RECOM 4, augmented by two V-150s and charged with the mission of recapturing Sangley Point for the government, held a coordinating conference to synchronize their movements.744 But even before they arrived at the Sangley Main Gate at about 3:00 p.m., some of the rebels had began dispersing from the shipyard area, takingthe shoreline route towards Varadero and Naval Base Cavite. Many were seen still carrying their firearms but others had changed to civilian clothes.745 A brief firefight occurred at about 100 meters away from the Main Gate in front of the Combank branch office. Tecson and Oliveros, with their troops, were stopped by PC troops and escorted to Lt Col Katigbak who was at the Main Gate. An agreement was reached for the rebel soldiers to return to Bataan and by about 5:30 p.m., they were on board the Lady Vi-T- 1 on their way home. Lady Vi-T-1 could not, h owever, dock at Limay because of the low tide. It docked instead at Mariveles from where the troops returned to their respective command posts. Tecson and Oliveros proceeded to Camacho, Bataan and surrendered to BGen Manuel.746

Capt Pizarro, Capt Cuison, LCdr Fred Tuvilla, LCdr George Uy, Lt Michael Angelo Asperin, Lt Vicente Agdamag, LCdr Ruperto Borromeo and Ens Gerold Josue surrendered to Commo Fernandez. Later, on information given by Capt Pizarro, LCdr Perfecto Pascual, acting commanding officer of AD 614, was picked up from his ship.747

G.4. Activities of Lady Vi-T-1 Owners

G.4.a. 2 December

Lady Vi-T-1, now with only Capt Dalivenancio, and his crew on board, proceeded to the Navotas Fish Port where it eventually docked, reachingthe Navotas port at around 3:45 a.m. Before reaching Navotas, a Navy boat approached to a distance of around 100 meters, but did not board Lady Vi-T-1, confining itself to focusing its search lights on the latter vessel.748

At around 10:00 a.m., Dalivenancio went to the Odessa office and claimed that he gave a verbal report of the incident to Tiangco and Cruz. In the process, the question of whether or not to make a report as required by law to the Coast Guard was allegedly discussed. Dalivenancio, according to him, was afraid to do so; hence, he requested Tiangco and Cruz to make the report to which the two answered “sige” (Okay). Cruz instructed Dalivenancio to make a written report which the latter completed by the evening of the same day. He then delivered the written report to the Odessa office that evening and was received there by Mrs Villanueva.749

G.4.b. 4 December

According to Cruz, at past 1:00 p.m., Tiangco and he went to the police station of Navotas to report the alleged hijacking, saying that it was perpetrated by armed persons, but without identifying Tan or Jimenez, and also, without furnishing P/Cpl Florencio Castillo, the desk officer then on duty, with a copy of Dalivenancio’s written report; nor did Cruz and Tiangco bring with them Dalivenancio when they went to the Police station. Castillo suggested that the matter be reported to the Coast Guard and Tiangco said they would take care of it. Castillo said that Tiangco and Cruz merely wanted to have the incident recorded but not investigated.750

The police blotter of the Navotas Police contains the description of reports and events which the desk officer enters in chronological order. Each entry is given a number. The Commission observed that the entries usually contain a detailed description of what happened and the full names and addresses of persons included in the entry. The incident involving the Lady Vi-T-1 is unusual in that the entry was at the bottom of a page squeezed into only four lines; that its assigned number is the same as the next entry; and no address, company name nor ages are given for Odessa and either Cruz or Tiangco.751

Cruz admitted that neither he, nor Tiangco, nor Odessa, nor Dalivenancio made a report to the Coast Guard concerning the incident Dalivenancio also said that he did not execute or file a marine protest although he knew it was his duty to do so.752

Tiangco, in the course of his testimony before the Commission, mentioned that he knew Gregorio Honasan, having been introduced to the latter by Romeo Rivera. This happened in 1987 during a stag party given by Rivera for Don Honasan, who was about to be married. Rivera and Tiangco are both members of the Bullseye Gun Club. At the time Tiangco joined the club, Rivera was its president. Since that stag party, Tiangco claims that he never saw Gregorio Honasan again, although he admitted to regularly buying cement from Don Honasan.753

H. Malacañang and Sta Mesa Incident

H.1. 30 November

Government Troops Prepare for Defense of Malacañang

In response to reports of rebel troop movement from Bataan to Manila received at 9:00 p.m. of 30 November by P/Col Ernesto Diokno, then Acting Superintendent of the Western Police District (WPD),754 the entire district, consisting often stations and other organic units in the General Headquarters, went on full red alert. P/Col Diokno ordered the mobilization of all WPD personnel and summoned all field commanders to report to HQ for briefing.755

Meanwhile, Col Voltaire Gazmin, Commander Presidential Security Group (PSG), told the Commission that the PSG is always on red alert. However, because of information regarding a possible coup, Gazmin declared Defense Condition three, the highest state of preparedness, at 6:00 p.m.

H.2. 1 December

Bombing of Malacañang

At about 3:00 a.m., President Aquino convened an emergency Cabinet meeting, and after, the meeting, at 3:45 a.m., the President went on television to calm the nation. Demonstrating to the televiewers that she was “sitting here safely at this moment at my office,”756 she informed the nation of an ongoing coup attempt and assured the people that “our forces have the situation under control.”757 At about 6:30 a.m., three Tora-Toras took off from Sangley and flew towards Malacañang.758 Legaspi, reportedly acting as general control, directed the planes to fire rockets at Malacañang, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4 and Camp Crame.759 The planes strafed and bombed Malacañang Complex with machine gunfire and small bombs at 6:45 a.m. The bombings were apparently intended to kill President Aquino, judging from the fact that what was hit was the intended place of safety for President Aquino in case of attack. This was known to the rebels because Noble, being formerly with the Presidential Security Group (PSG), had access to their security plan for the President. However, unknown to the rebels, Gazmin had changed the security arrangements for the President.760

Capt Crisanto Reboya, CO of the 1 LACS stationed at Malacañang Park, ordered all gunners of the Armor Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV) to fire their 25 mm (anti-aircraft) weapons at the attacking rebel planes. Some dismounted troops also fired their issued firearms at the Tora-Toras.761

At 7:40 a.m., the President again went on the air to declare “the mutiny . . . is contained,” informing the people that fighter planes from Basa Air Base were at that moment attacking the Tora-Toras. She warned “never [to] give over this nation to tyranny.”762

Close to noon and after the Tora-Tora attack, US Ambassador Nicholas Platt called up the President and, on instructions ofWashington, expressed American support and willingness to assist the government. The President expressed her thanks for the supportive gesture of US President Bush and informed Ambassador Platt that in order to facilitate communication, Secretary Ramos would get in touch with him directly.

Ambassador Platt took the initiative and, contacted him straight away. Ramos, assessing the need of the hour to keep rebel planes away from Metro Manila, asked for a “couple of persuasion flights.” This, was done by US Phantom jets from about 2:00 p.m. to the evening of 1 December.

Attack of Malacañang from Ground Forces

Before midnight of 30 November, thirty rebel Scout Rangers were sighted on Quezon Bridge and 80 soldiers in civilian attire were reported at the foot of Sta. Mesa bridge.763

As Malacañang was bombed by rebel planes, rebel soldiers with most of them in civilian clothes, and civilians, armed with high caliber firearms such as M-16, M203, M60 and anti-tank weapons placed roadblocks and checkpoints in various strategic places in Sta Mesa. The rebels blocked the approaches leading to Malacañang in order to isolate it from friendly government troops coming to its defense.764

At one point, these rebel soldiers intercepted at their checkpoint PC Lt Wilbur Naldo of the CAPCOM West Sector Command, holding him hostage for an hour until he was able to trick his captors by pretending to have joined them. He was even introduced to the leader of the rebels at the vicinity of Stop and Shop, as Col de la Cruz.765

In the afternoon, Col Gazmin began offensive operations against rebel ground forces threatening Malacanang. He designated Maj Agustin Dema-ala, CO of HHSB PSG, as Task Group Green Commander to lead a company of Scout Rangers under Capt Jessie Dellosa, and a reserve platoon under Capt Nestor Castro, augmented by seven AIFV to assault the rebel soldiers in Sta Mesa.766 They were to join the forces of P/Col Diokno in fighting the rebels.

Police and military forces conducted a mopping-up operation along Magsaysay Blvd. In the afternoon, this was augmented by the troops under Maj Dema-ala.767 At about 7:00 p.m., Sta Mesa area was cleared of rebel soldiers.768 The only casualty on the government side was one unidentified tank gunner who was wounded during the Sta Mesa encounter.769

While the fightingto secure Malacañang was going on, the President stayed in Malacañang and went on the air confirming the government’s acceptance of the US offer of assistance, and acknowledging expressions of support from friendly governments. She cautioned against complacency, since the enemy “is routed but he is not yet vanquished.”

Mobilization of Police Forces

By morning, contingents from Chinatown Sub-Station and Police Station No. 6 of the WPD were dispatched to the Metropolitan Theater to neutralize rebel soldiers atop the Quezon Bridge. Members of the City Hall Police Detachment were ordered to establish a roadblock at Concepcion-San Marcelino, Arroceros, and P Burgos Sts to defend the Manila City Hall from possible enemy attack.

H.3. 2 December

Earlier in the afternoon, the operatives of the Operations Bureau and Intelligence Division of the WPD, apprehended Clifford Cobsilen Yequitan, 27 years old, single and native of Bontoc Province from whose possession one Ultimax rifle, cal 5.56 mm with serial number 102260 and several rounds of ammunitions were recovered.770

H.4. 3 December

P/Maj Gen Alfredo Lim, WPD Superintendent, arrived in Manila via Clark Air Base from an Interpol conference abroad. He immediately called for an emergency meeting of all WPD officers and issued orders to provide round-the-clock security detail at the Senate, Supreme Court, Manila Pavilion, Bay View Hotel and the Manila Hotel, where the Chief Justices of Asia and Western Pacific were holding a conference.

I. North and South Harbor Incidents

The RAM-HF also sought to control the Manila North and South harbors as docking facilities for vessels presumably loaded with rebel troops.

I.1. 30 November

Recruitment at North and South Harbors

The coup plotters wanted to win to their side the police forces guarding the harbors particularly the North Harbor Police stationed at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Building. Billy Bibit771 telephoned P/Capt Job Gavino, Station Commander (STACOM), North Harbor Port Police at 7:30 a.m. to say that he would send his representatives to see him regarding some important matters. At 11:00 a.m., 20 men in civilian clothes, presumably military men, arrived at the North Harbor Police Station, on orders of Bibit, looking for Gavino. They tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces but he allegedly refused.772

Calling of Guardian Center Foundation, Inc Members

At about 7:00 a.m., Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor of Baguio City, was informed by his niece, Nena Duba, that an unidentified soldier, who showed his Guardian tattoo, came earlier to his residence at Naval Base, Baguio City with a message about an emergency meeting of the Guardian Center Foundation, Inc (GCFI) to be held that day at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila. Being the President of the GCFI Region I Chapter, he felt bound to attend the meeting but decided to verify it first.773

Eito Ikeuchi, a full time martial arts instructor at the Department of Physical Education in PMA since August 1979 and a GCFI member, confirmed to Sagsago that there indeed was going to be a general meeting of the GCFI at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila.774 They agreed to go to Manila. They left Baguio at about 9:30 a.m. on board a private jeep.775

Declaration of Red Alert at Harbor Area

By late morning, the different military and police units at the Port Area started receiving information of a forthcoming coup. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Intelligence Unit received reports of the movement of armed men from Bataan to Manila on board an unidentified vessel.776

P/Capt Gavino declared red alert at 4:00 p.m., although as early as 7:30 a.m., he was already approached by Bibit to join the rebel forces.

At about 10:00 p.m., Capt Esmaralda Saplada, Staff Duty Officer of the Enforcement and Security Services (ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information from Antonio Tigno of the WPD that rebel troops known as “RAM boys” coining from Northern Luzon would be passing by South Harbor by boat. The information was immediately relayed to the Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard (HPCG).777

Meeting of the Guardian Center Foundation, Inc

Sagsago and Ikeuchi arrived at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila, at about 6:30 p.m. They entered a restaurant where they saw Sgts Rodolfo Mendez and Rodolfo Ocon and some 15 GCFI member soldiers from the PMA in civilian clothes sitting inside the restaurant. Ocon informed Mendez that there would be a national meeting of the GCFI.778 Their number later increased to about 30.779

Sagsago asked Sgts Ocon and Mendez what the meeting was all about. He was told by Ocon that they were supposed to wait for other GCFI members from Manila.780 At that time, there were already about 40 persons in the restaurant, including Sgt Jaime Camacho, Sgt Alimbuyao, and other members from the PMA.781

That evening, somebody whom Sagsago did not recognize, fetched his group and led them to a nearby building which he later on learned was the PPA office. There, he saw about 50 people, some in military uniform and armed, and others in civilian attire. Sagsago observed that not all of those gathered bore the GCFI tattoo. These individuals were in a festive mood. Some were saying it was the birthday of someone for which a goat was butchered and drinks were served. Sagsago identified Cagurangan, a retired soldier who went by the GCFI name of “Founder Barorot” and a certain Morit,782 a businessman who went by the GCFI name of “Magic Hermes”.783

Unidentified persons inside the PPA building told Mendez and other GCFI members of the “good news”. The unidentified persons declared that they would change the Government. Concluding that the gathering was not really a meeting, Sagsago claimed he called Mendez and Ocon, and other members of the Baguio Chapter, and told them he had decided to leave the place.784

Ocon informed Sagsago that there was going to be a coup and that they (GCFI-Baguio Chapter) were being asked to join. Sagsago, Ocon and Mendez and Ikeuchi discussed the matter. Sagsago claimed they all decided to leave. They passed the word around, among their other members, with instructions to leave in groups of two or three so as not to attract the attention of the rebel soldiers.785

Sagsago and Ikeuchi said they could not take their jeep out of the Port Area because by about 11:00 p.m. the gates were already blocked by the rebels. Both went back to the restaurant where they earlier met and stayed there until the next day leaving the premises only when the RAM-HF forces abandoned the harbor areas.786

I.2. 1 December

Attack at North Harbor/South Harbor Areas

Bibit’s troops started attacking the different units at the Harbors. The RAM-HF forces simultaneously took over entry and exit gates of South and North Harbors, the HPCG and the Customs Police Station located at the PPA building.

Twenty men in civilian clothes led by TSgt de la Cruz arrived at the PPA at 1:00 a.m. and tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces. Gavino claims he again refused. TSgt de la Cruz requested that they be allowed to stay at the North Harbor Area. Gavino relented to this request.787

As of 2:00 a.m., at the South Harbor Gate 3, soldiers in full battle gear, armed with high powered weapons, were already deployed all over the area. Their strength was estimated to be around 200 and were commanded by Bibit.788

Capt Esmeraldo Saplala with several customs policemen proceeded to Gate 3 of the South Harbor to alert the guards regarding the arrival of rebel soldiers. Upon reaching Gate 3 they saw that Bibit’s men had taken it over. Bibit asked Saplala to relay his message to the HPCG to “lay down their arms and join them on their mission”. Saplala contacted the HPCG but they refused. Saplala and his men were told to stay at Gate 3.789

At the PCG Station at the North Harbor (PCGS), a group of more than ten armed soldiers in camouflage uniform accompanied by PPA policeman Arturo Navarro arrived at 2:10 a.m. One of them, with a Philippine Marine insignia, ordered the PCGS personnel to place their firearms and ammunitions at the side of the gate. When OIC Jaime Daquilanes refused, a certain Capt Tapitan confiscated their arms consistingof: three M-16Armalite rifles, four long and short magazines and one US caliber .45 pistol with two magazines and 14 rounds of ammunition. Tapitan told the PCGS personnel to deposit the firearms at Bibit’s office in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Services (CIIS). They also tried to convince the personnel to join the rebel forces but they allegedly refused. RAM-HF soldiers barricaded the Lauro de la Cruz gate with commandeered dump trucks and left.790

The RAM-HF group at the Harbor was initially composed of some 60 fully armed soldiers and six Customs personnel namely: Bibit, Audie Serrano, Benjamin Cepe of CIIS, Arthur Garcia, Catalino Bondoc of ESS and Crisostomo Balneg, storekeeper. This complement later increased to about 300.791

Takeover of North Harbor

At about 3:00 a.m., PCGS personnel conducted discreet investigation of rebel forces who took control of the Zaragoza and Moriones gates of the North Harbor. The rebels were based at PPA Headquarters.792

At 3:00 a.m., RAM-HF soldiers took control of the South and North Harbors. They raided the ESS Headquarters, disarmed the personnel on duty and carted away 16 handguns and eight long firearms of various caliber. Using a bolt cutter, they also forced open Security Warehouse No. 9 and took 25 cartons of corned beef and several cartons of Marlboro cigarettes. They closed down the piers and barricaded Gate Nos. 3, 4 and 6 of the Port of Manila with container vans.793

At about 4:00 a.m., Capt Rafael Crisol, North Harbor Section Commander, arrived at Gate 1 and found it barricaded by container vans and manned by heavily armed men in military uniform, with some in civilian clothes, and PPA Police with white headbands. He estimated the number of the rebels at 200.794

The PCGS at the North Harbor received reports that PPA Police and heavily armed men had barricaded the Moriones Gate (Gate 2) and Zaragoza Gate (Gate 1) with container vans and cargo trucks. The PPA Police and the heavily armed persons prevented the entry and exit of vehicles at these gates.795

The North Harbor gates were secured apparently in preparation for the landing of reinforcements for the rebel forces. Elements of 339 PC Coy based in Bacolod tried to commandeer a vessel to take them to North Harbor.796

Many persons, some in civilian clothes, and others in fatigue uniforms, but all wearing white headbands, were seen converging at the PPA Headquarters which is just four meters away from the PCGS. PPA Policemen allegedly constantly seen with rebel forces were P/Capt Job Gavino, Augusto Pilapil, Manuel Coching, Danny Fonbuena, Renato Villanueva, Ernesto Domingo, Matias Tamayo, Jesus Tolosa, Ronnie Abunao, Wilfredo Lira, Francisco Casio, and two persons known only by their nicknames Vanguard and Bogard.797

RAM-HF Sets Up HQ at PPA Building, North Harbor

A group of about 30 RAM-HF soldiers went to the PPA Building on the night of 30 November. The group increased to about 150 persons by 4:00 a.m. Some soldiers, armed with Galil, M203 grenade launchers, armalites and all kinds of assorted firearms, went to the nearby PCGS. The leader who introduced himself as Capt Pilapil, said he was sent by Bibit. However,when STACOM of the Coast Guard. Cmdr Velasco later talked to Gavino, Velasco said that Pilapil was really ex-Capt Dante Pimentel, a GCFI member.

At about 8:00 a.m., Pimentel asked his brother GCFI, P/Capt Gavino, to join them in the fight against the Government. In his testimony, Gavino admitted joining the GCFI in January 1986.798 There were two media men present at this time. Gavino claimed he refused to join their group.799 Pimentel then asked the number of firearms stored in the armory. Gavino informed him that all the firearms had been issued to PPA police personnel. Pimentel requested that he and his group be allowed to stay at the Headquarters.800 The RAM-HF soldiers roamed around the area and closed the Zaragosa and the Moriones Gate.801 Pimentel ordered some of his personnel to man these gates. Then, he proceeded to the PCGS.802

Recruitment at the Coast Guard Station

Pimentel, Sgt Willy Lira and others identified as Bibit’s agents, entered the PCGS at 9:00 a.m.803 There, Pimentel tried, without success, to convince Velasco, to join the rebel forces.804

Meanwhile, Gavino, by telephone, informed his immediate superior, Port Manager Atty Salialam, about the presence of almost 300 rebels at the area near the PPA Police Station. Atty Salialam gave instruction for the men to stay put and to secure the place particularly the Cashier’s Office and the armory.805

Pedro Salazar, Arnold Navarette, and Hilconido Oira, members of the Law Enforcement Team, Coast Guard Station, noticed several uniformed armed men and civilians with white headbands, together with P/Capt Gavino and PPA policemen Ronnie Abundo, Ernesto Domingo, Augusto Pilapil, and Renato Villanueva standing, in front of the PPA Station.806 The Coast Guard Station Manila under Velasco monitored the actions of Gavino.807

RAM-HF Soldiers Withdraw from North Harbor

The RAM-HF soldiers under Pimentel stayed at the North Harbor area near the PPA police and PCGS from about 1:00 a.m. until late afternoon. At 5:30 p.m., they started to leave the PPA Police station bringing with them one shotgun from the station. Atty Salialam reported that the reinforcements of the RAM-HF, from the AFP LOGCOM, did not arrive.808

By early evening, the North harbor had been cleared of about 100 RAM-HF soldiers.809 At 8:00 p.m., the remainder of the RAM-HF men reportedly left the area. Government troops immediately took over and established checkpoints.

Assessing the Situation at the South Harbor

Lt Col Virgilio Danao, Acting Chief of the Customs Police, received information at about 3:00 a.m. that a coup d’etat was in progress, and VAB had been taken by rebel forces. To assess the extent of rebel deployment, he checked the NAIA District Command under Maj Alpapara, who told him that his area was not bothered by the rebels. Danao also called POM Command, and was advised by Desk Officer Customs Policeman (Cpm) Felix Simangan, that everything was normal and quiet in their area of responsibility.810

Danao went to South Harbor at 5:45 a.m., and was surprised to see the vicinity of ESS HQ surrounded by men in uniform with white arm bands and fully armed with high powered weapons. He made rounds in the area to assess the situation and found that all his men on duty had been overwhelmed by Bibit’s soldiers. The rebels were atop the new ESS Building with a .50 cal machine gun aimed at the HPCG Building.811

During the rounds at the Customs Police Division, the Desk Officer reported to Danao that their firearms were confiscated by the rebels led by Cpm Arthur Garcia. The office of Lt Antonio de Guzman of Logistics was also ransacked and firearms were carted away. Danao tried to get in touch with Bibit at 6:30 a.m. but the latter refused to talk to him.812

Danao called a staff meeting at about 7:00 a.m. for briefing and assessment of the situation. He learned that the entire South Harbor was occupied by the rebels led by Bibit as early as 1:30 a.m. and that most of the zone gates were barricaded. He received a report that Garcia and other RAM-HF men commandeered the blue pick-up of the Customs Police Division. To avoid damage to said vehicle, Danao ordered Cpm Lino Bondoc to drive the vehicle and to keep him (Danao) informed on activities on the rebel side.813

Customs Commissioner Salvador Mison, a retired LtGen and former Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP, called up Danao at 7:30 a.m. and asked for developments. Danao informed Mison of the loss of P400,000.00 in cash from the Cashier’s Office. Mison gave instructions to secure the area to prevent looting, pilferage and damage to government properties. Danao also received a report that Capt Saplala, his Deputy Staff Officer, was being detained and held hostage at Gate 3 by the rebels. He sent Cpm Eugenio Monforte to take custody of Saplala from the rebels.814

At 10:30 a.m., Danao received a report that the Office of the Customs Commissioner at South Harbor was ransacked. When he, Cpm Ely Abiog, and Eugenio Monforte went there, they found no sign that the office had been ransacked, although there were some tell-tale signs of break-in. Danao called up Bibit and together, they conducted an inventory. Bibit took two portable transceivers and, after talking to Mison over the phone, left a note acknowledging custody of the transceivers.815

Government Forces Arrive at South Harbor

At 10:00 p.m., the HPCG received unconfirmed reports from BGen (Ret) Benjamin Cruz, ESS Chief, of rebel troops landing at South Harbor.816

I.3. 2 December

At 4:00 a.m., RAM-HF troopers abandoned the ESS HQ compound and regrouped at the Commissioner’s Office Building.817

At noontime, CAPCOM and WPD elements led by P/Col Diokno arrived at the South Harbor with the intention of assaulting rebel groups there. Being unfamiliar with the area, Diokno decided to call for reinforcements. He then conferred with the HPCG Battle Staff at the HPCG regarding the joint operations to be conducted against the rebels.818

Two patrol cars from the CAPCOM, with sirensblowing, unexpectedly entered the Port Area through Gate 1. This prompted the HPCG to sound the General Quarters alarm even before the scheduled arrival of reinforcements from the WPD. A RAM-HF unit withdrew through Gate 6 where they boarded waiting vehicles and trucks parked at the area fronting the Lusteveco Office.819

Later, Diokno and his group, composed of P/Col Proceso Almando, P/Lt Col Robert Barbers, P/Capt SA Straebel and other WPD Officers and men, in coordination with BGen (Ret) Cruz, drove away 30 to 40 soldiers headed by Bibit. The rebels escaped through Gate 6 of South Harbor on board different vehicles. A box containing 140 dynamite sticks and four vehicles used by the rebels were recovered.820

At 1:00 p.m., the expected reinforcement led by BGen (Ret) Cruz arrived at the ESS HQ. Majs Generoso Halican, Maglipon, Capt Rolando Sacramento, and some policemen of POMDC checked the area and confirmed that the area was clear of rebels.821

The North and South Harbor areas were clear of RAM-HF forces by 2:00 p.m.822

J. Other Hostile Events in Luzon

J.1. Solcom Incident (RSAF 4)

At around 7:00 p.m. of 30 November, 2Lt Eliseo Rasco, CO, ISAC, RSAF 4 stationed at Brgy Sto Cristo, Sariaya, Quezon, together with Lts Herminio Cantaco, Jonas Calleja and 47 enlisted personnel, commandeered a Philtranco Bus and proceeded to Sangley Point upon instructions given to Rasco by an army officer two days earlier. Arriving at Sangley at around 6:00 a.m. of 1 December, they beefed up the group of Navy Capt Turingan in guarding the gate, port and airstrip. After the rebels’ air assets were destroyed in the afternoon, Rasco and his men joined Lt Col Tecson and Maj Oliveros in boarding a fishing vessel, with Mariveles, Bataan as destination.823

Maj Rosalio Magsino, Battalion Commander of RSAF 4, explained that although Rasco’s unit was under him, its operational control was under Col Miguel Fontanilla, head of Task Force Hunter. Magsino failed to arrive at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, despite orders from BGen Evaristo Carino because along the way he received conflicting orders from Lt Cols Nicetas Katigbak and Aglipay.824

J.2. Legazpi City Incident

At 9:30 a.m., 1 December, Capt Florencio Flores, CO 3 SRB, with two V-150s and a whole compliment of 3 SRB occupied Legazpi City Airport.

Elements of his unit simultaneously took over DZRC radio station and PLDT office. Upon receiving a report of Flores’s activities, Col Marino Filart, RECOM 5 Commander, constituted a provisional brigade under Col Ernesto Maristela to cope with the situation.825

At 10:00 a.m., 1 December, Maristela met with Flores, Lts Jay Tindoy, Marcel Mercado and Emmanuel Martin to convince them to return to barracks. They would not accede because according to Flores: “I am here in compliance to a directive from the regimental commander of the 1st Scout Ranger Regiment which I belong.” However, Maristela succeeded in having Flores agree to vacating the premises of DZRC and PLDT, consolidating his forces at and confining them to one end of the airport. In return, Maristela confined his troops to the other end of the airport.826

Maristela then ordered his battalion commander, Maj Julius Ovilla, CO RSAF 5, to position his men in strategic places and park two dump trucks on the runway. As Ovilla was deploying his men, Capt Reynaldo Rafal, Deputy R1, RECOM 5, arrived at 2:00 p.m., with his men and some soldiers from 3 SRB on board a 6 x 6 truck driven by Sgt Asistio Cerillo. They joined the forces of Flores at the airport.827

At 6:00 p.m., 1 December, Col Filart ordered Maristela to disengage his troops at the airport. He met with Flores to advice him that he was disengaging to avoid a confrontation but he asked Flores to continue confining his troops to the airport.828

At 6:00 a.m. of 2 December, Maristela, Rafal, Tindoy and Martin met at the Mayon Restaurant inside the airport terminal and again Maristela tried to persuade them to vacate the airport for the sake of public convenience. The rebel officers left to confer with Flores who arrived shortly and told Maristela that he has to consult BGen Blando. When Flores returned, he said he was unable to reach Blando. Maristela continued his dialogue with Flores because he could sense that Flores was starting to weaken.

At 9:30 a.m., 2 December, Gov Romeo Salalima arrived followed by Capt (PN) Rex Robles, both of whom were given permission to talk to Flores and his men. At 10:00 a.m., the rebels received an ultimatum from Col Filart. One of the rebel officers asked through Maristela for an hour’s extension which was granted. Gov Salalima returned with Msgr Quiambao and Msgr Sarte of the Legazpi Diocese to intercede with the rebels. At the same time, Flores requested a one-on-one meeting with Maristela which culminated in Flores and his men returning around 12:30 p.m. to their camp in Villahermosa, Daraga, Albay.829

J.3. Sorsogon

On 1 December at around 6:30 a.m., Col Rene Bautista, Provincial Commander of Sorsogon, assembled his men inside Camp Escudero, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. During the briefing, Capt Leovic Dioneda, an officer previously implicated for leading with Capt Rafal the siege of Legazpi Airport during the August 1987 coup, spoke to Col Bautista’s men. Capt Ruben Liwanag, OIC, 253rd PC Company, and his EX-O, Lt Gualberto Macalos, decided to join the rebel side. They commandeered two passenger buses, a Philtranco and a JB Liner. With 100 men, they boarded the buses at around 8:30 a.m. bound for Manila. Col Bautista did not report the troop movement to RECOM headquarters.830

The blocking force of P/Lt Jacinto Sison, Field Force Commander stationed at Brgy Binogsocan, Guinobatan, Albay, failed to stop this troop movement since they received the order ten minutes after the rebels passed by them. At around 11:30 a.m., the two buses were intercepted by the blocking force established by Camarines Sur Constabulary Command in Camarines Sur, however, the rebels were able to proceed as planned. The Provincial Commander of Camarines Sur tried but failed to convince the rebels to turn back.831 However, in Camarines Norte, the Provincial Commander, after seven hours of negotiation, successfully convinced the rebels to return to Camp Escudero which they reached before midnight.832

In the late evening of 2 December, Capts Liwanag, Dioneda and Lt Macalos organized a second troop movement this time originating from Villahermosa, Daraga, Albay where the 3 SRB is based. It fizzled out because the rebel Rangers would no longer follow.833

When asked while testifying before the Commission if he had heard that Capt Dioneda had the reputation of being something of a Robin Hood, BGen Filart (who was promoted to BGen sometime after December 1989) replied

Yes sir, as a matter of fact, . . . that was one of the reasons why he [Dioneda] should be transferred out of the region because he or his family was operating a jueteng operation in Sorsogon.834

Filart also added

. . . during my interview with Capt Liwanag about any money involved, he told me, according to Capt Dioneda, he [Dioneda] was given P500.000 to support the Bicol operation . . . to defray expenses for the movement.835

K. Mactan Incident

Historic Mactan Island, site of the alternate international airport and Mactan Air Base (MAB), was in the public eye for a period of nine days during the December 1989 attempted coup d’etat, as rebel forces led by BGen Jose Comendador, Commanding General 2nd Air Division (CG 2 AD) took control of MAB and the airport, including aircrafts belonging to the Philippine Air Lines (PAL).

Of specific interest were the PAF air assets, particularly the F-5 jets and the Sikorsky helicopter gunships, which could provide ample air support to whomsoever controlled MAB. There were 27 PAF aircrafts at MAB at the time: four F5s, three C130s, one T-28, one T-33, seven Nomads, two S-76s (Sikorsky), and nine Hueys. The C 130s and the Hueys are capable of moving troops. There were also 13 commercial aircrafts at the Mactan alternate international airport; two 747s (which were diverted to Cebu since NAIA was closed to air traffic), two BAC-111s, six Sunrisers, two Fokkers, and one LBC AVRO. Apparently, the intended use of the base, the airport, and the PAF and PAL air assets would have provided a convenient means of moving combat troops to Luzon from Visayas and Mindanao and vice versa.836

K.1. 30 November

BGen Comendador Briefs his Men

At about 8:00 p.m., red alert was declared at the MAB. Thirty minutes later, Comendador talked to his personnel at the 2 AD and told them “You have got to put your trust in me, get orders from me, and follow the chain of command.” At that particular time, 2 AD personnel thought that BGen Comendador was still their legitimate commander and was receiving orders from BGen Renato Palma, COMVISCOM.837

Meanwhile, at 11:00 p.m., of the same evening, some elements of the 23 IB 4 ID in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur were told by Lt Gerry Amante that they would go to Nasipit, Butuan City for a security mission.838 Cpl Elmer Barrientos drove Lt Col Ericson Aurelio, CO 23 IB, in his service jeep for Nasipit, followed by two 6 x 6 trucks loaded with soldiers and one V-150. At Nasipit, Barrientos was informed that they were going to secure MAB.839

At about the same time, Lt Pedro Sumayo informed his men, a segment of 23 IB personnel at their Headquarters in Bidcor Compound, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, that they would be proceeding to MAB to secure government facilities there. After the briefing, they were issued firearms, given a basic load of ammunitions, and proceeded to Nasipit wharf, where they boarded the M/V Our Lady of Lourdes and sailed for Mactan. Aside from Lt Sumayo, the officers included Aurelio, Amante and 2Lt Ramos.840 At about 11:00 p.m., members of the Alpha Coy, 30 IB 4 ID, based in Bad-as (Placer) Surigao del Norte, were told by Lt Ricardo Nepomuceno that they will proceed to Mactan to secure the air base. Forty three enlisted personnel boarded a 6 x 6 truck. Nepomuceno with his escort boarded a mini cruiser and all of them, together with a V-150 commando vehicle, left their Command Post and proceeded to Surigao pier where they boarded M/V Sweet Pearl and left for Mactan.841

K.2. 1 December

Upon BGen Comendador’s instructions, Lt Rodolfo de la Torre, Junior Aide-de-camp of Comendador and Intelligence Officer of 2 AD, with about 20 enlisted personnel, manned a checkpoint at the foot of the Mactan bridge (Lapu-Lapu side) at about 2:00 a.m. to prevent any Cebu City troops from reaching Mactan.842

Troop Movements Toward Cebu

VISCOM headquarters received information of unauthorized troop movements of the 23 IB and 30 IB, which were on their way to the Cebu Headquarters, 4 ID and Headquarters PC/INP RECOM 7. They learned that 23 IB was headed by Aurelio, while 30 IB elements, identified as A Coy was headed by Nepomuceno. Their combined strength was estimated at 550-600 soldiers, with two V-150s, 90 mm recoilless rifles and 81 mm mortars.843

With the confirmation that the Mindanao troops were in fact bound for Cebu, BGen Palma contacted Naval District V Headquarters and instructed them to intercept the two vessels by all means. BGen Comendador was also called upon to help the Navy in preventing the ships from docking and to coordinate directly with Capt Vicente Escala, Jr, of Naval District V.844

Request for PAF F-5 Planes

At around 7:00 a.m., Col Filamer Artajo, EX-O for Operations, talked to Lt Col Romeo Lood, Director for Operations of 2 AD, to release four F-5 aircrafts for Basa Air Base.845 Not getting any result, MGen Jose de Leon, Jr, CG PAF, personally called and ordered Comendador to give clearance for the four F-5 jets to take off from MAB. The latter answered in the affirmative but did not comply with the instruction.846

At around 9:00 a.m., Col Artajo again called Lood to follow the direct order of de Leon to Comendador for the release of the four F-5 jets, but was informed that Comendador had countermanded the order.847

Interception of M/V Sweet Pearl

PO1 Restituto Baring, Captain of Naval Gunboat DF 338, received instructions at around 9:00 a.m., from his Operations Officer, Lt Jimenez, to intercept M/V Sweet Pearl. The vessel was seen inside Cebu Harbor and was contacted by radio to drop anchor. Instead, M/V Sweet Pearl maneuvered and headed for the General Milling Corporation (GMC) wharf. From the Operations Center, DF 338 fired warning shots but M/V Sweet Pearl nevertheless proceeded. DF 338 was then instructed to fire directly at the propeller of the vessel to disable the same, but due to the presence of civilian passengers on board M/V Sweet Pearl, DF 338 just fired another warning shot. Upon seeing a bazooka aimed at its direction, DF 338 moved to a safer distance, but continued to guard the ship.848

M/V Sweet Pearl was able to dock at the GMC wharf at around 9:10 a.m. M/V Our Lady of Lourdes followed suit at past 10:00 a.m. that morning by shipsiding with M/V Weasel, a vessel owned by Load Star Shipping which was discharging bulk grain white corn. When soldiers in full battle gear started disembarking, Security Guard Norvie Craus observed that the soldiers had no name patches, while guard Ceferino Lopez testified that PAF soldiers led by ex-Lt Col Ebuen with 6 x 6 trucks from the PAF, with plate numbers SAG 961, SCV 676, SCV 677, SBY 931, BBY 843, SBY 483 and a civilian truck with plate number CAW 436, fetched the soldiers at around 1:30 p.m. that day, and brought them inside MAB near the office of 2 AD.

Some soldiers immediately proceeded to the ramp where the air assets were. Other soldiers were left on board M/V Sweet Pearl and M/V Our Lady of Lourdes to guard the heavy armaments and vehicles which could not be unloaded from the vessels because of low tide. They were finally unloaded the following day, 2 December.849

Comendador Instructs Pilots Not to Fly

Before the arrival of the vessel in the morning, BGen Comendador held a conference with some 25 pilots, instructing them to follow the chain of command, not to go near the aircrafts, and not to take off without his prior clearance.850

Lt Col Fusilero was at the headquarters of the 348 PC Coy located at the foot of the Mactan bridge (Mandaue City side) at about 8:00 a.m. carrying a hand-held radio. While there, Fusilero informed Maj Rolando Irizari of the arrival of the troops from Mindanao on board two commercial vessels, and gave instructions for Irizari’s troops to be on standby position. Irizari then proceeded to the METRODISCOM Headquarters where an updated briefing on the coup was held. Irizari informed Col Wahing, the Acting METRODISCOM Commander and Maj Ernesto Padua, METRODISCOM Intelligence Officer, of the presence of Fusilero at the 348 PC Coy.851

At about the same time that Fusilero was at the 348 PC Coy HQ, Ebuen, together with Maj Ricardo Mutya, PAF, were at the middle of the Mactan bridge monitoring the arrival of the two vessels from Mindanao through their hand-held radios. Airmen Dominino Recla and Efren Tabanas testified that Fusilero was seen inside MAB in the morning of 30 November 1989. Ebuen was also seen with Comendador and Col Pablo Regullano at about 5:00 p.m. of the same date, near the office of the 2 AD.852

After BGen Comendador’s meeting with the pilots at around 8:00 am., he ordered Lt Col Antonio Anciano, PAF, Commander of the Mactan-based 208 Tactical Helicopter Squadron of the 205 HW (under the over-all command of BGen Loven Abadia), to report to him. BGen Comendador asked Lt Col Anciano if they can possibly work together, apparently as a way of gauging the latter’s loyalty.853

During all this time, Palma was trying to contact Comendador without success. He was informed that Comendador was at the ramp.854 This was only a ploy as MAB was already preparing for the arrival of troops from Mindanao.

At about 11:15 a.m., Maj Almario Hilario, Lt Col Anciano’s PMA classmate and Intelligence Officer of VISCOM, called up the latter and asked him (Anciano) to remind Comendador to call up VISCOM Headquarters. Comendador told Anciano that he would call VISCOM, particularly Palma in due time. By this time, Anciano doubted Comendador’s loyalty.855

In the afternoon, Ebuen suggested that C130 pilots be located for the purpose of ferrying the Mindanao troops to Manila. Lt Col Romeo Lood, Operations Director of the 2 AD was informed by the Wing Operations Center of 220 Airlift Wing that there were no available pilots. The alternative plan, to utilize the PAL BAC-111 aircraft for the same purpose, met the same fate — no PAL pilot could be found. It was clear at this point that the troops from Mindanao had nowhere to go. At sundown, Aurelio wanted the aircrafts at the ramp crippled or destroyed, as they had become useless inasmuch as there were no pilots to fly them. Besides, it was so cumbersome for the troops to guard the aircrafts, and they might as well concentrate on guarding the Mactan Bridge. Lood was able to convince Comendador that destroying the aircrafts would be senseless. Heeding Lood’s advise, Comendador instead ordered the removal of the batteries and starting units of the aircrafts.856

Meanwhile, Fusilero was again seen in the afternoon at the Headquarters of the 348 PC Coy. This time, there was merriment and clapping among PC soldiers and some Navy personnel, while the Philippine flag at the headquarters flagpole hung inverted, i.e., red side up and blue side down, a sign of a declaration of war.857 It took an order coming from the RECOM 7 Chief of Staff, Col Superable, to have tire flag returned to its normal position.858 It would appear that the soldiers at the 348 PC Coy had been misled by Fusilero that the chain of command of RECOM 7 had sided with the rebels. Seen in the company of Fusilero were LCdrDanilo Abinoja, LtSG Napoleon Estilles, Lt Reynaldo Esquerra, and LtJG Leodegardo Acebedo of the Coast Guard, PN.859

Inversion of the Philippine Flag

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Irizari, during the August 28, 1987 coup attempt, had also allowed the inversion of the flag in his Headquarters in Siquijor for which offense he was found guilty, reprimanded, and his salary for one month forfeited.860

In the afternoon, Comendador was seen fuming mad, after having monitored through commercial radio that Phantom jets of the US Air Force flew persuasion flights in Metro Manila. Around this time, Comendador openly admitted to all and sundry, including the media, BGen Imperial and BGen Palma that he was supporting the rebels.861

K.3. 2 December

In the early morning, Lts Sumayo and Amante led teams of the 23 IB from MAB to the foot of the Mactan-Mandaue bridge instructing them to check movements of vehicles and people coming in and out of Mactan Island.862

Inside MAB that morning, Anciano, clad only in shorts and T-shirt, jogged around the base, slipped out surreptitiously and went to VISCOM Headquarters. Anciano briefed Palma on what transpired inside the base and assured him that not one ofhis pilots would fly for Comendador. Anciano later returned to the pilot’s quarters at MAB with Palma’s instructions for the pilots to immediately leave the base. The pilots left on board a convoy of an ambulance, a private car, and a tricycle and proceeded directly to VISCOM HQ.863

At about 2:00 p.m., Cerge Remonde, Radio Station DYLA broadcaster and Cebu City newspaperman, received a telephone call from former PC RECOM 7 Commander BGen Abenina requesting that he be allowed to air a statement over the radio station. Abenina went on the air expressing support for the RAM-HF.864

Negotiations with BGen Palma

Negotiations between COMVISCOM and BGen Comendador began at about 8:00 p.m. Comendador told Palma that he would surrender only when rebel forces in Manila gave up the struggle. At that time also, the Mindanao Independence Movement, led by former Assemblyman Reuben Canoy, expressed firm support for the rebels’ cause and distributed anti-government materials in Cebu City.865

Later that evening, Gen de Villa ordered Palma to take Mactan. However, VISCOM at that time was seriously handicapped by lack of manpower and firepower as they had but one company of infantry from the 57 IB, based in Negros Oriental, which only arrived earlier in the morning.866

K.4. 3 December

BGen Cesar Go, Wing Commander of the 220 Airlift Wing based in Mactan, who was in Manila when the coup started, was designated by MGen de Leon as Acting Commander, 2 AD, vice Comendador, because the latter had publicly announced his support for the rebel forces. Upon his designation, Go proceeded to Cebu using the old Lahug Airport and, upon arrival immediately proceeded to VISCOM HQ and reported to Palma. Although Go had at first intended to proceed to MAB, he was prevailed upon by Palma not to do BO, since he might be taken hostage by the rebels.

While at VISCOM headquarters, Go contacted Comendador and attempted to convince him to give up in order to avoid a bloody confrontation. Comendador refused, and advised Go not to enter MAB nor initiate an air assault upon his forces; otherwise, he (Comendador) would blow up all the aircraft in the base. Comendador also told Go that despite the lack of pilots to fly the aircraft in MAB, they could still avail of it for strategic purposes. In another talk with Comendador, the latter told Go that he would submit himself to Palma, once the rebel forces in the Manila area had surrendered. Even after the surrender of rebel troops in Makati’s Commercial District, however, Comendador still clung to the belief that this was only a ruse played by government forces on him.867

K.5. 4 December

Comendador Establishes Command Post

In the early morning, Comendador left MAB and established a command post at Heidelberg Restaurant situated at the foot of the Mactan-Mandaue Bridge, Lapulapu City side.868 Comendador had no more troops to command as most 2 AD personnel had deserted him and had reported to the newly-installed 2 AD Commander, BGen Go. The rebels, therefore, had to consolidate their forces at the foot of the bridge because of continuing threats of invasion from the government forces coming from the other end of the bridge.

At 6:30 a.m., combined elements of R2 Division, RECOM 7, NISC and NDV took into custody former Assemblyman Canoy. After due investigation, Canoy was charged with the crime of rebellion before the local RTC. Earlier, Canoy was seen conferring with Comendador and other rebel soldiers at the former’s office at 2 AD.869

Armed with the necessary clearance from COMVISCOM and RECOM 7 Commander, Mayor Alfredo Ouano of Mandaue City, Vice Mayor Paterno Canete, Acting Mayor Camilo Eyas of Lapulapu City, ABC President Paulino Dy and Councilor Manuel Masangkay spoke to Comendador inside MAB at about 6:00 p.m. about the latter surrendering peacefully. Comendador assured the group he would not fire the first shot but he would not surrender. He complained that the country was “prostituted” when help was sought from the US Air Force in fighting the rebels, adding that the people surrounding the President were communist-leaning and should be dismissed. He also stated that the present leadership was not sincere with the armed forces and that he wants a snap election.870

K.6. 5 December

At 3:00 p.m., Palma informed de Villa, that the ultimatum given for the surrender of rebel forces in Mactan Island had lapsed and that he was preparing for a military offensive against the rebels. This time, augmentation troops from nearby islands had arrived, enhancing the capability of VISCOM to retake Mactan.871

Efforts by Mediators

Earlier efforts made by Cardinal Vidal, Msgr Achilles Dakay, and some public officials for the surrender of Comendador proved futile. Authorities consequently got in touch with relatives of Comendador as a last ditch effort to persuade the latter to give up peacefully. At around 5:00 p.m., Cardinal Vidal and Msgr Dakay, this time in the company of Ruth Comendador, daughter Pinky and son Dexter, himself an air force pilot with the rank of captain, in a tearful reunion at Heidelberg Restaurant tried to convince Comendador to surrender, but without success.872

K.7. 7 December

After his arrival from Hongkong, Cebu Governor Emilio Osmena joined Cardinal Vidal, Msgr Dakay and Ernest Weigel in a series of talks with Comendador that started about 2:20 p.m. of 7 December at the Heidelberg Hotel. As the discussion progressed, Comendador made clear his refusal to recognize the Constitution. Hence, the negotiators felt that there was no point in further talks. Besides, Comendador asked, as a pre-condition for his surrender, the resignations of President Aquino and the entire Cabinet. Given such demands, the negotiators informed President Aquino and Palma that the negotiations had bogged down.873

K.8. 8 December

At about 8:00 p.m., Comendador and his seven close-in security men left Heidelberg Hotel and checked-in at the Traveller’s Inn, Reclamation Area, Cebu City.

K.9. 9 December

In the early morning of 9 December Comendador, with Sgt Ursal left Traveller’s Inn for an undisclosed place.874 At 10:35 a.m., Palma announced that rebel soldiers were willing to give up and return to their barracks. It was about this time also that de Villa instructed Palma to proceed to Mactan and accept the surrender.

Fusilero relayed certain conditions for their meeting at the Mactan Bridge. There were to be no troop movement at the bridge, no one should carry long arms, each party to be made up of only nine persons should meet each other at the middle of the bridge for final negotiations, and the time of the meeting to be at 1:30 p.m.875

At 12:01 p.m. of 9 December, negotiations between the government side led by Palma and Imperial and the rebel side led by Fusilero, Aurelio and Nepomuceno began. The government guidelines for the surrender issued by de Villa were: “for the rebel forces to subject themselves to military control of their respective commanders, to turn in their firearms, to return to barracks; and to meet the consequences of their actions.”876

Negotiations at the bridge were concluded at 2:00 p.m. Comendador submitted himself to Palma and was placed under the custody of Go, while Fusilero was placed under the custody of Imperial. All others were brought to VISCOM HQ. Army soldiers boarded M/V Our Lady of Lourdes bound for Cagayan de Oro City with their two V-150s and APC, accompanied by Congressman Vicente de la Cerna of Cebu. Ebuen eluded the military cordon around Mactan Island and continues to be at large.877

K.10. 10 December

Surrender of Comendador

At around 12:40 a.m. of 10 December, M/V Our Lady of Lourdes left Cebu for Cagayan de Oro with five officers, 114 enlisted personnel, two V-150s, two 6 x 6 trucks and jeeps.878

The following day, at 12:18 p.m., Comendador and Fusilero were brought to Manila aboard Fokker plane NR 210879 and thus ended the saga of Mactan Air Base.

L. Hostile acts in the province

L.1. Bacolod (NICOM) Incident

On 1 December at around 2:00 a.m., a group of 50 fully armed soldiers under Capt Leonardo Villanueva, Company Commander of the 339th PC Company, stationed at Victorias, Negros Occidental and later joined by MSgt Felizardo Espinosa, Patrol Base Commander of the 331st PC Company, assigned in Brgy Granada, Bacolod City and Lt Emil Ong, PA Team Leader of the 7 Riverine Assault Company 3rd Special Forces Battalion, and four of his men, occupied the Bacolod Airport.880 Their presence there, together with some civilians, was confirmed from footages taken by the crew of the local station, Channel 4 of ABS CBN.881

Apparently, the rebels went to the airport to wait for a plane expected to come from MAB, to ferry them to Manila. With the development in Mactan, the rebels decided to secure other means of transportation. At around 2:00 p.m., 103 rebels proceeded to Banago wharf to board a vessel there. Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Negros Occidental Provincial Commander, prevented the sailing of a ship by not making the master and crew available and at the same time feigning that certain parts of the ship were malfunctioning. At 5:00 p.m., after negotiations, the rebels capitulated.882

At around 10:00 a.m., two platoons of the 11 IB under Lt Fidelino Agustin were sent to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, where a port of entry is situated. They were later augmented by two more platoons under Capt Augusto Go. At around 11:00 a.m., Lt Ong and his men tried but failed to persuade Lt Agustin to side with them.883

To secure the V-150 of the 332nd PC Company under the command of Capt Rolando Lopez, Coronel had it parked at the police station in Bago City on 1 December between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.884

L.2. Fernando Air Base

At about 8:30 in the morning of 1 December 1989, Col Hector M. Tarrazona called a meeting of 26 officers stationed at the Fernando Air Base. Those who attended included the Wing Chaplain, the Legal Officer, the Medical Officer, the members of the Wing staff and some junior officers. The purpose of the meeting was to sound out their concern about the ongoing coup attempt.885 In the course of the meeting, Col Tarrazona stepped out and, by phone, informed the Wing Commander that some junior officers wanted to fly two of the Marquitte aircrafts in the Base as a show of support for the rebels. The Marquitte aircraft is essentially a training plane and is not armed. The Wing Commander, Col Felipe Abando Jr, instructed Col Tarrazona to dissuade the officers from carrying out their plan, and instead, follow the chain of command.886

As Col Tarrazona proceeded to try and change the minds of the junior officers sympathetic to the rebels, Col Abando directly contacted the maintenance officers of the 443 Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron to place all the aircrafts inside the hangar and remove from the planes all batteries and parts needed to make them operational, keep the planes in a secured place, and otherwise prevent the planes at all costs from flying.887

After about an hour and a half of an open and candid discussion, to which Col Tarrazona promised confidentiality, the meeting was adjourned with the group deciding to stay loyal to the government. During that meeting, only five junior officers were very vocal and sympathetic to the rebels, although Col Tarrazona observed, “if we go by head count, most of the pilots were sympathetic to [the] rebels”.888 Nevertheless, after the meeting, these same five outspoken officers assisted in strengthening the security of the base.889

L.3. Davao Incident

On 30 November at around 9:30 p.m., BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, PC INP Region XI Commander, convened and directed his commanders to uphold the Constitution and follow the chain of command. It was gathered from Col Franco Calida of the Davao METRODISCOM that some junior officers were conducting clandestine meetings in Davao City and that one of these officers was 2Lt Cesar Mancao III assigned to PC CIS, District XI. Baccay ordered Mancao to cease and desist from trying to recruit PC/INP junior officers for the rebel cause.890

On 1 December at around 8:00 a.m., Baccay assembled his men and reiterated the need to follow the chain of command. At around 11:40 a.m., he received information that elements of the 25 IB stationed in Pintatagan, Banaybanay, Davao Oriental were about to commandeer passenger buses to go to Davao City, and from there on to Manila. However, the soldiers abandoned their plan after their commander talked to them.891

On 2 December at around 5:00 p.m., a group of company grade officers numbering about 25, accompanied by Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, Provincial Commander Davao del Norte, went to Baccay at Camp Panacan in Catitipan, Davao City, to seek guidance regarding the ongoing coup and other issues such as violence and US intervention. For two and a half hours, Baccay emphasized the theme that an abrupt change in the government was not the cure to the present problems. Apparently, the officers were convinced so they promised to adhere to the Constitution, observe the chain of command and return to their respective stations.892

In the morning of 3 December, Capt Gregory Ramos, CO Alpha Coy 2 LABde PALAR stationed in Tuburan, Mawab, Davao del Norte, left his station with 20 of his men and proceeded to Davao City. He had with him five armored vehicles consisting of two V-150, two AIFV and one APC. The vehicles were commanded by Lt Oscar Singson, Company EX-O, Sgts Leon Admachelo, Feliciano Gayla, Magin Montalban, and Nereo Macabenta. In Brgy Sasa, Davao City at around 10:00 a.m., they encountered a roadblock often wheeler trucks manned by elements of the PC METRODISCOM. They turned around and met Col Danilo Olay, CO 602 Bde, 6 ID, the immediate superior of Ramos. Olay observed that while they were at the roadblock, several junior officers from RSAF, CIS, METRODISCOM, and RSU spontaneously arrived. When Olay learned what the movement was all about, he brought Ramos and the whole group to Baccay at Camp Panacan. Some junior officers had prepared a manifesto expressing support and sympathy for the rebels’ cause and sentiments against the AFP,893 which Ramos handed to Baccay. There were two other armored vehicles from Calinan, Davao which arrived in Panacan. After a dialogue, the officers returned to barracks at 5:40 p.m.894

L.4. Nasipit

On 3 December 1989, the rebels tried to put on board the M/V Nasipit Princess and the M/V Don Calvino four armored personnel vehicles and an undetermined number of men from 402 Bde.895

Sometime during the day, Lt Anito Alfajardo, station commander, received a report that the radio operator of the M/V Nasipit Princess, while it was docked at the Nasipit wharf in Agusan del Norte, was approached by a man in civilian clothes and told to turn off all communications equipment. Later, at about 6:00 p.m., the Coast Guard sighted armed soldiers aboard six 6 x 6 trucks in the Nasipit wharf area. Lt Alfajardo forthwith motored from Butuan to Nasipit and, upon arrival, ordered elements of the Nasipit detachment to look for the ship master of M/V Nasipit Princess. The ship master, Capt David Escalera, Jr was found at about 8:00 p.m. When he was informed of the situation, he voluntarily placed himself under the protection of the Coast Guard which hid him in a safehouse somewhere in Nasipit.896 He remained there until the situation normalized in Metro Manila. This prevented the rebel group, of about 50 enlisted men of 30 IB, led by Lt Generoso Bolina, from using the vessel to proceed to Mactan.897

On the same day 3 December, a group of about 11 rebel soldiers commandeered the WV La Lealtad, while it was docked at the Lumbacan pier in Butuan City, and forced its master, Capt Antonio Ambray, to proceed to the entrance of the Nasipit wharf, possibly to rendezvous with the MA7 Nasipit Princess had the latter been able to set sail, or at least pick up some troops if for some reason the latter could not proceed. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the Nasipit pier, the master deliberately ran the vessel aground thereby disabling it.898

A third vessel which the rebels tried to board was the M/V Don Calvino. Their plans were likewise frustrated when the captain and the key crew members abandoned it.899

L.5. Resignations at Cagayan de Oro

In the late afternoon of 7 December, a number of officers of the 4 ID met somewhere in Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. A few of those who were at the meeting claimed that they were invited by Lt Amador Tabuga “to meet some of our classmates and co-peemayers in a get-together party.”900 Nonetheless, it appears that on account of their concern with news reports of a possible bloody confrontation of rebel and government forces in Cebu as well as the media accounts of US military intervention in Metro Manila, the participants decided to arrange a dialogue with their CG, BGenRogelioVillanueva. For this purpose, Maj William Dormitorio was told to see the General at his office.901

Villanueva advised Dormitorio that, because a dialogue will involve a confrontation with his junior officers in Camp Evangelista away from their posts, he would talk to them only if they resigned.902 Maj Dormitorio relayed the General’s response to Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera who informed the rest.903

Accordingly, the officers individually signed resignation letters. The resignations were not filled out in the official form but simply in a preprinted half-sheet of paper with blanks for their names distributed by one of the officers under Rivera.904 Since Rivera was the most senior officer in the group, he was requested to carry the letters of resignation. Just before he left to see the General, Rivera requested Capt Santiago Pascual to accompany him and carry all the resignations except Rivera’s, which he carried himself.905

Villanueva, upon being presented the letters of resignation, met with the officers from 9:00 p.m. of 7 December up to 3:00 a.m. of 8 December. The dialogue, though centering on the grievances of the officers, consisting mostly of national issues, was described as “conducted in a cordial manner.”906 At the end, Villanueva told the officers that he was not accepting their resignations and ordered them to return to their posts.

Before the officers could do so, they were told to stay because MGen (Ret) Mariano Adalem and BGen Arturo Enrile were en route from Metro Manila to see them. At 8:00 a.m. of 8 December, a second dialogue was thus held. The officers repeated their grievances to Adalem and Enrile and thereafter were told to return to their respective stations.

The affidavits submitted by the officers uniformly maintain that the affiants did not intend to resign and that they did so only to fulfill the condition precedent set by their CG for a dialogue. Thus, Capt Ruben Clarito claimed to have torn up his resignation letter after it was returned to him.907

M. Possible US Involvement

Newspaper accounts every now and then have appeared since 1986 reporting the alleged presence of American intelligence personnel on the occasion of past coup attempts. For example, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was reported to have promised to deliver food and aviation fuel to the RAM in case they launched a coup against then President Marcos in 1986. DIA, it was said, did not keep its promise.908

Thereafter, a US Embassy spokesman by the name of Allan Croughan, confirmed that a US Vice Consul, in the absence of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth who was then on leave, privately conferred with Arturo Tolentino when the latter and other Marcos loyalists occupied the Manila Hotel in July 1986. Croughan justified his actuations by saying that: “We do it everytime [something like this develops] to get an appraisal of the situation.”909

In early January 1987, Col James Nicholson, officially a US Military Attache, was photographed talking with the rebels at the GMA-7 during the occupation of the station.910

Then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, officially wrote to former Secretary of National Defense, Rafael Ileto, that several Americans were said to have been seen closely following the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. Lt Col Victor Rafael, who was formerly a US Military Attache to the Philippines, allegedly tried to dissuade Col Dado from attacking Camp Aguinaldo, where Gregorio Honasan was at the time. Col Rafael was said to be the godfather of Honasan’s son. Also, Maj Dennis Fayler was supposedly seen at the perimeter of the Villamor Air Base on board his armored car, monitoring the events there. Finally, a certain Stephen Herry was purportedly observed monitoring the August 1987 coup attempt.911

In the December 1989 coup attempt, the rebels took advantage of the Balikatan Exercise (Balikatan), a RP-US military exercise, to provide cover for their troop involvements. According to BGen Lisandro Abadia, Balikatan is a regular annual joint RP-US activity. It was scheduled for 4 December 1989. The Balikatan consisted of field exercises, where actual troops were involved, and command post exercises where simulated war games were conducted. It is normal for the JUSMAG people, particularly the American officers, to participate. The American participants usually billeted themselves in hotels (in December 1989, in Nikko) from where they are bussed every morning and every night to and from Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. The Americans participating normally arrive one week before the scheduled opening. Thus, these American military personnel were already in the Philippines prior to 1 December 1989.912

A noteworthy part of Balikatan 1989 was the use of sophisticated communications equipment by the American participants. The communications equipment are such that from where they are or from where, they were, “You can lift up the phone and you can call anywhere in the world.”913

Col Samson Mahimer, 1989 Director of Balikatan, testified that the intended role of the US military personnel, was “as tutors for group training”. Col Mahimer also stated that the communications system held by the Americans at that time were “state of the art communications system, either wired or wireless.”914

Upon inquiry by the Commission, BGen Cardones stated in a letter that, during the period, 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989, American military personnel participated in communications training activities for the appropriate units in the entire PA, including FSSR personnel and FSSR HQ communication facilities at Fort Bonifacio.915 Furthermore, Col Urgello confirmed in a letter to the Commission that “11 special communications courses had been evaluated by five US instructors at the FSRR Compound in Fort Bonifacio from 1987 to 1989.”916

At Sangley, during the morning of 1 December, there were two US Navy ships anchored, reportedly as part of Balikatan.

It is reasonable to suppose, regardless of whether or not US military persons were in Philippine military camps only coincidentally because of Balikatan, that they were, at least, closely monitoring the developments of the December 1989 coup attempt.

Duringhis testimony before the Commission, Press Secretary Tomas Gomez mentioned an H Natzke as supposedly having been a CIA agent attached to the US Embassy in Manila during the early ’70s and now working for Lucio Tan in San Francisco. Secretary Gomez remembered Natzke because a photograph of his daughter with rebel soldiers in Makati appeared in one of the Honolulu newspapers. According to Secretary Gomez, he inquired and was told that Natzke was here during the last coup.917 The Commission, on the other hand, discovered that Apt 19-C in Twin Towers, Ayala Ave., Makati, is listed as occupied by Helbert Natzke and owned by Arithmos International.918

A video tape provided the Commission shows a helicopter load of US Marines landing and deploying at the US Embassy grounds on 2 December.919

While the Commission does not believe that the foregoing events constitute proof of US involvement in past coup attempts, the Commission, nevertheless, urges the government to look deeper into this matter. Considering American strategic interests in the Philippines, it is both logical and prudent for the government to do so. The Commission, not having any military intelligence capability or recourse to diplomatic channels, is neither equipped nor possessed of the necessary authority to effectively pursue such an investigation. For example, when the Commission sought to interview US Naval Attache Capt Thomas Mann in connection with his having reported to AFP GHQ that a wall of Camp Aguinaldo had been breached by the rebels during the last attempted coup, the US Embassy invoked, pro forma, his diplomatic immunity.

N. Some of the Damages Due to the Coup

N.1. Coup Casualties

As of 18 January 1990, the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee (DNDSIC) reports 669 confirmed casualties.

Table V-l—DNDSIC Record of Casualties

Government Forces 31 252 283
Military Rebel Forces 17 79 96
CAFGU 1 0 1
Civilians 50 239 289
TOTAL 99 570 669

The casualties from the military (government and rebels) came from the following units:

Table V-2—DNDSIC Military Casualty Breakdown





Philippine Army




Philippine Air Force




Philippine Constabulary




















* Killed in action
**Wounded in action

On the other hand, the Philippine National Red Cross reported on 26 April 1990 a total of 575 casualties.920

Table V-3—PNRC Record of Casualties

Military 34 265 299
Civilian 42 234 276
TOTAL 76 499 575

N.2. Armed Forces

According to Gen de Villa’s report dated 17 January 1990921 the total damage sustained by the AFP is estimated at P469 million.

Table V-4—Summary of Losses/Damages in Peso Value

Branch of Service Facilities Equipment Armaments Critical Items Total
PA 12,500 5,681,476 17,279,609 165,280 23,138,865
PAF 15,583,000 104,717,358 14,234,000 82,016,516 216,550,874
PC 16,872,000 10,498,200 8,750 403,148 27,782,098
PN 4,933,413 26,708,318 11,273,259 126,592,146 169,507,136
AFPWSSUS 12,533,347 5,059,973 5,262,839 9,092,884 31,949,043
TOTAL 49,934,260 152,665,325 48,058,457 218,269,974 468,928,016
* Killed in action
**Wounded in action

N.3. Philippine Airlines

Levy Rebanal, vice president of PAL for Risk and Insurance Management, testified that the net revenue loss due to the coup amounted to P112 million plus P9 million attributable to the takeover of Mactan. The loss of revenue after the coup for the months of January to March, based on a projected growth rate of 10 percent to 12 percent, was estimated at P226 million.922

N.4. Tourism

At the time, right after the coup, Tourism Secretary Peter Garrucho estimated that the hotel occupancy in Metro Manila could plunge to alow 40 percent.923

N.5. Stock Trading, Investments, and Prices

Stock trading slumped to a volume of 2.6 billion shares from 3.9 billion shares in 29 November 1989. Since then, volume and value of stock traded generally remained on the low side reflecting the reluctance of investors to raise their market exposure.924

A marked drop in the initial paid-up capital investments was recorded during the week of the coup. Investments declined by 83.7 percent, from P297.8 million during the week of 7 November to 1 December, to P48.4 million after 1 December. For the month of December, initial paid-up capital investments dropped to P343.86 million from P963.77 million recorded during November.925

N.6. Total Losses

Combined financial losses due to the December 1989 failed coup attempt, based on the figures above, would be in the order of P800 million to P1 billion. But the loss of lives, loss of confidence and damage to our international image are worth far more than the financial losses.


(1) Except for Abenina, Honasan and Zumel were at large at this time. Honasan escaped from detention in April 1988 while Zumel was already the object of a manhunt ordered by then CSAFP Gen Ramos as early as January 1987. Both were subsequently dropped from the military rolls.

(2) Sworn Testimony of Gen Renato de Villa, CSAFP, given before the Fact-Finding Commission (FFC) on 7 April 1990; Sworn Testimony of BGen Galileo Kintanar, former Chief, ISAFP, given before the FFC on 26 July 1990.

(3) Sworn Testimony of Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, former security officer of BGen Alejandro Galido, given before the FFC on 9 August 1990; Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, Memorandum Re: Alleged Involvement of BGen Edgardo Abenina (Table C of Enclosure 2, AFPSIC) submitted by BGen Rene Cardones, former Commanding General, FSRR, dated 16 April 1990.

(4) Exh. “B-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia”, Intelligence Developments on the Sixth Coup Attempt, submitted by Gen Renato S. de Villa, CSAFP, to President Corazon C. Aquino, dated 3 January 1989.

(5) Exh. “KKKKK-8”-Commission, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, dated 27 January 1990; Exh. “KKKKK-10”-Commission, Supplemental Sworn Statement of Capt Mapalo, dated 17 March 1990; Affidavit of Capt Mapalo, dated 12 January 1990 and 17 March 1990, respectively; Mapalo Testimony, op. cit.

(6) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, Sworn Statement of BGen Alejandro Galido, former CG SOLCOM AFP, given before Col Benjamin Libarnes PC at AFPCIC, dated 17 January 1990.

(7) Exh. “B-BGen Raul Aquino”, Letter of BGen Raul Aquino (Ret) addressed to MGen Mariano Adalem, CG PA, dated 5 May 1989, photocopy.

(8) Mapalo Testimony, op. cit.

(9) Sworn Testimony of Col Juan Mamorno, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Command Info Office, SOLCOM, given before the FFC on 9 August 1990.

(10) Ellen Gallardo, “US Embassy Confirms Magleo, Galido Meeting,” Philippine Star, 4 April 1990, pp. 1-2; “US Confirms Magleo Was Here,” Manila Bulletin, 4 April 1990, p. 1.

(11) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.; Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(12) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, Ibid.

(13) Exh. “B-5’Cardones”, op. cit.; Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, Ibid.

(14) Ibid.

(15) Sworn Testimony of BGen ArtemioTadiar, Jr, Deputy CG, Subic Naval Base, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.

(16) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(17) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.; Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, ibid.

(18) Tadiar Testimony, op. cit.

(19) Sworn Testimony of Cmdr Bernardo Patino, Chief of .Staff, Naval District VI, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.

(20) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Exh. “KKKKK-8”- Commission, op. cit.

(23) Exh. “B-Diana Aguas”, Letter of Diana Z. Aguas addressed to the Chairman of FFC, dated 7 August 1990.

(24) Sworn Testimony of Diana Z. Aguas, given before the FFC on 16 August 1990.

(25) Exh. “A-1-Cobarrubias”, Philippine Village Hotel’s registration cards of occupants of Room 317 from the period of 1 November 1989 to 7 December 1989, photocopies.

(26) Exh. “KKKKK-2”-Commission, op. cit.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Mamorno Testimony, op. cit.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Exh. “KKKKK-6”- Commission, Affidavit of Col Juan Mamorno, given at AFPCIC, dated 1 February 1990; Mamorno Testimony, Ibid.

(31) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(32) Sworn Testimony of Luis Tabuena, given before the FFC on 7 May 1990.

(33) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(34) Tabuena Testimony, op. cit.

(35) Exh. “KKKKK-3”- Commission, Additional Sworn Statement of BGen Galido, dated 23 January 1990.

(36) Exh. “KKKKK-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(37) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(38) Exh. “KKKKK-2”-Commission, op. cit.

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Exh. “21-LOGCOM”, Sworn Statement of Lt Col Gimeno C. Villanueva, dated 8 December 1989.

(43) Sworn Testimony of Col Manuel Mariano, Commander, LOGCOM AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, given before the FFC on 28 May 1990.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oswaldo Villanueva, CG 6 ID, given before the FFC on 21 May 1990.

(46) Exh. “B-4-Villanueva”, also marked as Exh. “B-Fortich”, colored photograph showing former Gov Fortich, dated 26 February 1990; Exh. “B-7-Villanueva”, also marked as Exh. “C-Fortich”, colored photograph showing Gov Fortich (marked Exh. “C-1-Fortich”), Reuben Canoy (marked Exh. “C-2-Fortich”), Alexander Noble (marked Exh. “C-3-Fortich”), and Atty Romeo Montalban (marked Exh. “C-4-Fortich”), dated 26 February 1990.

(47) Exh. “B-Dejarme”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Asterio Dejarme, given before SSgt Domingo Doctor, dated 29 December 1989.

(48) Sworn Testimony of Sgt Asterio Dejarme, given before the FFC on 24 March 1990.

(49) Ibid.

(50) Ibid.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid.

(53) Ibid.

(54) Ibid.

(55) Exh. “C-Dejarme”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Asterio Dejarme, dated 3 January 1990.

(56) Exh. “G-3-Dejarme”, Real Property Tax Declaration No B-067-01962 issued by the City Assessor of Quezon City, dated 29 June 1990.

(57) Exh. “G-2-Dejarme”, Sworn Statement of Emmanuel Lao given before Special Counsel Alejandro Bijasa at the FFC, dated 5 July 1990.

(58) Dejarme Testimony, op. cit.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Exh. “C-BGen Ruiz”, Swom Testimony of BGen Federico Ruiz, Jr, CG 8 ID, Camp Lukban, Catbalogan, Samar, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990; Exh. “B-BGen Flores”, Special Report on the December 1 Coup and Involvement of AFP Units in Mindanao submittedby BGen Guillermo Flores, CGSOUTHCOM, datedl4 December 1989.

(64) Sworn Testimony of Salvador Mison, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, given before the FFC on 22 February 1990.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Sworn Testimony of Fe de los Reyes, given before the FFC on 16 April 1990.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Exh. “L-Holiday Inn”, Report in response to the request for verification made by the FFC submitted by Lt Col Reynaldo V. Velasco, PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental, dated 25 June 1990.

(69) Ibid.

(70) Sworn Statement of Eladio D. Fasinal (with attached logbook entries), a security guard at Holiday Inn, dated 6 April 1990.

(71) Exh. “C-1-Salialam”, Incident Report submitted by P/Capt Job Gavino, dated 4 December 1989.

(72) De los Reyes Testimony, op. cit.

(73) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(74) Exh. “A-SOLCOM”, Special Report on the Actions Taken by COM SOLCOM regarding the 1989 coup d’etat, made by BGen Galido.

(75) Sworn Testimony of BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, given before the FFC on 7August 1990.

(76) Manila Chronicle, 13 September 1986, as shown by the NBI records check on ex-Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero (PRO File No F-246, dated 24 November 1986).

(77) Sworn Testimony of Maj Anacleto Chagas, CO 347 PC Coy, Toledo City, given before the FFC on 4 April 1990.

(78) Exh. “D-Maj Crucero”, Special Report to the Chief of Staff, 3 ID, COMNICOM, by Maj Alphonsus Crucero, Chief of Intelligence, 3 ID, Camp Peralta, Capaz, Tarlac, dated 18 September 1989.

(79) Sworn Testimony of Rogelio Osmena, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.

(80) Ruiz Testimony, op. cit.

(81) Osmeña Testimony, op. cit., p. 6.

(82) Exh. “A-Mactan”, After Mactan Crisis Report, submitted by BGen Renato Palma, CG VISCOM, dated 19 December 1989.

(83) Sworn Testimony of Lt Augusto Marquez, Jr, Chief of Operations, R3 Division, RECOM 7, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.

(84) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.

(85) Sworn Testimony of Capt Cecil Ezra Sandalo, CO 342 PC Coy, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.

(86) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.

(87) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit.

(88) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.

(89) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit

(90) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.

(91) Ibid.

(92) Ibid.

(93) Ibid.

(94) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.

(95) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit.

(96) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.

(97) Sworn Testimony of Col Andres Superable, Chief of Staff, PC/INP RECOM 7, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.

(98) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.

(99) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.

(100) Sworn Testimony of BGen Victor Natividad (Ret), former Deputy Chief, PC, given before the FFC on 17 April 1990.

(101) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR, given before the FFC on 9 March 1990.

(102) Exh. “A-Salac”, Memorandum prepared by the office of Col Dominador Salac, Chief A2, Villamor Air Base, as an aid for his testimony before the FFC, dated 24February 1990.

(103) Exh. “JJJJJ-4” – Commission, Confidential Intelligence Report Re: Ambassador Eduardo Cojuangco, prepared by NBI Senior Agent Isabelo Cerna, dated 22 January 1987, photocopy.

(104) Exh. “A-3-Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc”, Aircraft Flight Log Book entry made by Capt Adriano Morales, dated 20 November 1989, photocopy; Exh. “B-Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc”; Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 25 July 1990.

(105) Sworn Testimony of ex-Capt Adriano Morales, General Manager, Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc, given before the FFC on 10 August 1990.

(106) Supplementary Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 7 September 1990.

(107) Exh. “A-4-Executive Tourist and Aviation, Inc”, Aircraft Flight Log Book entry for RP-C 585, dated 23 November 1989.

(108) Morales Testimony, op. cit.: Sworn Testimony of Capt Loreto Vergeire, given before the FFC on 22 August 1990; Supplemental Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 31 August 1990.

(109) Exh. “A-2-Agricultural Investors, Inc”, Aircraft Flight Log Book Report No. 6249, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 21 November 1989.

(110) Exh. “A-Agricultural Investors, Inc”, Affidavit of Armando S. Narciso, General Manager of Agricultural Investors, Inc, dated 9 July 1990; Exh. “A-2-Agricultural Investors, Inc”, op. cit.;

Exh. “A-3-Agricultural Investors, Inc”, Aircraft Flight Logbook Report No 6250, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 22 November 1989; Exh. “A-4-Agricultural Investors, Inc”, Aircraft Flight Logbook Report No 6301, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 23 November 1989.

(111) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jose Castillo, given before the FFC on 17 August 1990.

(112) Morales Testimony, op. cit.

(113) Exh. “A-4-Executive Tourist Aviation”, op. cit.

(114) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG NCRDC, given before the FFC on 21 December 1989.

(115) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, Intelligence After-Operations Report, submitted by Col Benjamin Libarnes, GSC PC, dated 29 December 1989.

(116) Ibid.

(117) Sworn Testimony of Col Raul Urgello, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, PA, given before the FFC on 9 February 1990.

(118) Sworn Testimony of Col Rene Dado, Brigade Commander, 702 Bde PA, Bataan, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.

(119) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.

(120) Exh. “A-Salac”, op. cit.

(121) Ibid.

(122) Ibid.

(123) Ibid.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Exh. “B- 1-BGen Lisandro Abadia”, op. cit.

(126) Sworn Testimony of Capt Melito Mabilin, PC Station Commander, San Pedro, Laguna, given before the FFC on 20 June 1990.

(127) Sworn Testimony of Capt Felizardo Serapio, Jr, Company Commander, 74 PC Coy, Angeles City, given before the FFC on 8 May 1990.

(128) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.

(129) Exh. “D-Crucero”, op. cit.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Sworn Testimony of BGen Renato Palma, Commander, VISCOM, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.

(132) Exh. “D-Crucero”, op. cit.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Exh. “B-NICOM”, Investigation Report submitted by Lt Col Wilfredo Alejaga (GSC) to AFPSIC, dated 23 January 1990.

(135) Exh. “A-NICOM”, After-Coup Report submitted by Maj Alphonsus Crucero, dated 10 December 1989.

(136) Ibid.

(137) Exh. “B-NICOM”, op. cit.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Exh. “JJJJJ-5”- Commission, Pertinent Documents Re: Coup-Related Incidents in Davao, submitted by Special Counsel Amor Sunodan to the FFC (containing the report of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr on coup related incidents in Region XI, submitted by BGen Baccay to Chief, PC/Director General INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City), dated 9 December 1989.

(140) Exh. “B-Villanueva”, Summary Report on December 1989 Coup Attempt, submitted by BGen Rogelio Villanueva, CG 4 ID, Cagayan de Oro City, dated 23 February 1990.

(141) Sworn Statement of Constantino Alcaraz, Mayor of the Municipality of Moncayo, Davao del Norte, given before Special Counsel Amor Sunodan at FFC, dated 24 February 1990.

(142) Exh. “JJJJJ-5”- Commission, op. cit.

(143) Exh. “B-Flores”, op. cit.

(144) Exh. “A-Ilano”, Special Report on the December Coup, submitted by Col Cesar llano, Office of the Chief of Staff, PA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 8 December 1989.

(145) Exh. “A-Dado”, Report to CG PA submitted by Col Rene Dado, CO 4 IBde, dated 4 December 1989; Exh. “B-Tagaytay”, Sworn Statement of SSgt Angeles Pascual given before Maj Mario Abundo (JAGS), dated 30 November 1989.

(146) Ibid.

(147) Exh. “C-Tagaytay”, Sworn Statement of SSgt Mario Maitim, given before Maj Mario Abundo (JAGS), dated 29 November 1989.

(148) Exh. “A-Dado”, op. cit.

(149) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.

(150) Sworn Testimony of BGen Loven Abadia, CG, 205th Helicopter Wing, Villamor Air Base, given before the FFC on 3 August 1990.

(151) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.

(152) Ibid.

(153) Exh. “B-BGen Cardones”, Report with Respect to Involvement of Scout Rangers in the December 1989 coup, submitted by BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR, dated 20 December 1989.

(154) Kxh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(155) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, “Chronology of Events,” The Philippine Star, 3 December 1989, p. 3.

(156) Exh. “D-Makati”, Affidavit of Capt Jaime Yangzon, given before Capt Mauro Abalos (INF) PA at OG3, HPA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 19 December 1989.

(157) Exh. “C-Makati”, Affidavit of Capt Edgardo Gurrea, given before Capt Mauro Abalos (INF) PA at OG3 HPA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 19 December 1989.

(158) Exh. “A-Ilano”,

(159) Sworn Testimony of Col Cesar llano, Group Commander, SISG, given before the FFC on 8 February 1990.

(160) Sworn Testimony of Capt Danilo Estropia, Special Activity Unit, Fort Bonifacio, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.

(161) Sworn Testimony of BGen Manuel Cacanando, CG PA, given before the FFC on 1 February 1990.

(162) Sworn Testimony of Col Abraham Paray, Commander, Light Armor Brigade, given before the FFC, dated 12 February 1990; Exh. “A-Paray”, Sworn Statement of Col Abraham Paray, dated 8 December 1989.

(163) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit

(164) Exh. “A-Ilano”, op. cit.

(165) Exh. “A-Lagman”, Sworn Statement of Col Ferdinand Lagman, dated 14 February 1990.

(166) llano Testimony, op. cit.

(167) Exh. “A-Ilano”, op. cit.

(168) Exh. “A-1-Ilano”, Memorandum Re: Planned Coup Attempt, from Col Cesar llano, dated 30 November 1989.

(169) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.

(170) Exh. “B-Makati”, Sworn Statement of Capt Jose Cruz, given before Maj Mario Abundo at NCRDC, AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, dated 4 December 1989.

(171) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC, After-Operations Report of the 1st Marine Brigade (Annex “P” of the After-Operations Report of the NCRDC) submitted by BGen Cesar Abella, dated 5 January 1990.

(172) Exh. “A-Ilano”, op. cit

(173) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit

(174) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.

(175) Exh. “B-Ligot”, Letter of Lt Col Jacinto C. Ligot, former Deputy and Executive Officer, G3, PA, sworn to before Col Francisco Paredes, dated 11 December 1989, photocopy.

(176) Exh. “A-3-Ligot”, Affidavit of Lt Col Jacinto C. Ligot, dated 6 February 1990.

(177) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(178) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(179) Exh. “C-Crame”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Gabriel Alecojole, dated 18 December 1989.

(180) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(181) Exh. “A-Ilano”, op. cit.; Estropia Testimony, op. cit.

(182) Exh. “A-Ilano”, op. cit.; Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.

(183) llano Testimony, op. cit.

(184) Exh. “A-Paray”, Report Re: Personal Observations During the Coup submitted by Col Abraham Paray, CO LABde, PA, to CG PA, dated 4 December 1989.

(186) Paray Testimony, op. cit.

(186) Exh. “Q-Makati”, Report to CSAFP, submitted by Col Reynaldo Gopilan, G4, AFP, dated 6 December 1989.

(187) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.

(188) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.

(189) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.

(190) Exh. “Q-Makati”, op. cit.

(191) Exh. “QQQQQ”- Commission, “Recapitulation Summarizing the Number of Officers and EP of Different Units of PA Allegedly Involved in the December 1989 Coup,” undated.

(192) Exh. “A-1-Ligot”, op. cit.

(193) Ibid.

(194) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit.

(195) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, Narrative Report Re: Activities of 71st Infantry Battalion During the Coup d’Etat, submitted by Maj Pedro Gutierrez, dated 8 December 1989.

(196) Ibid.

(197) Exh. “B-1-Cardones”, op. cit.

(198) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.

(199) llano Testimony, op. cit.

(200) Exh. “A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia”, Affidavit of BGen Lisandro Abadia, dated 10 February 1990.

(201) Exh. “A-1-Ligot”, op. cit.

(202) Sworn Statement of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Provincial Commander, PC/INP, San Fernando, Pampanga, dated 17 February 1990.

(203) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(204) Exh. “A-1-Ligot”, op. cit.

(205) Dado Testimony, op. cit.

(206) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.

(207) Ibid.

(208) Exh.”C-Sangley”, Affidavit of Capt JoseT. Agudelo (with narrative events from 30 November 1989 to 4 December 1989), dated 13 December 1989.

(209) Ibid.

(210) Ibid.

(211) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col C. Jacinto Ligot, Deputy ExecutiveOfficer for Operations, G3, PA, given before the FFC on 7 March 1990.

(212) Exh. “A-3-Ligot”, op. cit.

(213) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Salvador S. Limsiaco, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3, Light Armor Brigade, given before the FFC on 13 February 1990.

(214) Sworn Testimony of Capt Danilo Lim, Operations Training Officer, FSRR, given before the FFC on 20 February 1990.

(215) Dado Testimony, op. cit.

(216) Paray Testimony, op. cit.

(217) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit.

(218) Paray Testimony, op. cit.

(219) Ibid.

(220) llano Testimony, op. cit.

(221) Sworn Testimony of Capt Eugenio de los Santos, Head of the Battery Command, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.

(222) Exh. MA-Col Abraham Paray”, op. cit.

(223) Ibid.

(224) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit.

(225) Exh. “QQQQQ-2”- Commission, Sworn Statement of Pfc Pedro Daga, dated 3 January 1990.

(226) Exh. “S-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Romualdo D. Timupig, dated 16 December 1989.

(227) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(228) Exh. “A-15-NCRDC”, NCRDC COC Journal (Annex “N” of the After-Operations Report of the NCRDC), dated 5 January 1990.

(229) Sworn Testimony of BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, CO Philippine Marines, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.

(230) The Rangers thought that BGen Galido’s troops would come from SOLCOM and go to Fort Bonifacio to defend the same against the rebels.

(231) Exh. “A-de los Santos”, Affidavit of Capt Eugenio de los Santos, dated 12 February 1990.

(232) Exh. “A-Col Abraham Paray”, op. cit.

(233) Ibid.

(234) Exh. “A-de los Santos”, op. cit.

(235) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit.

(236) Exh. “QQQQQ-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(237) Exh.”A-Dado”, op. cit.

(238) Exh. “C-Makati”, op. cit.

(239) Exh. “A-Dado”, op. cit.

(240) Exh. “D-Makati”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Capt Jaime C. Yangzon, dated 19 December 1989.

(241) Exh. “A-1-Iigot”, op. cit.

(242) Exh,. “D-Makati”, op. cit.; Exh. “A-1-Ligot”, op. cit.

(243) Urgello Testimony, op. cit.

(244) Exh. “A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia”, op. cit.

(245) Dado Testimony, op. cit.

(246) Exh. “A-Col Ilano”, op. cit.

(247) Affidavit of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, op. cit.

(248) Exh. “A-Dado”, op. cit.

(249) Exh. “A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia”, op. cit.

(250) Ibid.

(251) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, op. cit.

(252) Sworn Testimony of BGen Alexander Aguirre, CG CAPCOM, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.

(253) Sworn Testimony of Jejomar Binay, Mayor of the Municipality of Makati, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.

(254) Maj Abraham Purugganan, Interview by Sheila Coronel, 14 January 1990, transcript submitted to the FFC by the latter.

(255) Exh. “A-15-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(256) Exh. “34-LOGCOM”, Sworn Statement of Capt Manuel Ison, dated 12 December 1989 (also marked as Exh. “A-1-Ison”).

(257) Binay Testimony, op. cit.

(258) Sworn Testimony of Bias Ople, former Commissioner, Constitutional Commission of 1986, given before the FFC on 7 May 1990.

(259) Sworn Testimony of Emelinda Santos, given before the FFC on 28 February 1990.

(260) Exh. “A-Intercon Hotel”, Hotel Intercontinental Manila Action Reservation Form for Nacionalista Party Meeting, dated 2 December 1989, photocopy.

(261) Sworn Statement of Ramon Isberto, given before the FFC on 9 May 1990.

(262) Ople Testimony, op. cit.

(263) Sworn Testimony of Gloria Diaz, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.

(264) Sworn Testimony of Pedro Rojo, Chief Security Officer, Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, given before the FFC on 25 June 1990.

(265) Sworn Testimony of Jean Pierre Etroit, Resident Manager, Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, given before the FFC on 28 February 1990.

(266) Ibid.

(267) Rojo Testimony, op. cit.

(268) Ibid.

(269) Lim Testimony, op. cit.

(270) Exh. “SSSSS”- Commission, Edited Radio Reports on the Attempted Coup from 1-7 December 1989, submitted by the Loyola House of Studies.

(271) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, After-Operations Report of the NCRDC, submitted by BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CGNCRDC, dated 5 January 1990.

(272) Exh. “I-DND”, Final Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee, submitted by Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairman, DNDSIC, dated 22 March 1990.

(273) Exh. “A-27-de la Peña”, Transcript of Radio Broadcast over Station DZNC from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. on 1 December 1989, submitted by Lilia de la Peña, Director of the National Telecommunications Commission, NCR.

(274) Sworn Testimony of MGen Ramon Montano, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and Director General of the INP, given before the FFC on 25 January 1990.

(275) Ibid.

(276) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.

(277) Exh. “B-Maganto”, After-Operations Report, submitted by P/Lt Col Romeo B. Maganto, Commander, Metropolitan Police Field Force, dated 9 December 1989.

(278) Sworn Testimony of P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto, given before the FFC on 22 January 1990.

(279) Exh. “A-2-B-NCRDC”, Annex “A” to After-Operations Report of NCRDC by BGen Rodolfo Biazon, dated 5 January 1990.

(280) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.

(281) Ibid.

(282) Exh. “A-27-de la Peña”, op. cit.

(283) Exh. “A-Montano”, Report of BGen Ramon Montano, former Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Director General, INP, dated 12 January 1990.

(284) Exh. “SSSSS”-Commission. op. cit.

(285) Ibid.

(286) Ibid.

(287) Exh. “B-Maganto”, op. cit.

(288) Ibid.

(289) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(290) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.

(291) Ibid.

(292) Exh. “A-21-NCRDC, After-Operations Report submitted by BGen Alexander Aguirre to the PC Chief, dated 11 December 1989.

(293) Exh. “A-1-J-Montano”, Re: Incident Report (Annex “I” to the Report of MGen Ramon Montano), dated 12 January 1990.

(294) Ibid.

(295) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(296) The Philippine Star, 10 December 1989.

(297) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(298) Sworn Testimony of Peter Garrucho, Jr, Secretary, Department of Tourism, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.

(299) Exh. “A-21-NCRDC, op. cit.

(300) Sworn Testimony of Virgilio Poblete, Chief Security Officer, Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, given before the FFC on 13 June 1990.

(301) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.

(302) Exh. “A-21-NRCDC”, op. cit.

(303) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC, op. cit.

(304) Ibid.

(305) Ibid.

(306) Exh. “C-Crame”, op. cit.

(307) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(308) Exh. “A-27-NCRDC”, Chronology of Events during the December 1989 Failed Coup, submitted by Commo Antonio Empedrad, AFP, dated 18 December 1989.

(309) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.

(310) Exh. BA-21-NCRDC, op. cit.

(311) Exh. “0OOOO-2”- Commission, op. cit.

(312) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC, op. cit.

(313) Exh. “A-21-NCRDC”, op. cit.; Exh. “A-Montano”,

(314) Sworn Testimony of BGen Arturo Enrile, PMA Superintendent, given before the FFC on 5 March 1990.

(315) Exh. “A-27-de la Peña”, op. cit.

(316) Exh. “D”-Commission, Initial Report on the Attempted Coup d’Etat, submitted by BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, dated 20 December 1989.

(317) Exh. “A-21-NCRDC, op. cit.

(318) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(319) Sworn Testimony of Rafael Alunan, Undersecretary, Department of Tourism, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.

(320) Ibid.

(321) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.

(322) Exh. “L-Makati”, Report to CSAFP on the Negotiations with AM-SFP Rebel Forces in Makati, submitted by BGen Arturo Enrile, dated 16 December 1989; Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(323) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.

(324) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(325) Ibid.

(326) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.

(327) Sworn Testimony of BGen Cabanlig, op. cit.

(328) Exh. “LLLLLL-6-A”- Commission, Amended List of Red Alert Status Declarations of the Philippine Marines Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio for the period 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989, submitted by Lt Col Armenio Cristal, Jr. AC of S, G3, dated 5 September 1990.

(329) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.

(330) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jonathan Martir, Deputy Operations Officer, PM, given before the FFC on 19 April 1990.

(331) Ibid.

(332) Ibid.

(333) Ibid.

(334) Ibid.

(335) Ibid.

(336) Exh. “D”- Commission, op. cit.

(337) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.

(338) Ibid.

(339) Martir Testimony, op. cit.

(340) Ibid.

(341) Exh. “DD-V Luna”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni 3CT Felipe Bernabe PN (M), dated 7December 1989.

(342) Exh. “48-Marines”, Sworn Statement of 3CT Gilbert Alejandro, dated 7 December 1989; Exh. “61-Marines”, Sworn Statement of 3CT Arsenio Rivera, dated 8 December 1989.

(343) Exh. “61-Marines”, op. cit.

(344) Exh. “81-Marines”, Sworn Statement of Pfc Danny Palaruan, dated 9 December 1989.

(345) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(346) Exh. “NN-V Luna”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Alibundin S. Maing PN (M), dated 16 December 1989.

(347) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.

(348) Sworn Testimony of Col Romeo Daranchang, Chief of Staff, Philippine Marines, given before the FFC on 26 February 1990.

(349) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.

(350) Exh. “D”- Commission, op. cit.

(351) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.

(352) Exh. “D”- Commission, op. cit.

(353) Exh. “A-6-B-de Leon”, Chronology of Events at the Headquarters of the PAF, submitted by MGen Jose de Leon, CGPAF, dated 7 December 1989.

(354) Exh. “A-26-NCRDC”, After-Operations Report, submitted by BGen Rogelio Estacio to CG, NCRDC, dated 15 December 1989.

(355) Exh. “A-6-de Leon”, op. cit.

(356) Exh. “A-26-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(357) Exh. “C-Tarrazona”, Special Report on the December 1989 Coup Attempt, submitted by Col Felipe Abando, Jr, Wing Commander, 100th Training Wing, PAF, Fernando Air Base, to the Commanding General, PAF, dated 7 December 1989, photocopy.

(358) Exh. “A-6-BGen de Leon”, Narrative Report of PAF Activities During the Failed Coup, submitted by MGen Jose de Leon, Jr, dated 22 December 1989.

(359) Time ranged from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight.

(360) Sworn Testimony of BGen Loven Abadia, Wing Commander, 205th Helicopter Wing, given before the FFC on 3 August 1990.

(361) Exh. “A-1-Ligot”, op. cit.

(362) Sworn Statement of TSgt Armando Padilla, given before the FFC on 30 December 1989.

(363) Exh. “A-6-de Leon”, op. cit.

(364) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(365) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rogelio Estacio, CG PAFSECOM, given before the FFC on 7 August 1990.

(366) Exh. “A-de la Torre”, Narrative Report Re: Attempted Coup d’Etat, submitted by Maj Julius de la Torre, Squadron Commander, 529th Special Operations Squadron, 520 ABW, dated 7 December 1989.

(367) Ibid.

(368) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(369) Exh. “A-de la Torre”, op. cit.

(370) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(371) Exh. “A-de la Torre”, op. cit.

(372) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(373) Exh. “A-6-de Leon”, op. cit.

(374) Ibid.

(375) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(376) Exh. “A-6-de Leon”, op. cit.

(377) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(378) Exh. “M-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay niSgt Benjamin T. Taton, dated 16 December 1989.

(379) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(380) Ibid.

(381) This captain was later identified as Capt Dante Grafil.

(382) Exh. “A-Maceda”, Sworn Statement of Capt Jose Z. Maceda, dated 14 December 1989.

(383) Exh. “A-6-B-de Leon”, op. cit.

(384) Ibid.

(385) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(386) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(387) Exh. “A-6-B-de Leon”, op. cit

(388) Exh. “A-15-NCRDC”.

(389) Exh. “A-6-B-de Leon”, op. cit.

(390) Ibid.

(391) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(392) Sworn Statement of Lt Lopito Gonzales, Aide-de-camp of Col Ileto, given before the FFC on 29 June 1990.

(393) Exh. “A-de la Torre”, op. cit.

(394) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(395) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(396) Ibid.

(397) Sworn Testimony of Col Roberto Sabularse, EX-O, Office of Air Comptroller, VAB, given before the FFC on 27 February 1990.

(398) Exh. “A-2-Bulos”, Affidavit of Col Roberto Sabularse, EX-O, Office of Air Comptroller, VAB, dated 28 December 1989.

(399) Exh. “A-6-B-de Leon”, op. cit.

(400) Ibid.

(401) Ibid.

(402) Ibid.

(403) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.

(404) Exh. “11-Marines”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Rolando Ridao, dated 11 December 1989.

(405) Exh. “32-Marines”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Cpl Danilo O. Bernaid, dated 19 December 1989.

(406) Exh. “M-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(407) Sworn Statement of TSpt Padilla, op. cit.: Exh. “3-Marines”. Sworn Statement of 3CT Nelson Marino, dated 4 December 1989.

(408) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(409) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(410) Exh. “I-V Luna”, Affidavit of Pfc Victorio V. Botulan, dated 7 January 1990.

(411) Exh. “A-6-de Leon”, op. cit.

(412) Ibid.

(413) Ibid.

(414) Exh. “A-de la Torre”, op. cit.

(415) Exh. “A-OCS”, Operations Report on December 1989 Coup, submitted by BGen Pedro Juachon, dated 11 January 1990.

(416) Exh. “D-DND”, Third Progress Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee, submitted by Leonardo A. Quisumbing, dated 15 January 1990.

(417) Exh. “A-Raquion”, Sworn Statement given by P/Lt Romeo Raquion before the FFC, dated 20 August 1990.

(418) Rodolfo Morit, Jr is one of the incorporators of the GCFI. Job Gavino, an official of the Philippine Ports Authority, is reportedly also one of the incorporators. The latter is known to have contributed P1,000 for hospitalization expenses of one Guardian prison guard named Nicolas who got injured while trying to foil an escape attempt of some prisoners for the New Bilibid Prisons. See Sworn Testimony of Meliton Goyena, Director, Bureau of Corrections, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.

(419) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.

(420) Sworn Testimony of Manuel Garces, Jr, Prison Guard, Bureau of Corrections, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.

(421) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.

(422) Exh. “F-13-DND”, op. cit.

(423) Ibid.

(424) Exh. “121-LOGCOM”, Sworn Statement of PO3 Dante B. Cruz, dated 15 December 1989.

(425) Exh. “C-4-Dumlao”, Letter of BGen Pantaleon Dumlao to the Secretary of Justice, submitted by BGen Pantaleon Dumlao, Chief CIS (PC), dated 11 April 1990.

(426) Garces Testimony, op. cit.

(427) Exh. “3-Maganto”, op. cit.

(428) Exh. “A-26-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(429) Garces Testimony, op. cit.

(430) Body number F-301.

(431) Sworn Testimony of TSgt Armando Padilla, given before the FFC on 23 February 1990.

(432) Exh. “A-I-J-Montano”, op. cit.

(433) Padilla Testimony, op. cit.

(434) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(435) Rogelio Estacio Testimony, op. cit. However, the manager of DHL, Jose Feliciano, said that he was not aware of the use of the facilities by Col Bibit during the coup. See testimony of Jose Feliciano, given before the FFC on 15 August 1990.

(436) Feliciano Testimony, op. cit.

(437) Exh. “KKKKK-3”- Commission, op. cit.

(438) Exh. “A-26-NCRDC. op. cit.

(439) Exh. “A-22-NCRDC”, Report on Command Preliminary Activities from 30 November to 7 December 1989, submitted by Lt Col Jose Bandung PC, CO South Sector Command, dated 12 December 1989.

(440) Ibid.

(441) Ibid.

(442) Maganto Testimony, op. cit.

(443) Exh. “A-22-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(444) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(445) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.

(446) Garces Testimony, op. cit.

(447) Goyena Testimony, op. cit

(448) Ibid.

(449) In Re: Urging the Department of Justice to take Appropriate Administrative and/or Criminal Actions Against Prison Guards at the New Bilibid Prison who were Possibly Involved in the Attempted Coup of December 1989.

(450) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(451) Exh. “A-1-J-Montano”, op. cit.

(452) Exh. “G-Ch 2/4”, Sworn Statement of MSgt Jesus de Guzman, dated 15 December 1989.

(453) Exh. “F-Ch 2/4”, Sworn Statement of 2Lt Alfredo Javillonar PC, dated 13 December 1989.

(454) Exh. “G-Aguinaldo”, Sworn Statement of Sgt Augusto Borbe PA, dated 27 December 1989.

(455) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(456) Exh. “A-de la Cruz”, op. cit.

(457) Ibid.

(458) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, After-Operations Report of Security Battalion, NCRDC, (as Annex “CC” of BGen Rodolfo Biazon’s Report), dated 1 January 1990.

(459) Ibid.

(460) Ibid.

(461) Exh. “F-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(462) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(463) Exh. “F-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(464) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(465) Exh. “F-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(466) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(467) Exh. “O-CH 2/4”, op. cit.

(468) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(469) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(470) Exh. “W-Ch 2/4”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Arturo Bilbao, Housekeeper/Janitor of PTV-4, dated 14 December 1989.

(471) Exh.”A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(472) Exh. “A-15-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(473) Exh. “KK-V Luna”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Mario Cabigin PN (M), dated 19 December 1989.

(474) Exh. “E-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Nolasco Aloquina, dated 26 December 1989; Exh. “K-Aguinaldo”, Affidavit of Sgt Pecilo Dancalan PN (M), dated 20 December 1989.

(475) Exh. “S-V Luna”, Affidavit of Pfc Adelaido Tironez, dated 3 January 1990.

(476) Exh. “B-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(477) Exh. “L-V Luna”, Affidavit of Cpl Ruben C. Rivera, dated 2 January 1990.

(478) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(479) Exh. “KK-V Luna”, op. cit.

(480) Exh. “I-1-Isleta”, “Unit Situation Assessment in the Aftermath of the Failed Coup, submitted by BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander, 15th Strike Wing, Sangley, Cavite, to CG PAF, dated 9 December 1989.

(481) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(482) Annex “A” of Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, After-Operations Report of Security Battalion, NCRDC, submitted by Capt Alfredo Javillonar, OIC Security Platoon, Channels 2 and 4, dated 5 December 1990.

(483) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(484) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(485) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(486) Exh. “A-27-de la Peña”, op. cit.

(487) Ibid.

(488) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(489) Exh.”B-Fontanilla”,Sworn Statement of Capt Orlando Fontanilla, dated 4 January 1990.

(490) Sworn Testimony of Capt Orlando Fontanilla, PVSEA, given before the FFC on 14 May 1990.

(491) Ibid.

(492) Exh. “C-1-Fontanilla”, p. 2 of Capt Orlando Fontanilla’s Sworn Statement in Filipino, dated 13 December 1989.

(493) Exh. “B-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(494) Exh. “9-Marines”, Sworn Statements of Philippine Marine personnel involved in December 198.9 Coup Attempt, dated 19 December 1989.

(495) Exh. “A-30-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(496) Exh. “H-Ch 2/4”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni TSgt Ramon P. Mendoza PAF, dated 13 December 1989.

(497) Exh. “F-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(498) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(499) Ibid.

(500) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(501) Exh. “O-VP Laurel”, op. cit.

(502) Exh. “KK-V Luna”, op. cit.

(503) Sworn Testimony of Col Edgardo Batenga, CO 701 IBde, VAB, given before the FFC on 25 January 1990.

(504) Exh. “A-Salac”, op. cit.

(505) Ibid.

(506) Sworn Testimony of Maj Nardito Yoro PC, Chief FEU, given before the FFC on 1 June 1990.

(507) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(508) Ibid.

(509) Ibid.

(510) Sworn Testimony of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig PN, Former Deputy Commander, AFP LOGCOM, given before the FFC on 12 March 1990.

(511) Exh. “A-Aguinaldo”, Evaluation of the Evidence of the Camp Aguinaldo/White Plains Incident during the Last Failed Coup in December 1989, submitted by Capt Nilo Villarte, dated 3 January 1990.

(512) Exh. T-Aguinaldo”, Sworn Statement of Pfc Marcelino Peralta, dated 20 December 1989.

(513) Exh. “N-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Macario B. Mabazza, dated 27 December 1989.

(514) Sworn Testimony of Commo Virgilio Marcelo, Commander, HQS and HQS Service Group, AFP, given before the FFC on 5 May 1990.

(515) Exh. BA- 14-NCRDC”, op. cit.; Cardones Testimony, op. cit.

(516) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.

(517) Biazon Testimony, op. cit.

(518) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.

(519) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(520) Exh. “B-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Domingo M. Cuenco, dated 26 December 1989.

(521) Exh. “H-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Benjamin B. Asuncion, dated 26 December 1989.

(522) Ibid.

(523) Exh. “E-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(524) Exh. “H-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(525) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(526) Ibid.

(527) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oscar Florendo, CO, Civil Relations Service, AFP, given before the FFC on 15 February 1990.

(528) Exh. “N-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(529) Exh. “M-V Luna”, Affidavit of SN1 Danilo Tolentino, dated 4 January 1990.

(530) Exh. “E-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(531) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(532) Ibid.

(533) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(534) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.; Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(535) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(536) Exh. “A-20-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(537) Exh. “22-LOGCOM”, Sworn Statement by Maj Nelson Albano, given at AFP Logistics Training Command, dated 15 December 1989.

(538) Exh. “6-LOGCOM”, Affidavit by BGen Javier Carbonnel and Col Jovencio Mendoza, given before Col Manuel Mariano at Camp Aguinaldo, dated 3 December 1989.

(539) Sworn Testimony of Col Manuel Mariano, Commander, AFP LOGCOM, Camp Aguinaldo, given before the FFC on 28 May 1990.

(540) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.; Exh. “6-LOGCOM”, op. cit.

(541) Exh. “188-LOGCOM”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Antonio Cabigting, dated 19 December 1989.

(542) Exh. “34-LOGCOM.” op. cit.

(543) Ibid.

(544) Exh. “A-18-NCRDC”, After-Operations Report of the 701 IBde, submitted by Col Edgardo Batenga, dated 5 January 1990.

(545) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(546) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.; Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, CO 72 IB, given before the FFC on 22 December 1989; Lisandro Abadia Testimony, op. cit.

(547) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.

(548) Ibid.

(549) Exh. “13-LOGCOM”, Sworn Statement of Ramon Palad, dated 9 December 1989.

(550) Exh. “34-LOGCOM”, op. cit; Exh. “A-1-Ison”, op. cit.

(551) Affidavit of Maj Nelson Albano, dated 15 December 1989.

(552) Exh. “5-LOGCOM”, op. cit.

(553) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, After-Battle Report, submitted by BGen Cesar Abella, dated 16 December 1989.

(554) Exh. “A-19-NCRDC”, After-Operation Report Re: Counter-Coup Operation, submitted by Col Clemente Mariano, dated 22 December 1989.

(555) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(556) Exh. “DD-V Luna”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni 3CT Felipe Bernabe, dated 8 January 1990.

(557) Exh. “I-Aguinaldo”, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt B. Orena, dated 20 December 1989.

(558) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(559) Ibid.

(560) Exh. “A-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.

(561) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(562) Ibid.

(563) Ibid.

(564) Ibid.

(565) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC, op. cit.

(566) Exh. “N-Aguinaldo”, op. cit.; Exh. “V-Aguinaldo”, Affidavit of 3CT Ernesto Cancheta, dated 20 December 1989.

(567) These V-150s are the same ones which came from VAB; Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(568) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(569) Ibid.

(570) Ibid.

(571) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(572) Sworn Testimony of Col Thelmo Cunanan, CO 202 Bde, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.

(573) Exh. “NN-V Luna”, op. cit.

(574) Exh. “A-Padilla”, Sworn Statement of TSgt Armando Padilla, dated 30 December 1989.

(575) Exh. “Q-Aguinaldo”, Affidavit of Pfc Donato C. Ildefonso PN, dated 20 December 1989.

(576) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(577) Exh. “SSSSS”-Commission, op. cit.

(578) Exh. “A-20-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(579) Ibid.

(580) Exh. “W-Aguinaldo”, Sworn Statement of 3CT Romeo R. Recosana, dated 20 December 1989, at the AFP Medical Center.

(581) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(582) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(583) Exh. “A-20-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(584) Exh. “G-V Luna”, Joint Affidavit of Sgt Castor Wagan, Sgt Victor Flores, et al, dated 2 January 1990.

(585) Exh. “KK-V Luna”, op. cit.

(586) Exh. “B-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(587) Exh. “C-V Luna”, Sworn Statement of MSgt Jaime Ranopa, given at the AFP Medical Center, dated 4 December 1989.

(588) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(589) Exh. “A-19-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(590) Ibid.

(591) Exh. “B-Ch 2/4”, op. cit.

(592) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(593) Daranchang Testimony, op. cit.

(594) Exh. “B-5-Cardones”, op. cit.

(595) Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(596) Ibid.

(597) Sworn Testimony of BGen Marcelo Blando PA, former CG 7 ID, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija given before the FFC on 5 March 1990.

(598) Dado Testimony, op. cit.

(599) Exh. “B-1-BGen Villanueva”, Special Report on Coup Attempt Participated in by 7 ID PA, dated 4 December 1989.

(600) Ibid.

(601) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oswaldo Villanueva, CG 6 ID, given before the FFC on 21 May 1990.

(602) Ibid.

(603) Ibid.

(604) Exh. “D-DND”, op. cit.

(605) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(606) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit., the result of the investigation is not known.

(607) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(608) Exh. “A-Lagman”, Sworn Statement of Col Ferdinand Lagman, dated 14 February 1990.

(609) OPLAN Regal was the setting up of roadblocks along the major roads in Nueva Ecija to check the movement of rebel troops. See Sworn Testimony of Col Ferdinand Lagman, PC, Provincial Commander, Nueva Ecija given before the FFC on 15 March 1990.

(610) Lagman Testimony, op. cit.

(611) Ibid.

(612) Exh. “A-Undan”, op. cit.

(613) Sworn Testimony of Col Alejandro Trespeces, Jr, former Chief of Staff, 7 ID, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, now CO, Task Force Reserve Service, Q-46, Fort Bonifacio, given before the FFC dated 14 March 1990.

(614) Exh. “A-15 NCRDC”, op. cit.

(615) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit

(616) Exh. “A-15-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(617) Ibid.

(618) Sworn Testimony of Capt Herbert Avinante, former Deputy Commander of Scout Ranger Training Center, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, given before the FFC on 21 March 1990.

(619) Blando Testimony, op. cit.

(620) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.

(621) Sworn Testimony of Maj Pedro Gutierrez, Chief, Research and Special Studies Branch, G7 Division, PA, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990.

(622) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, op. cit.

(623) Ibid.

(624) Exh. “A-Undan”, op. cit.

(625) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, op. cit.

(626) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit. He said that the rumor came from his neighbor Maj Ricardo Brillantes, assigned at the Jl GHQ.

(627) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit.

(628) Sworn Statement of Capt Richard Parcon, AUH-76 Pilot assigned at 20th ACS station, 15 Strike Wing, Sangley Air Base, dated 18 December 1989.

(629) Ibid.

(630) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit.

(631) Exh. “A-Trespeces”, Affidavit of Col Alejandro Trespeces, CO, Task Force Reserve Service, dated 15 January 1990.

(632) Ibid.

(633) Ibid.

(634) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, op. cit; Exh. “A-Trespeces”, op. cit.; Sworn Testimony of BGen Orlando Antonio, COMNOLCOM, given, before the ETC on 2 February 1990; Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(635) Exh. “A-Gutierrez”, op. cit.

(636) Exh. “A-Lagman”, op. cit.

(637) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.

(638) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.

(639) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.

(640) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.

(641) Blando Testimony, op. cit.

(642) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.

(643) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.

(644) Blando Testimony, op. cit.

(645) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.

(646) Quote from a sworn statement submitted by Lt Col Erasmo during his testimony before the FFC (see Erasmo Testimony op. cit.).

(647) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.

(648) Ibid.

(649) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(650) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.

(651) Exh. “A-17-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(652) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.

(653) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.

(654) Dejarme Testimony, op. cit.

(655) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(656) Exh. “B-1-Gen Villanueva”, op. cit.

(657) Ibid.

(658) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(659) Exh. “B-1-Cardones”, op. cit.

(660) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.

(661) Exh. “A-Gordula”, Sworn Statement of Capt Lauro Gordula dated 15 December 1989.

(662) Exh. “A-Undan”, op. cit.

(663) Sworn Testimony of Lt Jose Rene Jarque, 4SRB, given before the FFC on 22 March 1990.

(664) Ibid.

(665) Jose Rene Jarque Testimony, op. cit.

(666) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.

(667) Exh. “B-1-Cardones”, op. cit.

(668) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.

(6fi9) Undan Testimony, op. cit.

(670) Ibid.

(671) Exh. “B-10-Cardones”, Special Report, to CG PA submitted by BGen Manuel Dizon, dated 20 December 1989.

(673) Jose Rene Jarque Testimony, op. cit.

(674) Ibid.

(675) Ibid.

(676) Ibid.

(677) Ibid.

(678) Exh. “A-Undan”, op. cit.

(679) Exh. “B-10-Cardones”, op. cit.

(680) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.

(681) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Provincial Commander PC/INP, San Fernando, Pampanga, given before the FFC on 17 February 1990.

(682) Ibid.

(683) Ibid.

(684) Lagman Testimony, op. cit.

(685) Efren Fernandez Testimony, op. cit.

(686) Ibid.

(687) Exh. “A-Trespeces”, op. cit.

(688) Exh. “A-Montano”, op. cit.

(689) Exh. “C-BGen Villanueva”, Affidavit of Col Oswaldo Villanueva, dated 30 March 1990.

(690) Exh. “D-Trespeces”, Report of Lt Col Dumag submitted by Col Alejandro Trespeces, dated 9 December 1989.

(691) Exh. ” A-Trespeces”, op. cit.

(692) Ibid.

(693) Exh. “A-Undan”, op. cit.

(694) Exh. “A-27-Dir De la Peña”, op. cit.

(695) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.

(696) Exh. “A-27-Dir De la Peña”, op. cit.

(697) Ibid.

(698) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.

(699) Exh. “I-1-Isleta”, op. cit.; Exh. “GGGG”- Commission, Intelligence Report submitted by the Director for Intelligence, 15 Strike Wing, PAF, dated 14 December 1989; Exh. “A-Sangley”, Narrative Report of the Failed Coup submitted by Commo Proceso Fernandez, dated 11 December 1989.

(700) Exh. “V-Sangley”, Letter Re: Suspected Leaders, submitted by Amado D. Espino, dated 14 December 1989.

(701) Sworn Testimony of 2Lt Siegfred Mison, given before the FFC on 16 March 1990.

(702) Ibid.

(703) Exh. “A-Trespeces”, op. cit.

(704) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Ramsey Ocampo, PC Provincial Commander of Bataan, given before the FFC on 16 April 1990.

(705) Ibid.

(706) Ibid.

(707) Ibid.

(708) Ibid.

(709) Ibid.

(710) Ibid.

(711) Ibid.

(712) Blando Testimony, op. cit.

(713) Ocampo Testimony, op. cit.

(714) Ibid.

(715) Ibid.

(716) Ibid.

(717) Ibid.

(718) Exh. “H-Rufino Tiangco”, a copy of the telegram sent by the FFC to the Station Commander of the INP of Puerto Princesa, dated 13 August 1990; Exh. “H-1- Rufino Tiangco”, Puerto-Princesa City Treasurer’s telegram received by the FFC on’20 August 1990; Exh. “I-Rufino Tiangco”, the telegram of the Station Commander which was received by the FFC on 25 August 1990; Exh. “M-Rufino Tiangco”, reply telegram sent by the Election Registrar to the FFC.

(719) Exh. “I-Rufino Tiangco”, op. cit.

(720) Sworn Testimony of Capt Pepito Dalivenancio, Ship Captain, M/V Lady Vi-T-1, given before the FFC on 16 August 1990.

(721) Ibid.

(722) Exh. “132-LOGCOM”, Sinumpaang Salaysay of Capt Jacinto Sanga, dated 11 December 1987.

(723) Ibid.

(724) Exh. “A-Sangley”, op. cit.

(725) Sworn Testimony of LCdr FredTuvilla PN, Phil Marines Brigade, given before the FFC on 18 June 1990.

(726) Sworn Testimony of BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander, 15th Strike Wing, Sangley, Cavite, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.

(727) Affidavit of Capt Artemio Orozco, dated 6 December 1989.

(728) Exh. “A-14-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(729) Exh. “GGGG’-Commission. op. cit.

(730) Exh. “I-Isleta”, op. cit.

(731) Exh. “GGGG”-Commission, op. cit.

(732) Exh. “I-1-Isleta”, op. cit.

(733) Exh. “A-Sangley”, op. cit.

(734) Ibid.

(735) Sworn Testimony of LCdr Damian Carlos, Commander, Naval Intelligence Security Group II, given before the FFC on 27 March 1990.

(736) Sworn Testimony of Commo Antonio Empedrad, Commander, Naval District II, given before the FFC on 26 March 1990.

(737) Sworn Testimony of Capt Romeo Meana, Deputy Commander, Naval District II and Commander, Task Force 21, given before the FFC on 4 April 1990.

(738) Sworn Testimony of Commo Proceso Fernandez, Philippine Fleet Commander, given before the FFC on 14 February 1990.

(739) Exh. “A-Sangley”, op. cit.

(740) Sworn Statement of Col Arsenio Tecson, former CO, 68 IB, PA,

given before the FFC, dated 1 March 1990; Exh. “1-Sangley”, Sinumpaang Salaysay of Manolito Caquitta, dated 19 December 1989.

(741) Isleta Testimony, op. cit.

(742) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jesus Durian, Base Commander, Cavite Naval Base, given before the FFC on 8 March 1990.

(743) Exh. “AA-Sangley”, Sworn Statement of Lt Fernando C. Romero dated 8 December 1989.

(744) Exh. “A-28 NCRDC”, After-Operations Report of Task Group RECOM IV (Annex “AA” of Exh. “A-1-NCRDC”).

(745) Exh. “11-Isleta”, op. cit.

(746) Exh. “V-Sangley”, op. cit.

(747) Exh. “A-Sangley”, op. cit.

(748) Dalivenancio Testimony, op. cit.

(749) Ibid.

(750) Sworn Testimony of Rufino Tiangco, given before the FFC on 10 August 1990.

(751) Exh. “B-1-B-Rufino Tiangco”, copy of pp. 381-382 of the police blotter where entry on alleged hijacking appears it was reported on 4 December 1989.

(752) Tiangco Testimony, op. cit.

(753) Tiangco Testimony, op. cit., Sighting of Don Honasan, Fat Puzon and Rico Puno at the PPSA c/o video by a CIS operative.

(754) This is the 68 IB and the 42 IB forces led by Lt Col Arsenio Tecson and Maj Alfredo Oliveros.

(755) Affidavit of P/Col Ernesto L. Diokno, op. cit.

(756) Exh. “B-Sec Azcuna”, Statement No. 1 of the series of statements of President Corazon Aquino issued at 7:40 a.m. of 1 December 1989.

(757) Ibid.

(758) Exh. “C-Malacañang”, Sworn Statement of Capt Rolando D. Medrano, PAF, dated 27 December 1989.

(759) Exh. “C-2-Lucas”, Resolution of the Department of Justice against LCdr Lucas for the December 1989 coup.

(760) Exh. “A-Malacañang”, Affidavit of Col Voltaire T Gazmin PA, dated 19 December 1989.

(761) Ibid.

(762) Exh. “C-Sec Azcuna”, Statement No. 2 of President Corazon C. Aquino issued at 7:40 a.m. of 1 December 1989.

(763) Exh. “A-5-Aguirre”, After-Battle Report of the Western Sector Command submitted by Maj Ricardo Quinto PC, Sector Commander, dated 12 December 1989.

(764) Exh. “B-Malacañang”, Affidavit of Maj Agustin Dermaala, dated 15 December 1989.

(765) Exh. “H-Malacañang”, Sworn Statement of Lt Wilbur Naldo, dated 20 December 1989.

(766) Exh. “B-Malacañang”, op. cit.

(767) Exh. “A-Malacañang”, op. cit.

(768) Ibid.

(769) Exh. “B-Malacañang”, op. cit.

(770) Sworn Statement of P/Col Ernesto L. Diokno, op. cit.

(771) Ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, PMA ’72, was the classmate of ex-Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo.Maj Crisolito Balaoing and Capt Rodolfo Tor.

(772) Exh. “C-1-Salialam”, op. cit.

(773) Sworn Testimony of Fiscal Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor, Baguio City, given before the FFC on 5 May 1990.

(774) Sworn Testimony of Eito Ikeuchi, Martial Arts Instructor, PMA, Fort del Pilar, Baguio City, given before the FFC on 17 April 1990.

(775) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.

(776) Exh. “B-Garrido” Special Report of Commo Pio H. Garrido, Commandant of Philippine Coast Guard, dated 13 December 1989.

(777) Exh. “C-2-Mison”, Memorandum Re: Staff Duty Officer’s Spot Report of Entry of Rebel Troops at South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, from Capt Esmeraldo Saplala to the Commissioner of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.

(778) Sworn Testimony of Sgt Rodolfo Mendez, given before the FFC on 31 May 1990.

(779) Exh. “E-Sagsago”, Sworn Statement by Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor, Baguio City, dated 9 May 1990.

(780) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.

(781) Mendez Testimony, op. cit.

(782) “Morit”, or Rodolfo Morit, Jr is the person alleged to have organized the Guardians at the Bureau of Corrections. See Garces Testimony, op. cit.

(783) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.

(784) Mendez Testimony, op. cit.

(785) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.

(786) Ibid.

(787) Ibid.

(788) Exh. “C-2-Mison”, op. cit.

(789) Ibid.

(790) Exh. “E-Salialam”, op. cit.

(791) Exh. “A-Mison”, Letter of Commissioner Salvador Mison to President Corazon Aquino reporting the incident on 1 December 1989 at the Bureau of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.

(792) Exh. “A-27-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(793) Exh. “A-Mison”, op. cit.

(794) Exh. “C-Crisol”, Letter of Capt Rafael Crisol, dated 4 December 1989, photocopy.

(795) F,xh. “A-27-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(796) Exh. “A-NICOM”, After-Coup d’Etat Report by BGen Raymundo Jarque, Negros Island Command, VISCOM, dated 16 December 1989; Affidavit of Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Provincial Commander, Iloilo PC/INP, dated 14 December 1989.

(797) Exh. “B-3-Garrido”, Annex “3” of Special Report of Pio Garrido, Commandant, Philippine Coastguard, dated 19 March 1990; Exh. “A-27-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(798) Sworn Testimony of P/Capt Job Gavino, Customs Police, PPA, North Harbor, Manila, given before the FFC on 31 May 1990.

(799) P/Capt Job Gavino organized the Guardian PPA Chapter in June 1986, after joining the Guardian Centre Foundation in January 1986. He was recruited by his brother, Sgt Allan Gavino, BGen Templo’s driver. P/Capt Gavino identified Maj Pimentel as a member of Guardian-Luzon by his mark on the left hand between the thumb and the pointer. See Gavino Testimony, op. cit.

(800) Exh. “E-Salialam”, Resolution in the case of “Philippine Ports Authority vs Job Gavino, et al,” I.S. No DOJ-SC-90-007, dated 7 March 1990, photocopy.

(801) Gavino Testimnoy, op. cit.

(802) Exh. “C-1-Salialam”, op. cit.

(803) Exh. “C-Crisol”, op. cit.

(804) Exh. “B-3-Garrido”, op. cit.; Exh. “A-27-NCRDC”, op. cit.

(805) Gavino Testimony, op. cit.

(806) Exh. “E-Salialam”, op. cit.

(807) Gavino Testimony, op. cit.

(808) Exh. “B-3-Garrido”, op. cit.

(809) Exh. “B-Garrido”, op. cit.

(810) Exh. “C-1-Mison”, Re: Sequence of Events and Courses of Action Taken during the period 1-2 December 1989, from Lt Col Virgilio M. Danao, Acting Chief, Customs Police Division, to Commissioner of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.

(811) Ibid.

(812) Exh. “C-1-Mison”, op. cit.

(813) Ibid.

(814) Ibid.

(815) Ibid.

(816) Exh. “B-Garrido”, op. cit.

(817) Exh. “C-1-Mison”, op. cit.

(818) Exh. “B-Garrido”, op. cit.

(819) Ibid.

(820) Sworn Statement of Diokno, op. cit.

(821) Exh. “C-1-Mison”, op. cit.

(822) Exh. “A-Mison”, op. cit.

(823) Sworn Statements of Lts Eliseo Rasco, Herminio Cantaco & Jonas Calleja, given before the FFC on 21 March 1990.

(824) Sworn Statement of Maj Rosalio D. Magsino.

(825) Exh. “NNN”-Commission, Report of FFC Special Counsels Gubaton and ByasaRe: Interviews Conducted With Witnesses Concerning Legaspi City and Sorsogon Incidents, dated 15 March 1990.

(826) Sworn Statement of Col Ernesto Maristela, dated 9 December 1989.

(827) Ibid.

(828) Sworn Testimony of BGen Marino Filart, Regional Commander, RECOM 5, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990.

(829) Ibid.

(830) Exh. BA-Filart”, After-Operations/Activity Report by Gen Marino Filart, Regional Commander, RECOM 5, dated 8 December 1989.

(831) Exh. “NNN”-Commission, op. cit.

(832) Exh. “A-Filart”, op. cit.

(833) Filart Testimony, op. cit.

(834) Ibid.

(835) Ibid.

(836) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(837) Exh. “LLL-3”- Commission, Sworn Statement of Lt Col Diosdado Docdocil, dated 3 April 1990.

(838) Exh. “R-Mactan”, Sworn Statement of TSgt Ramon Famolera, dated 4 January 1990.

(839) Sworn Statement of Cpl Elmer Barrientos, dated 5 January 1990.

(840) Sworn Statement of TSgt Normito Pacaldo, dated 4 January 1990.

(841) Ibid.

(842) Sworn Statement of 2Lt Rodolfo de la Torre, dated 18 December 1989.

(843) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(844) Ibid.

(845) Sworn Statement of Col Filamer Artajo, dated 5 January 1990.

(846) Sworn Statement of MGen Jose L. de Leon, dated 10 January 1990.

(847) Sworn Statement of Artajo, op. cit.

(848) Sworn Statement of PO1 Restituto Baring, dated 4 January 1990.

(849) Sworn Statements of Ceferino Lopez & Norvie Craus.

(850) Exh. “C-Lood”, Sworn Statement of Lt Col Romeo Lood, Assistant Chief, Division Staff for Operations, 2nd Air Division, Mactan Air Base, dated 20 December 1989.

(851) Sworn Testimony of Maj Rolando Irizari, CO, 347 PC Coy, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.

(852) Sworn Statement of AM Dominino Recla, dated 1 June 1990; Exh. “A-Tabanas”, Sworn Statement of AM Efren Tabanas, dated 1 June 1990.

(853) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Antonio Anciano, Squadron Commander, 208 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, given before the FFC on 30 March 1990.

(854) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(855) Anciano Testimony, op. cit.

(856) Sworn Statement of Lood, op. cit.

(857) Exh. “FFF”- Commission, Sworn Statement of Sgt Emerson Gallos, dated 21 December 1989.

(858) Irizari Testimony, op. cit.

(859) Sworn Statement of Gallos, op. cit.

(860) Irizarri Testimony, op. cit.

(861) Sworn Statements of Sgt Cecilio Ursal, MSgt Virgilio Gongora and BGen Raul Imperial, dated 17 December 1989.

(862) Sworn Statement of Pacaldo, op. cit.

(863) Anciano Testimony, op. cit.

(864) Sworn Testimony of Cerge Remonde, Manager of Radio station DYLA in Cebu City, taken at RECOM 7, Camp Osmefla, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 21 February 1990.

(865) Exh. “J-Mactan”, Report on Mactan Air Base Crisis, submitted by the Office of the AC of S AC2 at Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu, to COMVISCOM, dated 12 December 1989.

(866) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(867) Sworn Statement of BGen Cesar L. Go, Wing Commander of the 220th, Air Lift Wing, dated 19 January 1990.

(868) Exh. “H-Mactan”, After-Operations Report submitted by Lt Col Ernesto Lumaug.Jr, Group Commander, Military Intelligence Group 7, ISAFP to COMVISCOM, dated 13 December 1989.

(869) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.; Exh. “C-Mactan”, op. cit.

(870) Affidavit of Alfredo Ouano, Mayor of Mandaue City, dated 26 December 1989.

(871) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(872) Exh. “H-Mactan”, op. cit.

(873) Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Gov Emilio Osmeña, dated 22 January 1990.

(874) Sworn Statement of Sgt Francisco Balondo, dated 20 December 1989.

(875) Exh. MA-Mactan”, op. cit.

(876) Sworn Testimony of BGen Raul Imperial, Regional Commander, Regional Director, INP RECOM 7, Camp Osmeña, given before the FFC on 18 April 1990.

(877) Exh. “H-Mactan”, op. cit.

(878) Ibid.

(879) Exh. “A-Mactan”, op. cit.

(880) Exh. “A-NICOM”, op. cit.

(881) Exh. “A-NICOM”, ojuat; Affidavit of Lt Col Wilfredo B. Alejada; Affidavit of Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Provincial Commander, Iloilo PC/INP, dated 14 December 1989.

(882) Affidavit of Coronel, op. cit.

(883) Sworn Statement of Antonio Suatengco, Mayor of the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, dated 25 April 1990.

(884) Sworn Statement of Capt Rolando Lopez, given at the NBI Regional Office, Iloilo City, dated 23 April 1990.

(885) Sworn Testimony of Col Hector M. Tarrazona, Director for Operations, 100th Training Wing, given before the FFC on 12 March 1990.

(886) Ibid.

(887) Exh. “C-Tarrazona”, Special Report on the 1 December 1989 Coup Attempt submitted by Col Felipe R. Abano, Jr to the Commanding General, PAF, dated 7 December 1989.

(888) Tarrazona, op. cit.

(889) Ibid.

(890) Exh. “B-Baccay”, Sworn Statement of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, dated 26 February 1990; Sworn Testimony of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, Regional Commander, PC/INP RECOM 11, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.

(891) Exh. “C-Baccay”, Memorandum from Lt Col Manolo Gorospe to the FFC Chairman, dated 21 May 1990.

(892) Exh. “A-Viduya”, Sworn Statement of Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, dated 23 February 1990.

(893) Sworn Statement of Capt Gregory Ramos, dated 12 March 1990; Sworn Testimony of Capt Gregory Ramos, CO, “A” Coy, 2 LABde PALAR, given before the FFC on 27 March 1990.

(894) Affidavit of Col Danilo Olay, dated 18 December 1989; After-Battle Report, submitted by BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, Regional Commander, PC/INP RECOM 11, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, dated 9 December 1989.

(895) Exh. “LLLLL”- Commission, Report of the Flag-Officer-in-Command, Rear Admiral Carlito Y. Cunanan PN, dated 6 February 1990.

(896) Affidavit of Lt Anito A. Alfajardo, dated 21 February 1990.

(897) Exh. “A-Villanueva”, Summary Report of Lt Col Manuel O. de Leon, Chairman Investigation Team, 4 IB, PA, dated 23 February 1990.

(898) Affidavit of Alfajardo, op. cit.

(899) Ibid.

(900) Affidavit of Lt Arnulfo Matanguihan, dated 13 February 1990.

(901) Affidavit of Maj William V. Dormitorio, dated 5 February 1990.

(902) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rogelio Villanueva, Commander, 4 ID, given before the FFC on 26 February 1990.

(903) Affidavit of Dormitorio, op. cit.

(904) Joint Affidavits of Lt Amador T. Tabuga and Lt Rene V. Ferenal, dated 12 February 1990; Joint Affidavits of Lt Macatoon M. Bobong and 2Lt Manolo M. Samarita, dated 10 February 1990.

(905) Affidavit of Santiago P. Pascual, dated 27 January 1990.

(906) Affidavit of Capt Ernesto S. Monteros, dated 27 February 1990.

(907) Affidavit of Capt Ruben Clarito, dated 29 January 1990.

(908) Jarius Bondoc, “Setting Things Straight”, Daily Globe, 5 December 1989, p. 7.

(909) Rey Arquiza, “No Sanctuary for Turing and Henchmen,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, pp. 1-2.

(910) Arquiza, op. cit.